




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PLATO'S REPUBLIC
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
RICHARD GARNETT, C.B., LL.D.

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IN TWO STYLES OF BINDING, CLOTH,
FLAT BACK, COLOURED TOP, AND
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LONDON : J. M. DENT & CO.

NEW YORK : E. P. DUTTON & CO.

THE
SAGES
OF OLD
LIVE
AGAIN
IN US
GLANVILL

The REPUBLIC
OF PLATO
IN TEN BOOKS.
TRANSLATED
FROM THE
GREEK BY
H. SPENS. D.D.



LONDON: PUBLISHED
by J. M. DENT & CO
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INTRODUCTION

THE greatest authors of the world have bestowed a portion of their immortality upon legions of translators and commentators, parasite growths which, in default of such stems to cling to, would hardly have risen above the common level. It is the special distinction of Plato to have been thus ministered to by men of real genius, who, even were everything they accomplished for him effaced from the roll of their achievements, would still have left very considerable names. Passing over the Plotinus and Proclus of antiquity, and the Pletho and Ficinus of the Renaissance, we find this eminently true of those illustrious moderns, Schleiermacher, Victor Cousin, and Benjamin Jowett. If all the labours upon Plato which formed so conspicuous a part of these distinguished men's performance could be obliterated, their names would still endure; but conversely, these would be sufficiently preserved by their work on Plato had they no other title to perpetuity: and, in estimating their claims on the gratitude of posterity, their service to Plato occurs most readily to the mind. Homer and Aristotle, Dante and Shakespeare, have had more numerous disciples and apostles, but it is Plato's special glory to have attracted so many men of genius.

That service to Plato, nevertheless, is no sure passport to immortality is evinced by the complete oblivion which has overtaken the translation of Plato's *Republic*, by Dr. Harry Spens, although its priority to all other English translations, had it no other claim, should have kept it in remembrance. Published in 1763 at the Press of the University of Glasgow, by Foulis, the most eminent Scotch printer of the age, and dedicated to the Prime Minister, it appears to have attracted no notice from contemporaries, and has never been reprinted until now. The translator's own person is shrouded in almost equal obscurity. Though of sufficient consideration to fill the highest office to which a clergyman of the

Church of Scotland can be called, he did not occupy any prominent position in the public eye, and the translation of the *Republic* appears to have been his solitary publication. The few particulars to be gleaned are chiefly official, and we are indebted for them to the research most obligingly made by Mr J. Maitland Anderson, Librarian of the University of St. Andrews.

Spens, it appears, was the son of James Spens, Writer to the Signet, and was born in 1713 or 1714 at Kirkton, Alves, E'ginshire, where his father possessed a landed estate which had been in the family for generations, which he transmitted to his son. Spens was educated at King's College and the University, Aberdeen, where he graduated M.A. in 1730. He was licensed to preach in 1738, was ordained minister of Wemyss, Fifeshire, in 1744, and received the degree of D.D. from the University of Aberdeen in 1761. In 1771 he married Anne Duncan. On December 29, 1779, he was installed Professor of Divinity in St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrews, and on May 25, 1780, received the high distinction of being elected Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. He died on November 27, 1787, leaving no family.

The following specimens will admit of a comparison being made between Spens and more recent translators who have wrought by a higher standard and enjoyed greater advantages. The first examples are taken from Book III, p. 97.

The judge, friend, governs the soul by the soul ; which, if from its childhood it hath been educated with bad souls, and hath been conversant with them, and hath itself done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them so as accurately, by itself, to judge of the evils of others, as happens in the diseases of the body ; but it must, in its youth, be unexperienced and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itself, and to judge soundly of what is just. And hence the virtuous, in their youth, appear simple, and easily deceived by the unjust, as they have not within themselves dispositions similar to those of the wicked.—*Spens*.

A juror, my friend, governs mind by mind ; his mind, therefore, cannot be suffered to be reared from a tender age among vicious minds, and to associate with them, and to run the whole round of crimes in its own experience, in order to be quick in inferring the guilt of others from its own self-knowledge, as is allowable in the case of bodily disorders : on the contrary, it ought from his early youth to have been free from all experience and taint of evil habits, if it is to be qualified by its own thorough excellence to administer sound justice. And this is the reason why good men, when young, appear to be simple and easy victims to the impositions of bad men, because they have not in their own consciousness examples of like passions with the wicked.—*Davies and Vaughan.*

But with the judge it is otherwise, since he governs mind by mind ; he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from his youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness ; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment shall have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.—*Jowett.*

These translations, it will be seen, agree in substance, but Spens has gone wrong in deeming that Plato admits the possibility of the magistrate having been brought up in iniquity, which Plato refuses to contemplate ; and is evidently quite astray as to the connection of *δισξέληνθῆναι*, which he refers to the company of the wicked, instead of the practice of wickedness.

Other examples may be taken for comparison from the end of the Sixth Book :—

You have comprehended, said I, most sufficiently ; and conceive now that, corresponding to my four

sections, there are four faculties in the soul ; intelligence answering to the highest, demonstration to the second ; and assign opinion to the third, and to the last imagination ; and arrange the objects accordingly that as their objects participate of truth, so rather that they participate of perspicuity. I understand, said he, and I agree, and I range them as you desire.—*Spens.*

You have taken in my meaning most satisfactorily ; and I beg you will accept these four mental states as corresponding to the four segments—namely, pure reason corresponding to the highest, understanding to the second, belief to the third, and conjecture to the last, and pray arrange them in gradation, and believe them to partake of distinctness in a degree corresponding to the truth of the objects.

I understand you, said he. I quite agree with you, and will arrange them as you desire.—*Davies and Vaughan.*

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said ; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith for convicting to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your argument.—*Jowett.*

Spens is guilty of a serious error in rendering *διδασκαλία* “demonstration,” and he may be thought to have done no better by translating *εἰκασία* “imagination.” “Imagination” did not, however, bear the same lofty signification in his day as is frequently attached to it in ours, and his readers would not in general understand him to mean anything more than Davies and Vaughan denote by “conjecture.” Either version is more intelligible than Jowett’s “perception of shadows.” His bold rendering of *πίστις* by “opinion” shows that he was not afraid to depart from the literal sense of his author when

he thought that his true meaning could thus be better elicited. In fact neither word, nor yet "conviction," suggested as an alternative by Jowett, seems quite to fit the actual idea of Plato, which might perhaps be expressed by "instinctive assurance."

On the whole, Spens's version should not be lightly esteemed. It is clearly the work of a scholar and a man of considerable literary ability, who might have rivalled his successors if the standard of his age had been higher, and if he had possessed the *apparatus criticus* at their disposal. They had magnificent libraries at their command, which gave access to a mass of Platonic literature which did not exist in his day. His labours suffer much in comparison by the absence of the illuminating comment which imparts such zest to the versions of Davies and of Jowett. This arises in great measure from their special attention to the needs of students, while Spens considers only the general reader, who, by a pleasing fiction, was supposed to be able to read Plato without note or comment.

The long disquisition upon Plato which Spens has prefixed to his translation is eminently characteristic of the eighteenth century, elegant in diction, philanthropic in intention, and devoid of real grasp or insight. It neither throws nor endeavours to throw any new light upon Plato himself: his reputation is taken for granted, and it is supposed that his "sentiments" will be sufficiently ascertained from the perusal of his treatise. This, in the translator's as in Rousseau's opinion, is a treatise on justice, and Plato's commonwealth is merely projected as an illustration of his principles in action, "supposing the most perfect form of civil government to be an image and representation of that internal constitution and government formed and established by nature in the mind of a good man." Something like an analysis is attempted, but the delicate question of the community of women is evaded. Indeed, the translator lays more stress upon his second object, "to stir up the English youth to the study of the ancients," not Plato only. He deplores the decay of the taste for ancient literature, and agrees with almost all contemporary writers in lamenting the luxury of the age, and the universal pro-

pensity to read for mere amusement. The perusal of the *Republic*, he deems, may allure the thoughtless reader: "It is handled in an elegant manner, and many things collateral and in connection with the principal subject are most delicately touched; so that the reader is perpetually delighted with the variety of the matter, the beauty of the illustrations, the union of the whole, and, in particular, with that genuine air of real life which everywhere appears." If any ancient writer, then, can be read in the eighteenth century Plato will be. Spens's version has been so little heard of that it is much to be feared that its reception cannot have justified his anticipations. The dedication to Lord Bute, exempt from servility as it is, would not at that juncture recommend it to any but North Britons, and it may probably have been little heard of south of the Tweed. It merited a better fate as the first English translation, as a courageous undertaking carried out with exemplary diligence; and also from the amiable character of the translator, who reveals himself as a man of broad if nowise original mind, the warm admirer of Bacon and Newton and Hoadly, and endowed with such candour as to bestow the most cordial applause upon Sydenham's translation of Plato. This never reached the *Republic*, and Spens remained without a competitor until the publication of Thomas Taylor's version in 1804. He does not say how long his work had occupied him, but intimates that he had used no other translator or commentator than Ficinus.

The *Republic* of Plato deserves an eminent place among the epoch-making books of the world. It was probably the first in which full expression was given to the longing which must of necessity arise in the human heart when the cosmos and the individual appear at odds, so tersely expressed in Fitzgerald's *Omar Khayyám*,—

"Ah Love! could you and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire?"

In estimating the *Republic's* place in the history of thought we must take into account the circumstances

under which it was composed. The exact date is uncertain, but whether it existed in the form of a book by B.C. 393 or not, its ideals certainly then existed in Plato's mind and were known to his fellow-citizens, for the community of goods and the community of women are ridiculed in the *Ecclesiiazusae* of Aristophanes, acted in that year. As a young man Plato had passed through terrible experiences, the complete shipwreck of the vessel of State by the disastrous termination of the Peloponnesian War, the atrocities of the oligarchical party who thereupon gained dominion in Athens, and the unjust execution of his own adored master by an ignorant and misguided democracy. Such events were well calculated to engender in Plato's mind a distrust of all existing political systems, and to set him upon seriously projecting something to replace them. Ever since, the creation of ideal communities has been the frequent amusement of superior minds, and although every such endeavour has but strengthened the conviction that, as a matter of fact, the development of society must proceed upon the lines marked out for it from the beginning, in these, nevertheless, the aspiration after something.

“Too bright and good
For human nature's daily food”

is no unimportant factor. The winged genius which in ancient works of art accompanies the chariot of hero or demi-god adds nothing to the power or the speed, but stimulates the ardour of the charioteer.

Plato is broadly distinguished from his successors—More, Campanella, Bacon, Brockden Brown, etc., and his later self in his *Critias*, in this respect, that whereas these represent their ideal communities as already existing and only needing to be described, his Republic exists merely in thought, and not even there until it has been provided with a sound basis by a preliminary discussion of the abstract principles of justice.

“Nothing actually existing in the world,” says Jowett, “at all resembles Plato's ideal State, nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible.” This he repeats in the *Laws* (Book V.) where, casting a glance back on the Republic, he admits that the perfect state of com-

munism and philosophy was impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he answers ironically, "When one son of a king becomes a philosopher." It is worthy of note, however, that, little more than a century before Plato wrote, a son of a king *had* become a philosopher—Buddha.

We know not whether any commentator has noticed the resemblance between the prisoners in the seventh book of the *Republic*, who see only shadows cast upon the wall of their dungeon from the road adjoining, to the Lady of Shalott,—

"Shining through a mirror clear
That hangs before her all the year,
Shadows of the world appear :
There she sees the highway near,
Winding down to Camelot."

Was Tennyson conscious of the parallel with Plato, when, in *The Palace of Art*, he places along with "large-brow'd Verulam" first among *i maestri di color che sanno*? This dignity Dante confines to Aristotle; but Aristotle was the Doctor of the rival University, and the proud position assigned to Bacon is probably less a compliment to him than to his editor, Tennyson's friend Spedding.

The only personal notice of Spens to be met with is highly to his credit. The Rev. James Hall, at Vol. I, p. 59 of his *Travels in Scotland* (1807), describes him as "amiable, polite, and accomplished," and further as hitherto the only minister who had been able to instil some notion of religion into the people of Buckhaven, who must have been under his pastoral charge when he was minister of Wemyss. These people were of Danish race, descendants of a shipload of Danish fishers of both sexes driven ashore about the beginning of the eighteenth century, and who in Spens's time still followed the fisherman's calling. Suspicions of their neighbours and the idea that they were ridiculed by them had kept them strangers in such a state of isolation that religion and civilisation had nearly died out among them; and, though they spoke the language of the country, Spens found his instructions totally unintelligible. Proceeding, however, from objects and ideas that were familiar to

their minds to others with which they were unacquainted, but to which those familiar ideas bore some resemblance or analogy, Dr. Spens succeeded in communicating some notions of a Creator, a Redeemer, and a future judgment. The obstacles he had to encounter in this pious and laudable work, and the means by which he surmounted them, suggested "a subject of philosophical speculation to the worthy and ingenious doctor, who would sometimes amuse his friends with an account of both."

The necessary corrections have been made in Spens's punctuation, but otherwise his text remains unaltered.

RICHARD GARNETT.

1906.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE CHIEF ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS OF PLATO

The Republic

H. Spens, 1763 ; Davies and Vaughan, 1852, 1858, 1866 ;
B. Jowett, 1881 (3rd Ed.), 1888 ; T. Taylor (with Introduc-
tion by T. Wratishaw), 1894.

Works

Floyer Sydenham, 1759, 1776 ; T. Taylor and Sydenham,
1804 ; H. Cary [and H. Davis], 1848-52 (Bohn), 1900.
Bell's Class Trans., *The Platonic Dialogues*, W. Whewell,
3 vols., 1859-61 ; *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jowett,
1871, 1875, 1892.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

THE FIRST BOOK

Port of Athens

I WENT down yesterday to the Piræum, with Glauco, the son of Aristo, to pay my devotion to the goddess; and desirous, at the same time, to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival, as they were now to do it for the first time. The procession of our own country-men seem'd to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no less proper.

After we had paid our devotion, and seen the solemnity, we were on our way to the city, when Polemarchus, the Son of Cephalus, observing us at a distance, hurrying home; order'd his boy to run and desire us to wait for him; and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind, Polemarchus, says he, desires you to wait.

I turned about and asked where he was.

He is coming up, said he, after you; but do you wait for him. We will wait, said Glauco; and soon afterwards came Polemarchus, and Adimantus the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others as from the procession.

Then said Polemarchus: Socrates, you seem to me to be hurrying to the city.

You judge, said I, not amiss.

You see us, then, said he, how many there are of us.

Why do I not?

Therefore, now, you must either be stronger than these, or you must stay here.

Is there not, said I, one way still remaining? May we not persuade you that you must let us go?

Can you be able to persuade such as will not hear?

By no means, said Glauco.

Then, as we are not to hear, determine accordingly.

But you do not know, said Adimantus, that there is to be an illumination, in the evening, on horseback to the goddess.

On horseback! said I, that is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horses? or how do you mean?

Just so, reply'd Polemarchus. And besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity worth seeing. For we shall rise after supper and see the nocturnal festival, and shall be there with many of the youth, and converse together. But do you stay, and do not do otherwise.

It seems proper, then, said Glauco, we should stay.

Nay, if it seem so, said I, we ought to do it.

We went home therefore to Polemarchus's house; and there we found both Lysias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus; likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Paeoneian, and Clitipho the son of Aristonimus. Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewise in the house; he seemed to me to be pretty well advanced in years, for I had not seen him of a long time. He was sitting crown'd, on a certain couch and seat, for he had been offering sacrifice in the hall. So we sate down by him, for some seats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus saw me he saluted me and said; Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piræum; nevertheless you ought to do it, for were I still able easily to go up to the city, you shou'd not need to come hither, but we wou'd be with you. But now you shou'd come hither more frequently; for I assure you, that with relation to myself, as the pleasures respecting the body become insipid, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not fail, then, to make a party often with these youths, and come hither to us as to your friends and old acquaintance.

And, truly, said I, Cephalus, I take pleasure in conversing with those who are well advanced in years; for it appears to me proper that we learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, what the road is which it is likely we have to travel, whether rough and difficult or plain and easy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life which the poets

call the threshold of old-age, what your opinion of it is; whether you look on it, as the most grievous part of life, or what you think of it?

And I will tell you, Socrates, said he, what is really my opinion; for we frequently meet together in one place, several of us, who are of the same age, observing the old proverb. Now, most of us, when assembled, lament their state, when they feel a want of the pleasures of youth, and call to their remembrance the pleasures of love, those of drinking and feasting, and some others akin to these, and they express indignation, as if they were bereaved of some mighty things. In those days, they say, they lived well, but now they do not live at all. Some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old-age meets with from their acquaintance, and on this account also they lament old-age, which is to them the cause of so many ills. But these men, Socrates, seem not to me to blame the real cause; for if this were the cause, I likewise should have suffered the same things on account of old-age, and all others, even as many as have come to these years: whereas I have met with several who are not thus affected, and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet when he was asked by one, How, said he, Sophocles, are you affected towards the pleasures of love; are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend, reply'd he, most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master. He seem'd to me to speak well at that time, and no less so now, for certainly there is in old age a deal of peace and freedom from such things; for when the appetites cease to be vehement, and are become easy, what Sophocles said certainly happens: we are delivered from very many, and those, too, furious masters. But with relation to these things, and those likewise respecting our acquaintance, there is one and the same cause, which is not old-age, Socrates, but manners; for, if indeed they are discreet and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burdensome: if not, both old-age, Socrates, and youth are grievous to such.

Being delighted to hear him say these things, and wanting him to discourse further, I urged him and said; I fancy, Cephalus, the generality will not agree with you in those things, but will imagine that you bear old-age easily, not

from manners, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations.

You say true, reply'd he, they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say, but, however, not so much as they imagine. But the saying of Themistocles was just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said that he was honoured not on his own account, but on that of his country, reply'd that neither would himself have been renowned had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, had he been an Athenian. The same saying is justly applicable to those who are not rich and who bear old-age with uneasiness: that neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite easily, nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself.

But whether, Cephalus, said I, was the greater part of what you possess left you, or have you acquired it?

Somewhat, Socrates, reply'd he, I have acquired. As to money-getting, I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father: for my grandfather of the same name with me, who was left almost as much substance as I possess at present, made it many times as much again; but my father Lysanias made it yet less than it is now. I am satisfied if I leave my sons here no less, but some little more, than I received.

I asked you, said I, for this reason, because you seem to me to love riches moderately, and those generally do so who have not acquired them: but those who have acquired them are doubly fond of them; for as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the same manner those who have enriched themselves value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford; for which riches are valued by others.

You say true, reply'd he.

It is entirely so, said I. But further, tell me this: what do you imagine is the greatest good derived from the possession of much substance?

What, probably, said he, I shall not persuade the generality of. For, be assured, Socrates, continued he, that after a man begins to think he is soon to die, he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneasiness: for those stories concerning a future state, which represent that the man who hath done injustice

here must there be punished, though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his soul with apprehensions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near those things, views them more attentively. He becomes therefore full of suspicion and dread, and considers and reviews whether he hath in any thing injured any one. He then who findeth in his life a great deal of iniquity, and is wakened from sleep as children by repeated calls, is afraid and lives in miserable hope. But the man who is not conscious of any iniquity,

Still pleasing hope, sweet nourisher of age !
Attends,—

as Pindar says. This, Socrates, he hath beautifully expressed: that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness,

Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
Delighting, with him lives ; which most of all
Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

So that he says well and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpose I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable, not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the possession of riches contributes considerably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive, and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror, when either indebted in sacrifices to God, or in money to man. It hath many other advantages besides; but, for my part, Socrates, I deem riches to be most advantageous, to a man of understanding, chiefly in this respect.

You speak most handsomely, Cephalus, reply'd I. But with respect to this very thing, Justice, whether shall we call it truth, simply, and the restoring of what one hath received from another? Or shall we say that the very same things may sometimes be done justly and sometimes unjustly? My meaning is this: Every one would some how own, that if a man should receive arms from his friend who was of a sound mind, it would not be proper to restore such things if he should demand them when mad; nor would the restorer be just: as little would he who, to a man in such a condition, should willingly tell all the truth.

You say right, reply'd he.

This, then, to speak the truth and restore what one hath received, is not the definition of justice?

It is not, Socrates, reply'd Polemarchus, if at least we may give any credit to Simonides.

However that be, I give up, said Cephalus, this conversation to you; for I must now go to take care of the sacred rites.

Is not Polemarchus, said I, your heir?

Certainly, reply'd he, smiling, and went off to the sacred rites.

Tell me, then, said I, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it which, according to you, Simonides says so well concerning justice?

That to give every one his due is just, reply'd he; in saying this, he seems to me to say well.

It is, indeed, said I, not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now: that when one deposits with another any thing, it is to be given back to him when he asks for it again in his madness, yet what hath been deposited is in some respect, at least, due. Is it not?

It is.

But yet it is not at all, by any means, then, to be restored when any one asks for it in his madness?

It is not, reply'd he.

Simonides then, as it should seem, says something different from this, that to deliver up what is due is just?

Something different, truly, reply'd he; for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends some good, but no ill.

I understand, said I. He who restores gold deposited with him, if to restore and receive it be hurtful, and the restorer and receiver be friends, doth not give what is due. Is not this what you allege Simonides says?

Surely.

But what? are we to give our enemies, too, what may chance to be due to them?

By all means, reply'd he—what is due to them; and from an enemy to an enemy there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, some evil.

Simonides, then, as it should seem, reply'd I, expressed what is just enigmatically, and after the manner of the

poets; for he well understood, as it appears, that this was just, to give every one what was fitting for him, and this he called his due. But what, said he, is your opinion? Truly, reply'd I, if any one should ask him thus: Simonides, what is the art which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called Medicine? What would he answer us, do you think?

That art, surely, reply'd he, which dispenseth drugs and prescribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies.

And what is the art which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called Cookery?

The art which gives seasonings to victuals.

Be it so. What then is that art which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, may be called Justice?

If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates, by what is said above, the art which dispenseth good offices to friends and injuries to enemies.

To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice?

It seems so.

Who, then, is most able to do good to his friends when they are diseased, and ill to his enemies, with respect to sickness and health?

The Physician.

And who, when they fail, with respect to the danger of the sea?

The Pilot.

But as to the just man, in what business, and with respect to what action, is he most able to serve his friends and to harm his enemies?

It seems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other.

Be it so. But surely the physician is useless, Polemarchus, to those, at least, who are not sick?

It is true.

And the pilot to those who do not fail?

He is.

And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those who are not at war?

I can by no means think that.

Justice, then, is useful likewise in time of peace.

It is.

And so is agriculture, is it not?

It is.

Towards the possession of grain?

Certainly.

And is not shoe-making likewise useful?

It is.

Towards the possession of shoes, you will say, I imagine.

Certainly.

But what, now? For the use or possession of what would you say that justice were useful in time of peace?

For co-partnerships, Socrates.

You call co-partnerships joint companies, or what else?

Joint companies, certainly.

Whether, then, is the just man or the dice-player a good and useful co-partner for playing at dice.

The dice-player.

But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the mason?

By no means.

In what joint company, now, is the just man a better co-partner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp?

In a partnership about money, as I imagine.

And yet it is likely, Polemarchus, that with regard to the making use of money, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, the jockey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not?

He would appear so.

And with respect to a ship, the ship-wright or ship-master?

It would seem so.

When then is it, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others?

When it is to be deposited and be safe, Socrates!

Do you not mean, when there is no need to use it, but to let it lie?

Certainly.

When, then, money is useless, justice is then useful with regard to it?

It seems so.

And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, justice is useful

*Business of doc. is medicine
what is business
of just
man?*

both for a community and for a particular person; but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is useful.

It appears so.

And you will say, that when a buckler, a harp, is to be kept, and not to be used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the military and the musical art.

Of necessity.

And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless, but when they are not to be used, it is useful.

It seems so.

Justice, then, my friend, can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things which are not to be used. But let us consider this matter. Is not he who is the most dextrous at striking, whether in battle or in boxing, the same likewise in defending himself?

Certainly.

And is not he who is dextrous in warding off and shunning a distemper most dextrous too in bringing it on?

So I imagine.

And he too the best guardian of a camp who can steal the councils and the other operations of the enemy?

Certainly.

Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a dextrous thief.

It seems so.

If, therefore, the just man be dextrous in guarding money, he is dextrous likewise in stealing.

So it wou'd appear, said he, from this reasoning.

The just man, then, hath appeared to be a sort of thief; and you seem to have learned this from Homer, for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulysses by his mother, and says that he was distinguished beyond all men for thefts and oaths. It seems then, according to you, and according to Homer and Simonides, that justice is a sort of thieving, for the profit, indeed, of friends and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you say so?

No, by no means—nor, indeed, do I know any longer what I said; yet I still think that justice profits friends and hurts enemies.

But whether do you pronounce such to be friends as seem

to be honest? or such as are so, though they do not seem; and in the same way as to enemies?

It is reasonable, said he, to love those whom a man deems to be honest, and to hate those whom he deems to be wicked.

But do not men mistake in this, so as that many who are not honest appear so to them, and many contrarywise?

They do mistake. To such, then, the good are enemies and the bad are friends.

Certainly.

But, however, it is then just for them to profit the bad and to hurt the good.

It appears so.

But the good are likewise just, and such as do no ill.

True.

But, according to your speech, it is just to do ill to those who do no ill.

By no means, Socrates, reply'd he; for the speech seems to be wicked.

It is just, then, said I, to hurt the unjust and to profit the just.

This speech appears more handsome than the other.

Then it will happen, Polemarchus, to many, to as many indeed of mankind as have misjudged, that it shall be just to hurt their friends who are really bad, and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and so we shall say the very reverse of what we affirmed Simonides said.

It does, indeed, said he, happen so. But let us define again, for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy.

How were they defined, Polemarchus?

That he who seems honest is a friend.

But how shall we now define, said I?

That he who seems, reply'd he, and likewise is honest, is a friend; but he who seems honest, yet is not, seems, yet is not a friend. And the distinction about an enemy to be the very same.

The good man, according to this speech, will, as it seems, be the friend, and the wicked man the enemy.

Yes.

Do you now require us to describe what is just, as we did before, when we said it was just to do good to a friend and

ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition and now say that it is just to do good to a friend when he is good, and hurt to an enemy when he is ill?

This last, said he, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed.

Is it, then, said I, the part of a just man to hurt any man?

By all means, said he, he ought to hurt the wicked and his enemies.

But do horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse?

Worse.

Whether in the virtue of dogs or of horses?

In that of horses.

And do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses?

Of necessity.

And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man?

Certainly.

But is not justice the virtue of a man?

Of necessity this likewise.

Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust.

It seems so.

But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical?

It is impossible.

Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship?

It cannot be.

Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust; or in general can the good, by virtue, make men wicked?

It is impossible.

For it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat to make cold, but of its contrary.

Yes.

Nor is it the effect of drought to make moist, but its contrary.

Certainly.

Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but of his contrary.

It appears so.

But the just is good?

Certainly.

Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjust man.

In all respects, said he, you seem to me, Socrates, to say true.

If, then, any one says that it is just to give every one his due, and thinks this with himself, that hurt is due to enemies from a just man, and profit to his friend, he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth. For it hath no where appeared to us that any just man hurts any one.

I agree, said he.

Let us jointly contend, then, said I, if any one shall say that Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, said so, or any other of those wise and happy men.

I am ready, said he, to join in the fight.

But do you know, said I, whose saying I fancy it is, that it is just to profit friends and hurt enemies?

Whose? said he.

I fancy it is the saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban, or some other rich man who thought himself able to do a great deal.

You say most true, said he.

Be it so, said I. But as this hath not appeared to be justice, nor just, what else may one say that it is?

Thrasymachus frequently, during our reasoning, rush'd in the midst to lay hold of the discourse, but was hindered by those who sate by, who wanted to hear the conversation to an end. But when we paused, and I had said these things, he was no longer quiet, but, collecting himself, as a wild beast he came upon us, as if he wou'd have torn us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmost consternation; but he, roaring out in the midst, What trifling, said he, Socrates, is this, which long ago possessed you? and why do you thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But if you truly want to know what is just, ask not questions only and value yourself in confuting when any one answers you any thing (knowing this, that it is easier to ask than to answer), but answer yourself, and tell what it is you call just. And you are not to tell me that it is what is fit, nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor

what is advantageous; but what you mean, tell plainly and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you speak such trifles as these.

When I heard this, I was astonished, and looking at him, was frightened; and I should have become speechless, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me. But I had observed him first, when he began to grow fierce at our reasoning, so that I was now able to answer him, and said, trembling: Thrasymachus, be not hard on us, for if we mistake in our inquiries, Polemarchus and I, be well assured that we mistake unwittingly: For think not that, in searching for gold, we would never wittingly yield to one another in the search, and mar the finding it; but that, searching for justice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we should yet foolishly yield to each other, and not labour, friend, with the utmost ardour that we may discover what it really is. But I am afraid we are not able to discover it. It is more reasonable, then, that we be pitied than be used hardly by you who are men of ability!

Having heard this, he laugh'd aloud in a very coarse manner, and said: By Hercules! this is Socrates's wonted irony. This I both knew and foretold to these here, that you never incline to answer if any one ask you anything.

You are a wise man, therefore, Thrasyarchus, said I; for you knew well that if you asked any one, How many is twelve, and, when you ask should tell him before: You are not, friend, to tell me that twelve is twice six, nor that it is three times four, nor that it is four times three, for I will not admit it if you trifle in such a manner—I fancy it is plain to you that no man would answer one asking in such a way. But if he should say to you: Wonderful Thrasyarchus, how do you mean? May I answer in none of those ways you have told me—not even though the real and true answer happen to be one of them? but I am to say something else than the truth? or how is it you mean? What would you say to him in answer to these things?

If they were alike, I should give an answer; but how are they alike?

Nothing hinders it, said I. But though they were not alike, but should appear so to him who was asked, would

he the less readily answer what appeared to him, whether we forbade him or not?

And will you do so now, said he? Will you say in answer some of these things which I forbid you to say?

I should not wonder if I did, said I, if it should appear so to me on inquiry.

What then, said he, if I shall show you another and a better answer, besides all these about justice; what will you deserve to suffer?

What else, said I, but what is proper for the ignorant to suffer; and it is proper for them to learn some where from a wise man. I shall therefore deserve to suffer this.

You are pleasant now, said he, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewise.

Shall it not be after I have got it, said I?

There is for you, said Glauco; so, as to money, Thrasy-machus, say on, for all of us will advance for Socrates.

I truly imagine so, said he, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner—not answer himself, but when another answers, he may take up the discourse and confute.

How, said I, most excellent Thrasy-machus, can one answer? In the first place, when he neither knows, nor says he knows, and then, if he have any opinion about these matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reasonable that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us. Do not decline, then, but oblige me in answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glauco here and the rest of the company.

When I had said this, both Glauco and the rest of the company intreated him not to decline it. And Thrasy-machus appeared plainly desirous to speak, in order to gain applause, reckoning he had a very fine answer to make, yet pretended to be earnest that I should be the answerer; but at last he agreed, and then: This, said he, is the wisdom of Socrates: unwilling himself to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it.

That indeed I learn from others, said I, Thrasy-machus, is true; but in saying that I do not give thanks for it you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able; and I am only able to commend them, for money I have not. And how readily I do this, when any one appears to me to

Thrasymachus
speak well, you shall perfectly know this moment, when you make an answer: for I imagine you are to speak well.

Hear, then, said he, for I say that what is just is nothing else but the advantage of the more powerful. But why do not you commend? You are unwilling.

Let me learn first, said I, what you say, for as yet I do not understand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you say, is what is just. What at all is this you say now, Thrasymachus? for you certainly do not mean such a thing as this: If Polydamus, the wrestler, be more powerful than we, and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is likewise both just and advantageous for us who are weaker than he.

You are most impudent, Socrates, and lay hold of my speech on that side where you may do it the greatest hurt.

By no means, most excellent Thrasymachus, said I: but tell more plainly what is your meaning.

Do not you then know, said he, that with reference to states, some are tyrannical, others democratical, and others aristocratical?

Why are they not?

And is not the governing part in each state the more powerful?

Certainly.

And every government makes laws for its own advantage: a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others the same way. And when they have made them, they give out that to be just for the governed which is advantageous for themselves; and they punish the transgressor of this as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that, in all states, what is just and what is advantageous for the established government are the same; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly that, in all cases, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just.

Now I have learned, said I, what you say; but whether it be true or not, I shall endeavour to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thrasymachus, you yourself have affirmed to be likewise just, though you forbid me to give this answer; but, indeed, you have added to it that of the more powerful.

Probably, said he, but a small addition.

It is not yet manifest whether it is small or great; but it is manifest that this is to be considered, whether you speak the truth, since I too acknowledge that what is just is somewhat that is advantageous: but you add to it, and say that it is that of the more powerful. This I do not know, but it is to be considered.

Consider then, said he.

That, said I, shall be done. And, tell me, do not you say that it is just to obey governours?

I say so.

Whether are the governours in the several states infallible, or are they capable of erring?

Certainly, said he, they are liable to err.

Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make some of them right, and some of them not right?

I imagine so.

To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themselves; and to make them not right, disadvantageous? Or what is it you mean?

Entirely so.

And what they enact is to be observed by the governed, and this is what is just?

Why not?

It is, then, according to your reasoning, not only just to do what is advantageous for the more powerful, but also to do the contrary, what is not advantageous.

What do you say, reply'd he?

The same, I imagine, that you say yourself. But let us consider better. Have we not acknowledged that governours, in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may sometimes mistake what is best for themselves; and that what the governours enjoin is just for the governed to do? Have not these things been acknowledged?

I think so, said he.

Think, also, then, said I, that you have acknowledged that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to governours and the more powerful, since governours unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves, and you say that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not then, most wise Thrasymachus, necessarily happen that, by this means, it may be just to do the contrary of what you

say? For that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful is sometimes enjoined the inferiors to do?

Yes, indeed, Socrates, said Polemarchus; these things are most manifest.

Yes, if you bear him witness, said Clitipho.

What need, said I, of a witness? For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governours do indeed sometimes enjoin what is ill for themselves, but that it is just for the governed to do these things.

For it hath, Polemarchus, been established by Thrasymachus to be just to do what is enjoined by the governours.

And he hath likewise, Clitipho, established that to be just which is the advantage of the more powerful. And having established both these things, he hath acknowledged likewise that the more powerful sometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is disadvantageous for themselves; and, from these concessions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be just than the disadvantage.

But, said Clitipho, he said the advantage of the more powerful—that is, what the more powerful judged to be advantageous to himself—that this was to be done by the inferior; and this he established as just.

But, said Polemarchus, it was not said so.

There is no difference, Polemarchus, said I. But if Thrasymachus says so now, we shall allow him to do it.

And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you meant to say was just: the advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous or is not? Shall we say that you spoke thus?

By no means, said he: for do you imagine I call him the more powerful who misjudgeth at the time he misjudgeth?

I imagined, said I, you said this, when you acknowledged that rulers were not infallible, but that in some things they even erred.

You are a sycophant, said he, in reasoning, Socrates: for do you now call him who mistakes about the management of the sick a physician, as to that very thing in which he mistakes? or him who mistakes in reasoning a reasoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we say in common language that the physician

erred, that the reasoner erred, and the grammarian: thus, however, I imagine that each of these, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time. So that, according to accurate discourse (since you discourse accurately) none of the artists errs: for he who errs, errs by departing from science, and in this he is no artist; so that no artist, or wise man, or governour, errs, in so far as he is a governour. Yet any one may say the physician erred, the governour erred. Imagine, then, it was in this way I now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: that the governour, in as far as he is governour, errs not; and as he does not err, he enacts that which is left for himself, and this is to be observed by the governed. So that what I said from the beginning, I maintain, is just: to do what is the advantage of the more powerful.

Be it so, said I, Thrasymachus. Seem I to act the sycophant?

Certainly, indeed, said he.

For you imagine that I spoke as I did insidiously, and to abuse you?

I know it well, said he, but you shall gain nothing by it; for whether you abuse me in a concealed manner, or otherwise, you shall not be able to overcome me by your reasoning.

I shall not attempt it, said I, happy Thrasymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, define whether you speak of a governour and the more powerful according to common talk, or according to accurate discourse, as you now said, whose advantage, as he is the more powerful, it shall be just for the inferior to observe.

I speak of him, said he, who, in the most accurate discourse, is governour. For this, now, abuse me and act the sycophant, if you are able: I do not shun you. But you cannot do it.

Do you imagine me, said I, to be so mad as to attempt to shave a lyon and act the sycophant with Thrasymachus?

You have now, said he, attempted it, but with no effect.

Enough, said I, of this. But tell me, with reference to him who, accurately speaking, is a physician, whom you now mentioned, whether is he a gainer of money, or one who taketh care of the sick? and speak of him who is really a physician.

One who taketh care, said he, of the sick.

But what of the pilot, who is a pilot truly? Whether is he the governour of the sailors, or a sailor?

The governour of the sailors.

That, I imagine, is not to be minded, that he sails in the ship, nor that he is called a sailor; for it is not for his sailing that he is called pilot, but for his art and his governing the sailors.

True, said he.

Is there not, then, something advantageous to each of these?

Certainly.

And is it not for this purpose, said I, that art hath had its rise, to seek out and afford to each thing its advantage?

For this purpose, said he.

Is there, now, any thing else advantageous to each of the arts but to be the most perfect possible?

How ask you this?

As if you asked me, said I, whether it sufficed the body to be body, or if it stood in need of anything? I would say that it stood in need of something else. For this reason is the medicinal art invented, because the body is infirm, and is not sufficient for itself in such a state. In order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpose art hath been provided. Do I seem to you, said I, to say right or not in speaking in this manner?

Right, said he.

But what now? This medicinal art itself, or any other, is it imperfect so long as it is wanting in a certain virtue—as the eyes when they want seeing, and the ears hearing; and, for these reasons, have they need of a certain art to perceive and afford them what is advantageous for these purposes? And is there, still, in art itself some imperfection; and does every art stand in need of another art to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this stand in need of another in like manner, and so on to infinity? Or shall each art perceive what is advantageous to itself, and stand in need neither of itself nor of another to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own imperfection. For there is no imperfection nor error in any art, nor does it belong to it to seek what is advantageous to any thing but to that of which it is the art; but it is, itself,

infallible, pure, being in the right, so long as each art is an accurate whole, whatever it is. And consider now, according to that accurate discourse, whether it be thus or otherwise.

Thus, said he, it appears.

The medicinal art, then, said I, does not consider what is advantageous to the medicinal art, but to the body.

Yes, said he.

Nor the art of managing horses what is advantageous for that art, but what is advantageous for horses. Nor does any other art consider what is advantageous for itself (for it hath no need), but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art?

So, reply'd he, it appears.

But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are the arts.

He yielded this, but with great difficulty.

No science, then, considers the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it, but that of the inferior and of what is governed.

He consented to these things at last, though he attempted to contend about them, but afterwards he consented. Why, then said I, no physician, so far as he is a physician, considers what is advantageous for the physician, nor enjoins it, but what is advantageous for the sick; for it hath been agreed that the accurate physician is one who taketh care of sick bodies, and not an amasser of wealth. Hath it not been agreed?

He assented.

And likewise that the accurate pilot is the governour of the sailors, and not a sailor?

It hath been agreed.

Such a pilot, then, and governour will not consider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the sailor and the governed.

He consented, with difficulty.

Nor yet, Thrasymachus, said I, does any other in any government, as far as he is a governour, consider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed and of those to whom he ministers; and with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and suitable to this, he both says what he says, and does what he does.

When we were at this part of the discourse, and it was evident to all the definition of what was just stood now on the contrary side, Thrasymachus, instead of making answer:

Tell me, said he, Socrates, have you a nurse?

What, said I: ought you not rather to answer than ask such things?

Because, said he, she neglects you when your nose is stuff'd, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who understand neither what is meant by sheep nor by shepherd.

For what now is all this, said I?

Because you think that shepherds and neatherds ought to consider the good of the sheep or oxen, to fatten them and to minister to them, having in their eye something other than their master's good and their own. And you fancy that those who govern in cities, those who govern truly, are somehow otherwise affected towards the governed than one is towards sheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to somewhat else than this, how they shall be gainers themselves. And so far are you from the notion of just and of justice, and of unjust and injustice, that you do not know that both justice and just are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful and of the governour, but, properly, the hurt of the subject and inferior; and injustice is the contrary. And justice governs such as are truly simple and just; and the governed do what is for the governour's advantage, he being more powerful, and ministring to him, promote his happiness, but by no means their own. You must thus consider it, most simple Socrates, that, on all occasions, the just man gets less than the unjust. First, in co-partnerships with one another, where the one joins in company with the other, you never can find, on the dissolving of the company, the just man gets more than the unjust, but less. Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal substance, the just man pays more, the other less; but when there is any thing to be gained, the one gains nothing, the other a great deal, for when each of them governs in any public magistracy, this, if no other loss, befalls the just man, that his domestic affairs, at least, are in a worse situation through his neglect, and that

he gains nothing from the public, because he is just; add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domestics and acquaintance, when at no time he will serve them beyond what is just. But all these things are quite otherwise with the unjust, such an one, I mean, as I now mentioned, one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Consider him, then, if you would judge, how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjust than just, and you will most easily understand it if you come to the most finished injustice, such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured, and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched; and that is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, both by secret fraud and by open violence, both things sacred and holy, both private and public, and these not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular cases of such crimes, when one committing injustice is not concealed, he is punished, and suffers the greatest ignominy; for according to the several kinds of the wickedness they commit, they are called sacrilegious, robbers, housebreakers, pilferers, thieves. But when any one, besides these thefts of the substance of his citizens, shall steal and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of those ugly names he is called happy and blest, not by his citizens alone, but likewise by others, as many as are informed that he hath committed the most consummate wickedness. For such as revile wickedness revile it not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering, unjust things. And thus, Socrates, injustice, when in sufficient measure, is both more powerful, more free, and hath more absolute command than justice: and (as I said at the beginning) the advantage of the more powerful is justice; but injustice is the profit and advantage of one's self.

Thrasymachus, having said these things, inclined to go away, like the bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long discourse. These, however, who were present would not suffer him, but forced him to stay and give account of what he had said. I too, myself, earnestly entreated him, and said: Divine Thrasymachus, after throwing in upon us so strange a discourse, do you intend to go away before you teach us sufficiently, or

learn yourself, whether the case be as you say or otherwise? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a small matter, and not the guide of life by which each of us, being conducted, may lead the most happy life?

But I imagine, said Thrasymachus, that this is otherwise.

You seem, truly, said I, to care nothing for us, nor to be any way concerned whether we shall live well or ill, whilst we are ignorant of what you say you know. But, good Thrasymachus, be readily disposed to show it also to us: nor will the favour be ill placed, whatever you shall bestow on so many as are of us. And I, for my own part, tell you that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not although it should be permitted to exert itself, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it should incline. But, good Thrasymachus, let him be unjust, let him be able to do unjustly, either in secret or by force, yet will you not persuade me at least that injustice is more profitable than justice; and probably some other of us here is of the same mind, and I not single. Convince us, then, blest Thrasymachus! that we imagine wrong when we value justice more than injustice.

But how, said he, shall I convince you? For if I have not convinced you by what I have said already, what shall I further do for you? Shall I enter into your soul and put my reasoning within you?

God forbid! said I, you shall not do that. But, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it or, if you do change, change openly and do not deceive us. For now you see, Thrasymachus (for let us still consider what is said above), that when you first defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true shepherd should, strictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock; but you fancy, that as a shepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is best for the sheep, but as some glutton who is going to feast on them at some entertainment, or yet to dispose of them as a merchant, and not a shepherd. But the shepherd-art hath certainly no other care but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is best: for its own affairs are already sufficiently provided for, so as to be in the very best state while it

needs nothing of the shepherd-art. In the same manner I, at least, imagined there was a necessity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for the governed and those under its charge, both in political and private government. But do you imagine that governours in cities, such as are truly governours, govern willingly?

Truly, said he, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain.

Why now, said I, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they ask a reward, as the profit arising from governing is not to be to themselves, but to the governed? Or tell me this now: Do not we say that every particular art is in this distinct, in having a distinct power? And now, blest Thrasymachus! answer not differently from your sentiments, that we may make some progress.

In this, said he, it is distinct.

And does not each of them afford us a certain distinct advantage, and not a common one? as the medicinal affords health, the pilot-art preservation in sailing, and the others in like manner.

Certainly.

And does not the mercenary art afford a reward, for this is its power? Or do you call both the medicinal art and the pilot art one and the same? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you proposed, though one in piloting recover his health, because sailing agrees with him, you will not the more, on this account, call it the medicinal art?

No, indeed, said he.

Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art the medicinal, though one, in gaining a reward, recover his health.

No, indeed.

What now? Will you call the medicinal the mercenary art, if one, in performing a cure, gains a reward?

No, said he.

Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a distinct advantage of every art?

Be it so, said he.

What is that advantage, then, with which all artists in common are advantaged? It is plain it must be in using something common to all that they are advantaged by it.

It seems so, said he.

Yet we say that artists are profited in receiving a reward arising to them from the increase of a lucrative art.

He agreed, with difficulty.

Hath not, then, every one this advantage in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to consider accurately, the medicinal art produceth health, and the mercenary art a reward, masonry a house, and the mercenary art accompanying it a reward; and all the others in like manner—every one produceth its own work, and advantageth that for which it was ordained. But if it meet not with a reward, what is the artist advantaged by his art?

It does not appear, said he.

But does he then no service when he works without reward?

I think he does.

Is not this, then, now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art nor government provideth what is advantageous for itself, but as I said, long ago, provides and enjoins what is advantageous for the governed, having in view the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And for these reasons, friend Thrasymachus, I likewise said now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but asks a reward for it; because whoever will perform the art handsomely, never acts what is best for himself, in ruling according to art, but what is best for the governed; and on this account, it seems, a reward must be given to those who shall be willing to govern, either money or honour, or punishment if they will not govern.

How say you so, Socrates? said Glauco. Two of the rewards I understand; but this punishment you speak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not.

You know not, then, said I, the reward of the best of men, on account of which the most worthy govern, when they consent to govern. Or, do you not know that to be ambitious and covetous is both deem'd a reproach, and really is so?

I know, said he.

For those reasons, then, said I, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money nor for honour; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking clandestinely from those under their government; as little are they willing to govern for honour, for they are not ambitious. Of necessity, then, there must be laid on them a fine, that they may consent to govern; and hence, it seems, it hath been accounted dishonourable to enter on government willingly, and not by constraint. And the greatest part of the punishment is to be governed by a naughty person, if one himself is not willing to govern: and the good seem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern; and then they enter on the government, not as on any thing good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than themselves, nor like them to entrust with the government—since it would appear that if there was a city of good men, the contest would be not to be in the government, as at present it is to govern. And hence it would be manifest that he who is indeed the true governour doth not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that every understanding man would rather chuse to be served than to have trouble in serving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thrasy-machus, that justice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we shall consider afterwards. What Thrasy-machus says now seems to me of much more importance, when he says that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glauco, said I, which side do you chuse? and which seems to you most agreeable to truth?

The life of the just, said he, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable.

Have you heard, said I, how many good things Thrasy-machus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust?

I heard, said he, but am not persuaded.

Are you willing, then, that we should persuade him (if we be able any how to find arguments) that there is no truth in what he says?

Why not, said he.

If then, said I, pulling on the other side, we advance argu-

ment for argument, how many good things there are in being just, and then again, he on the other side, we shall need a third person to compute and estimate what each shall have said on either side, and likewise need some judges to determine the matter. But if, as now, assenting to one another, we consider these things, we shall be both judges and pleaders ourselves.

Certainly, said he.

Which way, then, said I, do you chuse?

This way, said he.

Come then, said I, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

Yes, indeed, I say so, reply'd he; and the reasons for it I have told.

Come now, do you ever affirm any thing of this kind concerning them? Do you call one of them virtue, and the other vice?

Why not?

Is not then justice virtue, and injustice vice?

Very likely, said he, most pleasant Socrates, after I say that injustice is profitable, but justice is not.

What then?

The contrary, said he.

Is it justice you call vice?

No, but I call it altogether genuine simplicity.

Do you, then, call injustice cunning?

No, said he, but I call it sagacity.

Do the unjust seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be both prudent and good?

Such, at least, said he, as are able to do injustice in perfection; such as are able to subject to themselves states and nations. But you probably imagine I speak of those who cut purses: even such things as these, he said, are profitable if concealed; but such only as I now mentioned are of any worth.

I understand, said I, what you want to say: but this I have wondered at, that you should deem injustice to be a part of virtue and of wisdom, and justice among their contraries.

But I do deem it altogether so.

Your meaning, said I, is now more determined, friend, and it is no longer easy for one to find what to say against it: for if, when you had set forth injustice as profitable, you had still allowed it to be vice, or ugly, as some others do, we should have had something to say, speaking according to the received opinions; but now it is plain you will call it beautiful and powerful, and all those other things you will attribute to it which we attribute to the just man, since you have dared to class it with virtue and wisdom.

You conjecture, said he, most true.

But, however, I must not grudge, said I, to pursue our inquiry, so long as I imagine you speak as you think; for to me you plainly seem now, Thrasymachus, not to be in irony, but to speak what you think concerning the truth.

What is the difference to you, said he, whether I think so or not, if you do not confute my reasoning?

None at all, said I. But endeavour, further, to answer me this likewise: Does a just man seem to you desirous to have more than another just man?

By no means, said he; for otherwise he should not be courteous and simple, as we now supposed him.

But what? will he not desire it in a just action?

Not even in a just action, said he.

But whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjust man, and count it just, or would he not?

He would, said he, both count it just and deem it proper, but would not be able for it.

That, said I, I do not ask; but whether a just man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a just man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjust?

This last, said he, is what he would incline to do.

But what would the unjust man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the just man, even in a just action?

Why not? said he—he who deems it proper to exceed all others.

Will not, then, the unjust man desire to exceed the unjust man likewise, and in an unjust action, and contend that he himself receive more than all others?

Certainly.

Thus we say, then, said I: The just man does not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike; but the unjust

man desires to exceed both one like and one unlike himself.

You have spoke, said he, perfectly well.

But, said I, the unjust man is both wise and good, but the just man is neither.

This, too, said he, is well said.

Is not then, said I, the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike?

Must he not, said he, be like them, being such an one as we have supposed, and he who is otherwise be unlike them?

Excellent. Each of them is indeed such as those he resembleth.

What else, said he?

Be it so, Thrasymachus. Call you one musical, and another unmusical?

I do.

Which of the two call you wise, and which unwise?

I call the musical wise, and the unmusical unwise.

Is he not good in as much as he is wise, and ill in as much as he is unwise?

Yes.

And what as to the physician? Is not the case the same?

The same.

Do you imagine then, most excellent Thrasymachus, that any musician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems proper to have more skill, than a man who is a musician, with reference to the intention or remission of the strings?

I am not of that opinion.

But what say you of exceeding a man who is no musician?

Of necessity, said he, he will deem it proper to exceed him.

And what as to the physician? In presenting a regimen of meats or drinks, does he want to exceed another physician in medical cases?

No indeed.

But to exceed one who is no physician?

Yes.

And as to all science and ignorance, does any one appear to you intelligent who wants to grasp at, or do, or say more than another intelligent in the art, and not to do the same things, in the same affair, which one equally intelligent with himself doth?

Probably there is a necessity, said he, it be so.

But what as to him who is ignorant? will not he want to exceed the intelligent and the ignorant both alike?

Probably.

But the intelligent is wise?

I say so.

And the wise is good?

I say so.

But the good and the wise will not want to exceed one like himself, but the unlike and contrary?

It seems so, said he.

But the evil and the ignorant wants to exceed both one like himself and his opposite?

It appears so.

Why then, Thrasy-machus, said I, the unjust desires to exceed both one unlike and one like himself. Do not you say so?

I do, said he.

But the just man will not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike?

Yes.

The just man, then, said I, resembles the wise and the good, and the unjust resembles the evil and the ignorant.

It appears so.

But we acknowledged that each of them was such as that which they resembled.

We acknowledged so, indeed.

The just man, then, hath appeared to us to be good and wise, and the unjust to be ignorant and ill.

Thrasymachus, now, confessed all these things, not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragg'd and with difficulty, and prodigious sweat, it being now summer season; and I then saw, but never before, Thrasy-machus blush. After we had acknowledged that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance:

Well, said I, let this remain so. But we said, likewise, that injustice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thrasy-machus?

I remember, said he. But what you now say does not please me, and I have somewhat to say concerning it, which I well know you would call declaiming, if I should advance it. Either, then, suffer me to say what I incline,

or if you incline to ask, do it: and I shall answer you, "be it so," as to old women telling stories, and shall assent and dissent.

By no means, said I, contrary to your own opinion.

Just to please you, said he, since you will not allow me to speak. But do you want any thing further?

Nothing, truly, said I; but if you are to do thus, do: I shall ask.

Ask then.

This, then, I ask, which I did just now (that we may in an orderly way see through our discourse): Of what kind is justice, compared with injustice; for it was surely said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice.

It was so said, just now, reply'd he.

But if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, I imagine, appear to be likewise more powerful than injustice, since injustice is ignorance; of this, now, none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for my own part, Thrasy-machus, to consider it not simply in this manner, but somehow thus: Might you not say that a state was unjust, and attempted to enslave other states unjustly, and did enslave them, and had many states in slavery under itself?

Why not? said he: and the best state will chiefly do this, and such as is most completely unjust.

I understand, said I, that this was your speech. But I consider this in it: Whether this state, which becomes more powerful than the other state, shall hold this power without justice, or must it of necessity be with justice?

With justice, said he, if indeed, as you now said, justice be wisdom; but if as I said, with injustice.

I am much delighted, said I, Thrasy-machus, that you do not merely assent and dissent, but that you answer so handsomely.

I do it, said he, to gratify you.

That is obliging in you. But gratify me in this, likewise, and tell me, do you imagine that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, such as jointly undertakes to do any thing unjustly, is able to effectuate any thing if they injure one another?

No, indeed, said he.

But what if they do not injure one another? will they not do better?

Certainly.

For injustice, somehow, Thrasymachus, brings seditions, and hatreds, and fightings among them; but justice affords harmony and friendship. Does it not?

Be it so, said he, that I may not differ from you.

You are very obliging, most excellent Thrasymachus. But tell me this: If this be the work of injustice, wherever it is, to create hatred, will it not then, when happening among free men and slaves, make them hate one another, and grow seditious, and become impotent to do anything together in company?

Certainly.

But what in the case of injustice between any two men? Will they not differ and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to just men?

They will become so, said he.

If, now, wonderful Thrasymachus, injustice be in one, whether does it lose its power, or will it no less retain it?

Let it, said he, no less retain it.

Does it not, then, appear to have such a power as this: That, wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever else, in the first place it renders it unable for action in itself, through seditions and differences, and, besides, makes it an enemy to itself and to every opponent, and to the just? Is it not thus?

Certainly.

And when injustice is in one man, it will have, I imagine, all these effects which it is natural for it to produce. In the first place, it will render him unable for action, whilst he is in sedition and disagreement with himself; and, next, as he is an enemy both to himself and to the just. Is it not so?

Yes.

But the Gods, friend, are likewise just.

Let them be so, said he.

The unjust man, then, Thrasymachus, shall be an enemy also to the Gods, and the just man a friend.

Feast yourself, said he, with the reasoning boldly; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to these Gods.

Come then, said I, and complete to me this feast, answering as you was doing just now: for the just already appear to be wiser, and better, and more powerful to act; but the unjust are not able to act any thing with one another. And what we said with reference to those who are unjust, that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act jointly together, this we spoke not altogether true, for they would not spare one another being thoroughly unjust; but it is plain that there was in them justice, which made them refrain from injuring one another and those of their party, and by this justice they performed what they did. And they rushed on unjust actions through injustice, being half wicked, since those who are compleatly wicked and perfectly unjust are likewise perfectly unable to act. This, then, I understand, is the case with reference to these matters, and not as you were establishing at first. But whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered: and they appear to do so even at present, as I imagine, at least from what hath been said. Let us, however, consider it further; for the discourse is not about an accidental thing, but about this: in what manner we ought to live.

Consider, then, said he.

I am considering, said I. And tell me, does there any thing seem to you to be the work of a horse?

Yes.

Would you not call that the work of a horse, or of any one else, which one doth with him only, or in the best manner?

I do not understand, said he.

Thus, then: Do you see with any thing else but the eyes? No, indeed.

What now, could you hear with any thing but the ears?

By no means.

Do we not justly, then, call these things the works of these?

Certainly.

But what, could not you with a sword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine?

Why not.

But with nothing, at least, I imagine, so handsomely as

with a pruning hook, which is made for that purpose: Shall we not then settle this to be its work?

We shall then settle it.

I imagine, then, you may now understand better what I was asking, when I enquired whether the work of each thing were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the best manner.

I understand you, said he, and this does seem to me to be the work of each thing.

Be it so, said I. And is there not likewise a virtue belonging to every thing to which there is a certain work assigned? But let us go over, again, the same things: we say there is a work belonging to the eyes?

There is.

And is there not a virtue also belonging to the eyes?

A virtue also.

Well then, was there any work of the ears?

Yes.

Is there not then a virtue also?

A virtue also.

And what as to all other things? Is it not thus?

It is.

But come, could the eyes ever handsomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue—but, instead of virtue, having vice?

How could they? said he, for you probably mean their having blindness instead of sight.

Whatever, said I, be their virtue; for I do not ask this, but whether it be with their own proper virtue they handsomely perform their own proper work, whatever things are performed, and by their vice unhandsomely?

In this at least, said he, you say true.

And will not the ears likewise, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill?

Certainly.

And do we settle all other things according to the same reasoning?

So I imagine.

Come then, after these things, consider this: Is there belonging to the soul a certain work which with no one other being whatever you can perform? such as this—to care for, to govern, to consult, and all such things; is

there any other than the soul to whom we may justly ascribe them and say they properly belong to it?

No other.

But what of this—to live: shall we say it is the work of the soul?

Most especially, said he.

Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue of the soul likewise?

We say so.

And shall, then, the soul ever at all, Thrasymachus! perform her works handsomely whilst deprived of her proper virtue, or is this impossible?

It is impossible.

Of necessity, then, an ill soul must in a bad manner govern and take care of things, and a good soul perform all these things well.

Of necessity.

But did not we agree that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice?

We did agree.

Why then, the just soul and the just man shall live well, and the unjust ill.

It appears so, said he, according to your reasoning.

But surely he who lives well is both blessed and happy, and he who does not is the opposite.

Why not?

The just, then, is happy, and the unjust miserable.

Let them be so, said he.

But it is not advantageous to be miserable, but to be happy.

Certainly.

At no time, then, blest Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice.

Thus now, Socrates, said he, have you been feasted in Diana's festival.

By you, truly I have, Thrasymachus, said I, since you are grown meek and have ceased to be troublesome. I have not feasted handsomely, owing to myself, and not to you: but as voracious guests, snatching still what is bringing before them, taste of it before they have sufficiently enjoyed what went before, so I, as I imagine, before I have found what we first enquired into, what

justice is, have left this, hurrying to enquire concerning it whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue: And a discourse afterwards falling in, that injustice was more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this from the other, so that from the dialogue I have now come to know nothing: for whilst I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it be some virtue or not, and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK

THE SECOND BOOK

WHEN I had said these things, I imagined that the debate was over; but this it seems was only the introduction. For Glauco, as he is on all occasions most courageous, so truly at that time did not approve of Thrasymachus in giving up the debate, but said: Socrates, desire you to seem to have persuaded us, or to have persuaded us in reality, that in every respect it is better to be just than unjust?

I would chuse, said I, to do it in reality, if it depended on me.

You do not, then, said he, do what you desire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would chuse to have, not regarding the consequences, but embracing it for its own sake—as joy, and such pleasures as are harmless, though nothing else arises afterwards from these pleasures than that the possession gives us delight.

There seems to me, said I, to be something of this kind.

But what? is there something, too, which we both love for its own sake, and also for what arises from it?—as wisdom, sight, and health: for we somehow embrace these things on both accounts.

Yes, said I.

But do you perceive, said he, a third species of good, among which is bodily labour, to be healed when sick, to practise physick, or other lucrative employment; for we say those things are troublesome but that they profit us and we should not chuse these things for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and those other advantages which arise from them.

There is then, indeed, said I, likewise this third kind.

But what now? in which of these, said he, do you place justice? *in 2.*

I imagine, said I, in the most handsome, ^{justice} which, both on its own account, and account of what arises from it, is desired by the man who is in pursuit of happiness.

It doth not, however, said he, seem so to the generality, but to be of the troublesome kind, which is pursued for the sake of glory, and on account of rewards and honours, but, on its own account, is to be shunned as being difficult.

I know, said I, that it seems so; and it was in this view that Thrasymachus a while ago despised it and commended injustice; but, it seems, I am one of those who are dull in learning.

Come then, said he, hear me likewise, if this be agreeable to you: for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you, like an adder, sooner than was proper; but with respect to myself, the proof hath not come out hitherto to my satisfaction in reference to neither of the two, for I desire to hear what each is, and what power it hath, by itself, when in the soul, letting alone the rewards and the consequences arising from them. I will proceed, therefore, in this manner, if it seem proper to you: I will renew the speech of Thrasymachus, and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is and whence it ariseth; and, secondly, that all those who pursue it, pursue it unwillingly as necessary, but not as good; thirdly, that they do this reasonably, for, as they say, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of the just, although, for my own part, to me, Socrates, it doth not yet appear so; I am, however, in doubt, having my ears stunned in hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But I have never hitherto heard from any one, as I incline, a discourse concerning justice as being better than injustice: I want, then, to hear it commended as it is in itself, and I most especially imagine I shall hear this from you: wherefore, pulling oppositely, I shall speak in commendation of an unjust life, and, in speaking, shall shew you in what manner I want to hear you condemn injustice and commend justice. But see if what I say be agreeable to you.

Extremely so, said I; for what would any man of understanding delight more to speak and to hear of frequently?

You speak most handsomely, said he. And hear what

I said I was first to speak of: what justice is, and whence it arises; for they say that, according to nature, to do injustice is good, but to suffer injustice is bad, but that the evil which arises from suffering injustice is greater than the good which arises from doing it. So that after men had done one another injustice, and likewise suffered it, and had experienced both, it seemed proper to those who were not able to shun the one and chuse the other to agree among themselves neither to do injustice nor to be injured, and that hence laws begun to be established, and their compacts; and that which was enjoined by law they denominated lawful and just, and that this is the origin and essence of justice. Being in the middle between what is best, when he who does injustice is not punished; and of what is worst, when the injured person is unable to punish; and that justice, being thus in the middle of both these, is desired, not as good, but is held in honour from an imbecillity in doing injustice. For the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with any one either to injure or to be injured, for otherwise he were mad. This, then, Socrates, and of such a kind as this, is the nature of justice, and this, as they say, is its origin. And we shall best perceive that these who pursue it, pursue it unwillingly and from an impotence to injure, if we imagine in our mind such a case as this: Let us give liberty to each of them, both to the just and to the unjust, to do whatever they incline, and then let us follow them, observing how their inclination will lead each of them. We should then find the just man, with full inclination, going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others. This, every nature is made to pursue as good, but by law is forcibly led to an equality. And the liberty which I speak of may be chiefly of this kind, if they happened to have such a power as they say happened once to Gyges, the progenitor of Lydus: for they say that he was the hired shepherd of the then governour of Lydia, and that a prodigious rain and earthquake happening, part of the earth was rent, and an opening made in the place where he pastured his flocks; that when he beheld, and wondered, he went down, and saw many other wonders, handed down to us in way of tradition, and a brazen horse likewise, hollow and with doors;

and on looking in he saw within, a dead body larger in appearance, than that of a man, which had nothing else upon it but a gold ring on its hand, which ring he took off and came up again. That when there was a convention of the shepherds, as usual, for reporting to the king what related to their flocks, he also came, having the ring. And whilst he sate with the others, he happened to turn the stone of the ring to the inner part of his hand, and when this was done, he became invisible to those who sate by, and they talked of him as absent. That he wondered, and again handling his ring, turned the stone outward; and on this became visible: And that having observed this, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power, and that it happened that on turning the stone inward he became invisible, and on turning it outward he became visible. That perceiving this, he instantly got himself made one of the embassy to the king, and that on his arrival he debauched his wife, and, with her, assaulting the king, killed him and possessed the kingdom. If, now, there were two such rings, and the just man had the one, and the unjust the other, none, it seems, would be so adamant as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from the things of others, and not to touch them, whilst it was in his power to take, even from the Forum, without fear, whatever he pleased, to enter into houses and embrace any one he pleased, to kill and to loose from chains whom he pleased, and to do all other things with the same power as a God among men. Acting in this manner he is no way different from the other, but both of them go the same road. This, now, one may say, is a strong proof that no one is just from choice, but by constraint, as it is not a good merely in itself, since every one does injustice, wherever he imagines he is able to do it; for every man imagines that injustice is, to the particular person, more profitable than justice; and he imagines justly, according to this way of reasoning: since if any one with such a liberty would never do any injustice, nor touch the things of others, he would be deemed by men of sense to be the most wretched and most void of understanding; yet would they commend him before one another, imposing on each other, from a fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things. But with reference to

the difference of their lives whom we speak of, we shall be able to discern aright, if we set apart by themselves the most just man and the most unjust, and not otherwise. And, now, what is this separation? Let us take from the unjust man nothing of injustice, nor of justice from the just man, but let us make each of them perfect in his own profession. And, first, as to the unjust man, let him act as the able artist: as a complete pilot or physician he comprehends the possible and the impossible in the art; the one he attempts, and the other he lets alone, and if he fail in any thing, he is able to rectify it. So, in like manner, the unjust man, attempting pieces of injustice in a dextrous manner, let him be concealed, if he want to be exceedingly unjust; but if he be caught, let him be deemed worthless; for the most complete injustice is to seem just, not being so. We must give, then, to the completely unjust the most complete injustice, and not take from him, but allow him, whilst doing the greatest injustice, to procure to himself the highest reputation for justice; and if in any thing he fail, let him be able to rectify it: And let him be able to speak so as to persuade, if any thing of his injustice be spread abroad: Let him be able to do by force, what requires force, through his courage and strength, and by means of his friends and his wealth. And having set him up such an one as this, let us place the just man beside him, in our reasoning, a simple and ingenuous man, desiring, according to Aeschylus, not the appearance, but the reality of goodness. Let us take from him the appearance of goodness; for if he shall appear to be just, he shall have honours and rewards, and thus it may be uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or on account of the rewards and honours. Let him be strip'd of everything but justice, and be made quite contrary to the other. Whilst he doth no injustice, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest, that he may be tortur'd for justice, not yielding to reproach, and such things as arise from it, but may be immoveable 'till death—appearing, indeed, to be unjust through life, yet being really just, that so, both of them arriving at the utmost pitch, the one of justice, and the other of injustice, we may judge which of them is the happier.

Strange! said I, friend Glauco, how strenuously you clean up each of the men as a statue which is to be judged of.

As much, said he, as I am able. Whilst, then, they continue to be such, there will not, as I imagine, be any further difficulty to observe what kind of life remains to each of them. It must, therefore, be told. And, if possibly it should be told with greater rusticity, imagine not, Socrates, that it is I who tell it, but those who commend injustice preferably to justice; and they will say these things: That the just man, being of this disposition, will be scourged, tormented, fettered, have his eyes burnt, and, lastly, having suffered all manner of evils, will be crucified; and he shall know that he should not desire the reality, but the appearance of justice: And that it is much more proper to pronounce that saying of Aeschylus concerning the unjust man: For they will in reality say that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of what is real, and living not according to the opinion of men, wants not to have the appearance, but the reality, of injustice,

Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
Whence all his glorious councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, being thought to be just; next, he marries wherever he inclines, and matches his children with whom he pleases, he joins in partnership and company with whom he inclines, and, besides all this, he will succeed in all his projects for gain, as he doth not scruple to do injustice. When, then, he engages in competitions, he will, both in private and in public, surpass and exceed his adversaries, and by this means he will be rich, and serve his friends and hurt his enemies; and he will amply and magnificently render sacrifices and offerings to the Gods, and will honour the Gods, and such men as he chuses, much better than the just man: from whence they reckon that it is likely he will be more beloved of the Gods than the just man. Thus they say, Socrates, that both with Gods and men there is a better life prepared for the unjust man than for the just.

When Glauco had said these things, I had a design to say something in reply. But his brother Adimantus said:

Socrates, you do not imagine there is yet enough said on the argument.

What further then? said I.

That hath not yet been spoken, said he, which ought most especially to have been mentioned.

Why, then, said I, the proverb is, A brother is help at hand: so do you assist, if he has failed in any thing—though what hath been said by him is sufficient to throw me down and make me unable to succour justice.

You say nothing, reply'd he. But hear this further, for we must go through all the arguments opposite to what he hath said, which commend justice and condemn injustice, that what Glauco seems to me to intend may be more manifest. Now, parents surely tell and exhort their sons, as do all those who have the care of any, that it is necessary to be just, not commending justice in itself, but the honours arising from it; that whilst a man is reputed to be just, he may get by this reputation magistracies, and marriages, and whatever Glauco just now enumerated as the consequence of being reputed just. But these men carry this matter of reputation somewhat further; for, throwing in the approbation of the Gods, they have unspeakable blessings to enumerate to holy persons, which, they say, the Gods bestow. As the generous Hesiod and Homer say; the one, that the Gods cause the oaks to produce to just men

Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
Their woolly sheep are laden with their fleece;

and a great many other good things of the same nature.
In like manner the other,

The blameless king, who holds a godlike name,
Barley and wheat his black mold brings him forth;
With fruit his trees are laden; and his flocks
Bring forth with ease; the sea affords him fish.

But Musaeus and his son tell us that the Gods give just men more splendid blessings than these; for, carrying them, in his poem, into the other world, and setting them down in company with holy men at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time in drinking, deeming eternal inebriation the finest reward of virtue. But some carry the rewards

from the Gods still further; for they say that the offspring of the holy and the faithful, and their children's children, still remain. With these things, and such as these, they commend justice. But the unholy and unjust they bury in the other world, in a kind of mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve, and making them, even whilst alive, to live in infamy. Whatever punishments were assigned by Glauco to the just, whilst they were reputed unjust, these they assign to the unjust, but no others they mention. This, now, is the way in which they commend and discommend them severally.

But besides this, Socrates, consider another kind of reasoning concerning justice and injustice, mentioned both privately and by the poets; for all of them, with one mouth, celebrate temperance and justice as indeed excellent, but yet difficult and laborious, and intemperance and injustice as indeed pleasant and easy to attain, but by opinion only and by law abominable. And they say, that for the most part, unjust actions are more profitable than just. And they are gladly willing, both in public and private, to pay honour to wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, and to pronounce them happy, but to condemn and overlook those who are anyhow weak and poor, even whilst they acknowledge them to be better than the others. But of all these speeches, the most marvellous are those concerning the Gods and virtue: as if even the Gods gave to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to contrary persons a contrary fate. And mountebanks and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, persuade them that they have a power, granted them by the Gods, of expiating by sacrifices and songs, with pleasures and with feastings, if any injustice hath been committed by any one or his forefathers; and if he want to blast any enemy, at a small expence he shall injure the just, in the same manner as the unjust, by certain blandishments and bonds, as they say, persuading the Gods to succour them. And to all these discourses they bring the poets, as witnesses, who, mentioning the proneness to vice, say:

How vice at once and easily is got ;
The way is smooth, and very nigh it dwells ;
Sweat, before virtue, by the Gods is placed,

and a certain long and steep way. Others make Homer witness how the Gods are prevailed on by men, because he says,

———The Gods themselves are turn'd
With sacrifices and appeasing vows ;
Libation and with fat, men them persuade,
Praying when one transgresses and offends.

They shew, likewise, a great many books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring, as they say, of the moon and of the Muses, according to which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private persons, but states likewise, that there are absolutions and purgations from iniquities, by means of sacrifices and sportive pleasures, and this for the benefit both of the living and of the dead: these they call the Mysteries, which absolve us from evils there, but that dreadful things await such who do not offer sacrifice.

All these, and so many things of the kind, friend Socrates, being said of virtue and vice, and their reward both with men and Gods, what do we imagine the souls of our youth do when they hear them; such of them as are of good birth, and able as it were to rush into all these things which are said, and from all to deliberate in what sort of character, and in what sort of road one may best pass through life? He might likely say to himself, according to that of Pindar,

Whether shall I the lofty wall
Of justice try to scale ;
Or, hedged within the winding maze
Of vice, still shall I dwell?

For, according to what is said, though I be just, if I be not reputed so, there shall be no profit, but manifest troubles and punishments; but the unjust man, who procures to himself the character of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since, then, the appearance surpasses the reality, as wise men demonstrate to me, and is the primary part of happiness, ought I not to turn wholly to it, and to draw round myself as a covering and picture the image of virtue, but to draw after me the cunning and versatile fox of the most wise Archilochus? But, says one, it is not easy, being wicked, always to be concealed. Neither is any thing else easy (will we say) which is great. But, however, if

we would be happy, thither let us go, where the steps of the reasonings lead us. For, in order to be concealed, we will make conjurations and associations together; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and political wisdom, by which means, whilst partly by persuasion and partly by force, we seize more than our due, we shall not be punished. But, surely, to be concealed from the Gods, or to overpower them, is impossible.

If then they be not at all, or care not about human affairs, we need not have any concern about being concealed. But if they really are, and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies; and these very persons tell us that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices and appeasing vows and offerings—both of which we are to believe, or neither. If, then, we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and of the fruits of our injustice offer sacrifice; if we be just, we shall indeed be unpunished by the Gods, but then we shall not have the gains of injustice: but if we be unjust, we shall make gain; and after we have transgressed and offended, we shall appease them by offerings, and come off unpunished: but we shall be punished in the other world for our unjust doings here, either we ourselves, or our children's children. But, friend, will the reasoner say, the Mysteries can do much; the Gods are exorable, as say the mightiest states, and the children of the Gods, the poets, who are also their prophets, who declare that these things are so.

For what reason, then, should we still prefer justice before the greatest injustice? which if we shall attain to, with any deceiving appearance, we shall fare according to our mind, both with reference to Gods and men, both living and dying, according to the speech now mentioned of many and excellent men. From all which hath been said, by what means shall one incline to honour justice who hath any ability of fortune or of wealth, of body, or of birth, and not laugh when he hears it commended? So that, though one were able even to shew what we have said to be false, and fully understood that justice is better, he hath, however, great allowance surely to give, and is not angry at the unjust; for he knows, that unless

one from a divine temper abhors to do injustice, or from acquired knowledge abstain from it, of others no one is willingly just, but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness condemns the doing injustice, when unable to do it. That it is so, is plain; for the first of these who gets it in his power is the first to do injustice, as far as he is able.

And the reason of all this is no other than that from whence all this discourse proceeded, Socrates, because, rare friend, of you all, as many as call yourselves the commenders of justice, beginning from those ancient heroes of whom any accounts are left to the men of the present time, no one hath at any time condemned injustice, nor commended justice, otherwise than regarding the reputations, honours, and rewards arising from them: but no one hath hitherto sufficiently examined, neither in poetry nor in prose-discourse, either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power in the soul of him who hath it, and concealed from both Gods and men, how that the one is the greatest of all the evils which the soul hath within it, and justice the greatest good. For if it had thus from the beginning been spoken of by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we would not need to watch over our neighbour lest he should do us injustice, but every man would have been the best guardian over himself, afraid lest in doing injustice he should dwell with the greatest evil.

These things, now, Socrates, and probably much more than these, Thrasyarchus or some other might say of justice and injustice, inverting their power, disagreeably as I imagine, for my own part. But I (for I want to conceal nothing from you), being desirous to hear you on the opposite side, speak the best I am able, pulling the contrary way. Do not, therefore, only shew us in your reasoning that justice is better than injustice, but in what manner each of them by itself, affecting the mind, is, the one evil, and the other good. And take away all opinions, as Glauco likewise enjoined; for if you do not take away the false opinions on both sides, and add the true ones, we will say you do not commend justice, but the appearance, nor condemn being unjust, but the appearance; and that you give it as your advice to be unjust when concealed;

and that you assent to Thrasymachus, that justice is a foreign good, the profit of the more powerful; and that injustice is the profit and advantage of one's self, but unprofitable to the inferior. Wherefore, now, after that you have acknowledged that justice is among the greatest goods, such as are worthy to be possessed for what arises from them, and much more in themselves, and for their own sake, such as, sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and such other goods as are real in their own nature, and not merely in opinion, in the same manner commend justice, how in itself it profits the owner, and injustice hurts him. And leave to others to commend the rewards and opinions; for I could bear with others in this way commending justice, and condemning injustice, celebrating and reviling their opinions and rewards; but not with you (unless you desire me), because you have passed the whole of life considering nothing else but this. Shew us, then, in your discourse, not only that justice is better than injustice, but in what manner each of them by itself affecting the owner, whether he be concealed or not concealed from Gods and men, is, the one good, and the other evil.

On hearing these things, as I always indeed liked the disposition of Glauco and Adimantus, so, at that time, I was perfectly delighted, and said: It was not ill said concerning you, sons of that worthy man, by the lover of Glauco, who wrote the beginning of the Elegies, when, celebrating your behaviour at the battle of Megara, he said:

Aristo's sons, of an illustrious man
The race divine——

This, friends, seems to be well said; for you are truly affected in a divine manner, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, and yet are able to speak thus for it. And to me you seem truly not to be persuaded; and I reason from the whole of your other behaviour, since, according to your present speeches at least, I should distrust you. But the more I can trust you, the more I am in doubt what argument I shall use; for I can neither think of any assistance I have to give (for I seem to be unable, and my mark is, that you do not accept of

Elements of society and

what I said to Thrasymachus, when I imagined I show'd that justice was better than injustice); nor yet can I think of giving no assistance, for I am afraid lest it be an unholy thing to desert justice when I am present and see it accused, and not assist it whilst I breathe and am able to speak. It is best then to succour it in such a manner as I can.

Hereupon Glauco and the rest entreated me by all means to assist, and not give over the discourse, but to search thoroughly what each of them is, and which way the truth lies as to their respective advantage. I, then, said what appeared to me: That the inquiry we were attempting, was not contemptible, but was that of one who was sharp-sighted, as I imagined. Since, then, said I, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make the inquiry concerning this matter in such a manner as if it were ordered those who are not very sharp-sighted to read small letters at a distance, and one should afterwards understand that the same letters are greater somewhere else, and in a larger field: it would appear eligible, I imagine, first to read these, and thus come to consider the lesser if they happen to be the same.

Perfectly right, said Adimantus. But what of this kind, Socrates, do you perceive in the inquiry concerning justice?

I shall tell you, said I. Do not we say there is justice in one man, and there is likewise justice in a whole state?

It is certainly so, reply'd he.

Is not a state a greater object than one man?

Greater, said he.

It is likely, then, that justice should be greater in what is greater, and be more easy to be understood? We shall first, then, if you incline, inquire what it is in states, and then, after the same manner, we shall consider it in each individual, contemplating the similitude of the greater in the idea of the lesser.

You seem to me, said he, to say right.

If then, said I, we contemplate in our discourse a state existing, shall we not perceive its justice and injustice existing?

Perhaps, said he.

And, is there not ground to hope, if this exists, that we shall more easily find what we seek for?

Method - find out individual
first, then, if you incline, inquire what it is in states, and then, after the same manner, we shall consider it in each individual, contemplating the similitude of the greater in the idea of the lesser.

Most certainly.

It seems, then, we ought to attempt to succeed, for I imagine this to be a work of no small importance. Consider then.

We are considering, said Adimantus, and do you no otherwise.

A city, then, said I, as I imagine, takes its rise from this, that none of us happens to be self-sufficient, but is indigent of many things; or do you imagine there is any other origin of building a city?

None other, said he.

Thus then, one taking in one person for one indigence, and another for another, as they stand in need of many things, they assemble into one habitation many companions and assistants, and to this joint-habitation we give the name city. Do not we?

Certainly.

And they mutually exchange with one another, each judging that if he either gives or takes in exchange, it will be for his advantage.

Certainly.

Come then, said I, let us in our discourse make a city from the beginning. And, it seems, our indigence hath made it.

Why not?

But the first and the greatest of wants is the preparation of food, in order to subsist and live.

By all means.

The second is of lodging, the third, of cloathing and such like.

It is so.

But come, said I, how shall the city be able to make so great a provision? Shall not one be a husbandman, another a mason, some other a weaver? or shall we add to them a shoemaker, or some other of those who minister to the necessities of the body?

Certainly.

So that the most indigent city might consist of four or five men?

It seems so.

But what now? must each of those do his work for them all in common? as the husbandman, being one, shall he

prepare food for four, and consume quadruple time and labour in preparing food, and sharing it with others; or, neglecting them, shall he for himself alone make the fourth part of this food, in the fourth part of the time; and, of the other three parts of time, shall he employ one in the preparation of a house, the other in that of cloathing, the other of shoes, and not give himself trouble in sharing with others, but do his own affairs by himself?

Adimantus said: And probably, Socrates, this way is more easy than the other.

No, certainly, said I, it were absurd; for whilst you are speaking, I consider that we are born not perfectly resembling one another, but differing in disposition, one being fitted for doing one thing, and another for doing another. Does it not seem so to you?

It does.

But what now? Whether will one do better if, being one, he works in many arts or in one?

When in one, said he.

But this, I imagine, is also plain, that if one miss the season of any work, it is ruined.

That is plain.

For, I imagine, the work will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but, of necessity, the workman must attend close upon the work, and not in way of a by-job.

Of necessity.

And hence it appears, that more will be done, and better and with greater ease, when every one does but one thing, according to their genius, and in proper season, and freed from other things.

Most certainly, said he.

But we need certainly, Adimantus, more citizens than four for those provisions we mentioned. For the husbandman, it would seem, will not make a plough for himself, if it is to be handsome, nor yet a spade, nor other instruments of agriculture; as little will the mason, for he likewise needs many things; and in the same way the weaver and the shoemaker likewise. Is it not so?

True.

Joiners, then, and smiths, and other such workmen being admitted into our little city, make it throng.

Certainly.

But it would be no very great matter neither, if we did not give them neatherds likewise, and shepherds, and those other herdsmen, in order that both the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and that the masons, with the help of the husbandmen, may use the cattle for their carriages, and that the weavers, likewise, and the shoemakers may have hides and wool.

Nor yet, said he, would it be a very small city, having all these.

But, said I, it is almost impossible to set down such a city in any such place as that it shall need no importations.

It is impossible.

It shall then certainly want others still who may import from another state what it needs.

It shall want them.

And surely this service would be empty if it carry out nothing which these want from whom they import what they need themselves. It goes out empty in such a case, does it not?

To me it seems so.

But the city ought not only to make what is sufficient for itself, but such things, and so much also, as may answer for those things they need.

It ought.

Our city, then, certainly wants a great many more husbandmen and other workmen?

A great many more.

And other servants besides, to import and export the several things: and these are merchants, are they not?

Yes.

We shall then want merchants likewise?

Yes, indeed.

And if the merchandise is by sea, it will want many others, such as are skilful in sea affairs.

Many others, truly.

But what as to the city within itself? How will they exchange with one another the things which they have each of them worked, and for the sake of which, making a community, they have built a city?

It is plain, said he, in selling and buying.

Hence we must have a mercat-place, and money, as a symbol, for the sake of exchange.

Certainly.

If now the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the mercat, but come not at the same time with those who want to make exchange with him, must he not be set idle from his work, sitting in the mercat?

By no means, said he. But there are some who, observing this, set themselves to this service; and in well-regulated cities they are mostly such as are weakest in their body, and unfit to do any other work. There they are to attend about the mercat, to give money in exchange for such things as any may want to sell, and things in exchange for money to such as want to buy.

This indigence, said I, procures our city a race of shop-keepers; for do not we call shop-keepers those who, fixed in the mercat, serve both in selling and buying, but such as travel to other cities we call merchants?

Certainly.

There are still, as I imagine, certain other ministers who, though unfit to serve the public in things which require understanding, have yet strength of body sufficient for labour, who, selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, as I imagine, hirelings: are they not?

Yes, indeed.

Hirelings, then, are, it seems, the complement of the city?

It seems so.

Hath our city now, Adimantus, already so encreased upon us as to be complete?

Perhaps.

Where, now, at all, should justice and injustice be in it? and in which of the things that we have considered does it appear to exist?

I do not know, said he, Socrates, if it be not in a certain use, somehow, of these things with one another.

Perhaps, said I, you say right. But we must consider it, and not weary.

First, then, let us consider after what manner those who are thus procured shall be supported. Is it any other way than by making bread and wine, and cloaths and shoes, and building houses? In summer, indeed, they will work for the most part without cloaths and shoes, and in winter

they will be sufficiently furnished with cloaths and shoes. They will be nourished, partly with barley, making meal of it, and partly with wheat, making loaves, boiling part, and toasting part, putting fine loaves and cakes over a fire of stubble, or over dried leaves, and resting themselves on couches strawed with smilax and myrtle leaves, they and their children will feast, drinking wine, and crown'd, and singing to the Gods, they will pleasantly live together, begetting children not beyond their substance, guarding against poverty or war.

Glauco, replying, says; You make the men to feast, as it appears, without meats.

You say true, said I; for I forget that they shall have meats likewise. They shall have salt and olives and cheese, and they shall boil bulbous roots and herbs of the field; and we set before them deserts of figs and vetches and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle berries and the berries of the beech-tree, drinking in moderation. And thus passing their life in peace and health, and dying, as is likely, in old age, they will leave to their children another such life.

If you had been making, Socrates, said he, a city of hogs, what else would you have fed them with but with these things?

But how should we do, Glauco, said I?

What is usually done, said he. They must, as I imagine, have their beds and tables, and meats and deserts, as we now have, if they are not to be miserable.

Be it so, said I: I understand you. We consider, it seems, not only how a city may exist, but how a luxurious city: and perhaps it is not amiss; for in considering such an one we may probably see how justice and injustice have their origin in cities. But the true city seems to me to be such an one as we have described, like one who is healthy; but if you incline that we likewise consider a city that is corpulent, nothing hinders it. For these things will not, it seems, please some, nor this sort of life satisfy them; but there shall be beds and tables and all other furniture, seasonings, ointments, and perfumes, mistresses, and confections: and various kinds of all these. And we must no longer consider as alone necessary what we mentioned at the first, houses and cloaths and shoes, but painting,

too, and all the curious arts must be set a-going, and carving, and gold, and ivory; and all these things must be got, must they not?

Yes, said he.

Must not the city, then, be larger? For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but is already full of luxury, and of a croud of such as are no way necessary to cities; such as all kinds of sportsmen, and the imitative artists, many of them imitating in figures, and colours; and others in music; poets, too, and their ministers, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, undertakers, workmen of all sorts of instruments, and what hath reference to female ornaments, as well as other things. We shall need likewise many more servants. Do not you think they will need pedagogues, and nurses, and tutors, hair-dressers, barbers, victuallers too, and cooks? And further still, we shall want swine-herds likewise; of these there were none in the other city (for there needed not), but in this we shall want these, and many other sorts of herds likewise, if any eats the several animals, shall we not?

Why not?

Shall we not, then, in this manner of life be much more in need of physicians than formerly?

Much more.

And the country, which was then sufficient to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say?

In this way, said he.

Must we not then encroach upon the neighbouring country, if we want to have sufficient for plough and pasture, and they in like manner on us, if they likewise suffer themselves to accumulate wealth to infinity, going beyond the boundary of necessities?

There is great necessity for it, Socrates.

Shall we afterwards fight, Glauco, or how shall we do?

We shall certainly, said he.

But we say nothing, said I, whether war does any evil or any good, but this much only, that we have found the origin of war, from whence most especially arise the greatest mischiefs to states, both private and public.

Yes, indeed.

We shall need then, friend, still a larger city, not for a

small, but for a large army, who in going out may fight with those who assault them for their whole substance, and every thing we have now mentioned.

What, said he, are not these sufficient to fight?

No, if you, at least, said I, and all of us, have rightly agreed when we form'd our city: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one to perform many arts handsomely.

You say true, said he.

What then, said I, as to that contest of war; does it not appear to require art?

Very much, said he.

Ought we then to take more care of the art of shoe-making than of the art of making war?

By no means.

But we charged the shoemaker neither to undertake, at the same time, to be a husbandman, nor a weaver, nor a mason, but a shoemaker, that the work of that art may be done for us handsomely. And in like manner we allotted to every one of the rest one thing, to which the genius of each led him, and what each took care of, freed from other things, to do it well, applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the seasons of working. And now, as to the affairs of war, whether is it of the greatest importance that they be well performed? Or is this so easy a thing, that one may be a husbandman and likewise a soldier and shoemaker, or be employed in any other art; but not even at chess or dice can one ever play skilfully unless he study this very thing from his childhood, and not make it a by work. Or shall one, taking a spear or any other of the warlike arms and instruments, become instantly an expert combatant in an encounter in arms, or in any other relating to war? And shall the taking up of no other instrument make a workman or a wrestler, nor be useful to him, who hath neither the knowledge of that particular thing, nor hath bestowed the study sufficient for it?

Such instruments, said he, would truly be very valuable.

By how much then, said I, this work of guards is one of the greatest importance, by so much it should require the greatest leisure from other things, and likewise the greatest art and study.

I imagine so, reply'd he.

And shall it not likewise require a competent genius for this profession?

Why not?

It should surely be our business, as it seems, if we be able to chuse who and what kind of geniuses are competent for the guardianship of the city.

Ours, indeed.

We have, truly, said I, undertaken no mean business; but, however, we are not to despair, so long at least as we have any ability.

No indeed, said he.

Do you think then, said I, that the genius of a generous whelp differs any thing, for guardianship, from that of a generous youth?

What is it you say?

It is this. Must not each of them be acute in the perception, swift to pursue what they perceive, and strong likewise if there is need to conquer what they shall catch?

There is need, said he, of all these.

And surely he must be brave likewise if he fight well.

Why not?

But will he be brave who is not spirited, whether it is a horse, a dog, or any other animal? Or have you not observed that the spirit is somewhat unsurmountable and invincible, by the presence of which every soul is, in respect of all things whatever, unterrified and unconquerable?

I have observed it.

It is plain then what sort of a guard we ought to have with reference to his body.

Yes.

And with reference to his soul, that he should be spirited.

This, likewise, is plain.

How then, said I, Glauco, will they not be savage towards one another, and the other citizens, being of such a temper?

No, truly, said he, not easily.

But yet, it is necessary that towards their friends they be meek, and fierce towards their enemies; for otherwise they will not wait till others destroy them, but they will prevent them doing it themselves.

True, said he.

What then, said I, shall we do? Where shall we find, at

once, the meek and the magnanimous temper? For the meek disposition is somehow opposite to the spirited.

It appears so.

But, however, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian, for it seems to be impossible; and thus it appears that a good guardian is an impossible thing.

It seems so, said he.

After hesitating and considering what had past: Justly, said I, friend, are we in doubt, for we have departed from that image which we first established.

How say you?

Have we not observed that there are truly such tempers as we were not imagining, who have these opposite things?

Where then?

One may see it in other animals, and not a little in that one with which we compared our guardian. For this, you know, is the natural temper of generous dogs, to be most mild towards the domestics and their acquaintance, but the reverse to those they know not.

It is so.

This, then, said I, is possible; and it is not against nature, that we require our guardian to be such an one.

It seems not.

Are you, further, of this opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, be a philosopher likewise?

How? said he, for I do not understand you.

This, likewise, said I, you will observe in the dogs, and it is worthy of admiration in the brute.

As what?

He is angry at whatever unknown person he sees, though he hath never got any harm from him before; but he is fond of whatever acquaintance he sees, though he hath never at any time received any good from him. Have you not wondered at this?

I never, said he, much attended to it before; but that he doth this is plain.

But indeed this affection of his nature seems to be an excellent disposition and truly philosophical.

As how?

As, said I, it distinguishes between a friendly and un-

friendly aspect by nothing else but this, that it knows the one, but is ignorant of the other. How, now, should not this be deemed the love of learning, which distinguishes what is friendly and what is foreign by knowledge and ignorance?

It can no way be shewn why it should not.

But however, said I, to be a lover of learning and a philosopher are the same.

The same, said he.

May we not then boldly settle it, that in man too, if any one is to be of a mild disposition towards his domestics and acquaintance, he must be a philosopher and a lover of learning?

Let us settle it, said he.

He then, who is to be a good and worthy guardian, for us, of the city, shall be a philosopher, and spirited, and swift, and strong in his disposition. *Page 6-16*

By all means, said he.

Education of rulers in early life 59-7
Let then our guardian, said I, be such an one. But in what manner shall these be educated for us and instructed? And will the consideration of this be of any assistance in perceiving that for the sake of which we consider all else: in what manner justice and injustice arise in the city; that we may not omit a necessary part of the discourse, nor consider what is superfluous?

The brother of Glauco, said I, for my part, greatly expect that this inquiry will be of assistance to that.

Truly, said I, friend Adimantus, it is not to be omitted, though it should happen to be somewhat tedious.

No, truly.

Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable and at our leisure, educate these men in our reasoning.

It must be done.

What, then, is the education?—or is it difficult to find a better than that which was found long ago, which is, exercise for the body, and music for the mind?

It is, indeed.

Shall we not then, first, begin with instructing them in music, rather than in exercise?

Why not?

When you say music you mean discourses, do you not?

*communism in property
family communism*

I do.

But of discourses there are two kinds, the one true, and the other false.

There are.

And they must be educated in them both, and first in the false.

I do not understand, said he, what you mean.

Do not you understand, said I, that we first of all tell children fables? And this part of music, somehow, to speak in the general, is false, yet there is truth in them; and we accustom children to fables before their exercises.

We do so.

This, then, is what I meant, when I said that children were to begin music before their exercises.

Right, said he.

And do you not know that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially to any one young and tender; for then, truly, in the easiest manner is formed and taken on the impression which one inclines to imprint on every individual?

It is entirely so.

Shall we then suffer the children to hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons, and to receive for the most part into their minds opinions contrary to those we judge they ought to have when they are grown up?

We shall by no means suffer it.

First of all, then, we must preside over the fable-makers, and whatever beautiful fable they make must be chosen, and what are otherwise must be rejected; and we shall persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children such fables as shall be chosen, and to fashion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But the most of what they tell them at present must be thrown out.

As what? said he.

In the greater ones said I, we shall see the lesser likewise; for the fashion of them must be the same, and both the greater and the lesser must have the same kind of power. Do not you think so?

I do, said he: but I do not at all understand which you call the greater ones.

Those, said I, which Hesiod and Homer tell us, and the

other poets; for they composed false fables to mankind, and told them as they do still.

Which, said he, do you mean, and what is it you blame in them?

That, said I, which first of all and most especially ought to be blamed: when one does not falsify handsomely.

What is that?

When one in his composition gives ill representations of the nature of Gods and heroes—as a painter drawing a picture no way resembling what he wanted to paint.

It is right, said he, to blame such things as these. But how have they failed, say we, and as to what?

First of all, with reference to that greatest lye and matters of the greatest importance, he did not lye handsomely who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Saturn punished him, and then what Saturn did, and what he suffered from his son. Although they were true, yet I should not imagine they ought to be so plainly told to the unwise and the young, but ought much rather to be concealed; but if there were a necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy by as few as possible, after they had sacrificed, not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice, that thus the fewest possible might chance to hear them.

These fables, said he, are indeed truly hurtful.

And not to be mentioned, Adimantus, said I, in our city. Nor is it to be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who does the most extreme wickedness does nothing strange; nor he who in every shape punishes his unjust father, but does the same as the first and the greatest of the Gods.

No, truly, said he, these things do not seem to me proper to be said.

Nor, in the general, said I, how Gods war with Gods, and plot and fight against one another (for they are not true), if, at least, those who are to guard the city for us ought to account it the most shameful thing to hate one another on slight grounds; as little ought we to tell in fables, and embellish to them, the fights of the giants, and many other various feuds both of the Gods and heroes with their own kindred and relations. But if we are at all to persuade them that at no time doth one citizen hate another, and

that it is unholy, such things as these are rather to be said to them immediately when they are children, by the old men and women, and by those well advanced in life; and the poets are to be obliged to compose agreeably to these things. Juno fettered by her son, and Vulcan thrown down from heaven by his father, for going to assist his mother when beaten, and all those fights of the Gods which Homer hath composed, must not be admitted into the city, whether they be composed in way of allegory or without allegory. For the young person is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not; but whatever opinions he receiveth at such an age are difficult to be washen out, and are immoveable. On these accounts one would imagine that, of all things, we should endeavour that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue.

There is reason for it, said he. But if any one now should ask us concerning these, what they are, and what kind of fables they are, which should we name?

And I said: Adimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city; and it belongs to the founders to know the models according to which the poets are to compose their fables, contrary to which if they compose they are not to be tolerated; but it belongs not to us to make fables for them.

Right, said he. But as to this very thing, the models concerning theology, which are they?

Some such as these, said I. God is alway to be represented such as he is, whether one represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy.

This ought to be done.

Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such?

Without doubt.

But nothing which is good is hurtful, is it?

It doth not appear to me.

Does, then, that which is not hurtful ever do hurt?

By no means.

Does that which does no hurt do any evil?

Nor this neither.

And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil.

How can it?

But what? Good is beneficial.

Yes.

It is then the cause of welfare?

Yes.

Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things which are in a right state; but is not the cause of those things which are in a wrong.

Entirely so, said he.

Neither then can God, said I, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the generality say, but he is the cause of a few things to men; but of many things he is not the cause: for our good things are much fewer than our evil, and no other is the cause of our good things; but of our evils we must not make God the cause, but seek for some other.

You seem to me, said he, to speak most true.

We must not then, said I, take it, neither from Homer nor any other poet trespassing so foolishly, with reference to the Gods, and saying how,

Two coffers on Jove's threshold stand, and both
Are full of lots: one good, the other ill;
The man whose lot Jove mingles out of both,
Sometimes by ill is rul'd, sometimes by good.
Whose lot is otherwise, of ill unmix'd,
Him o'er the sacred earth dire famine drives.

Nor that Jupiter is the dispenser of our good and evil. Nor if any one say that the violation of oaths and treaties, violated by Pandarus, was done by Minerva and Jupiter, shall we commend it; nor that dissension among the Gods and judgment by Themis and Jupiter; nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Aeschylus says, how,

Whenever God inclines to raze
A house, himself contrives a cause.

But if any one make poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer them to say they are the works of God; or, if of God, we must find that reason of them which we now require, and we must say that God did what was just and good; and that they were better'd by being chastised: but we must not suffer a poet to say, that they are miserable who are

punished, and that it is God who does these things. But if they say that the wicked, as being miserable, needed correction, and that in being punished they were profited by God, we may suffer them. But to say that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to any one, this we must by all means oppose, nor suffer any one to say so in his city, if he want to have it well-regulated; nor suffer any one, neither young nor old, to hear such things told in fable, neither in verse nor prose, as they are neither agreeable to holiness to be told, nor profitable to us, nor consistent together.

I vote along with you, said he, in this law, and it pleases me.

This then, said I, may be one of the laws and models with reference to the Gods: by which it shall be necessary that those who speak and who compose shall compose and say that God is not the cause of all things, but of good.

Yes, indeed, said he, it is necessary.

But what as to this second law? Think you that God is a buffoon, and insidiously appears, at different times, in different shapes, sometimes like himself, and at other times changing his appearance into many shapes, sometimes deceiving us and making us conceive false opinions of him; or do you imagine him to be simple, and, of all, the least departing from his proper appearance?

I cannot, at present at least, reply'd he, say so.

But what as to this:

If anything be changed from its appearance, is there not a necessity that it be changed by itself or by another?

Undoubtedly.

Are not these things which are in the best state least of all changed and moved by any other thing?—as the body, by meats and drinks and labours, and every vegetable by tempests and winds, and such like accidents: is not the most sound and vigorous least of all changed?

Why not?

And as to the soul itself, will not any perturbation from without least of all disorder and change the most brave and wise?

Yes.

And surely, somehow, all vessels which are made, and buildings, and vestments, according to the same reasoning,

such as are properly worked and in a right state, are least changed by time or other accidents?

They are so, indeed.

Every thing, then, which is in a good state, either by nature or art, or both, receives the smallest change from any thing else.

It seems so.

But God and all the divine conduct are in the best state.

Why not?

In this way then, God should least of all have many shapes.

Least of all, truly.

But should he change and alter himself?

It is plain, said he, if he be changed at all.

Whether then should he change himself to the better and to the more handsome, or to the worse and the more deformed?

Of necessity, reply'd he, to the worse, if he be changed at all; for we shall never at any time say that God is any way deficient with respect to beauty or excellence.

You say most right, said I. And this being so, do you imagine, Adimantus, that any one, either of Gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse?

It is impossible, said he.

It is impossible then, said I, for a God to desire to change himself; but each of them, being most fair and good, continues always, to the utmost of his power, invariably in his own form.

This appears to me, at least, said he, wholly necessary.

Let not then, said I, most excellent Adimantus, any of the poets tell us how the Gods;

—Like various foreign travellers drest,
And various forms assuming, visit states.

Nor let any one belye Proteus and Thetis, nor bring in Juno, in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself like a priestess, and collecting for the gracious sons of Inachus the Argive River; nor let them tell us many other such lyes. Nor let the mothers, persuaded by them, affright their children, telling the stories wrong, how that certain Gods go about all night,

Resembling various guests of various climes,

that they may not, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the Gods and render their children more dastardly.

By no means, said he.

But are the Gods, said I, such as, though in themselves they never change, yet make us imagine they appear in various forms, deceiving us and playing the mountebanks?

Perhaps, said he.

But what, said I, can a God cheat, holding forth a phantasm, either in word or deed?

I do not know, said he.

Do not you know, said I, that what is truly a cheat, if one can speak so, all, both Gods and men, abhor?

How do you say, reply'd he.

Thus, said I, that to offer a cheat to the chiefest part of themselves, and that about their chiefest interests, is what none willingly incline; but of all things every one is most afraid of having got a cheat there.

Neither as yet, said he, do I understand you.

Because, said I, you fancy I am saying some great matter: but I am saying, that to cheat the soul concerning realities, and to be so cheated, and to be ignorant, and there to have got and to keep a cheat, is what every one would least of all chuse; and a cheat in the soul is what they most especially hate.

Most especially, said he.

But this, as I was now saying, might most justly be called a true cheat, ignorance in the soul of the cheated person: since a cheat in words is but a kind of imitation of what the soul feels, and an image afterwards arising, and not altogether a pure cheat. Is it not so?

Entirely.

But this real lye is not only hated of the Gods, but of men likewise.

So it appears.

But, what now? The cheat in words, when hath it something of utility, so as not to deserve hatred? Is it not when employed towards our enemies, and some even of those called our friends, when, in madness or other distemper they attempt to do some mischief? in that case, for a dissuasive, as a drug it is useful. And in those fables we were now mentioning, as we know not how the

truth stands concerning ancient things, making a lye resembling the truth we render it useful as much as possible.

It is, said he, perfectly so.

In which then of these cases is a lye useful to God? Whether does he make a lye resembling the truth, as being ignorant of ancient things?

That were ridiculous, said he.

God is not, then, a lying poet.

I do not think it.

But should he make a lye from fear of his enemies?

Far from it.

But on account of the folly or madness of his kindred?

But, said he, none of the foolish and mad are the friends of God.

There is then no occasion at all for God to make a lye.

There is none.

The divine and Godlike nature is then, in all respects, without a lye?

Altogether, said he.

God then is simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself nor does he deceive others, neither by visions, nor by discourse, nor by the pomp of signs, neither when we are awake nor when we sleep.

So it appears, said he, to me at least, whilst you are speaking.

You agree then, said I, that this shall be the second model by which we are to speak and to compose concerning the Gods: that they are neither mountebanks to change themselves, nor to mislead us by lyes either in word or deed?

I agree.

Whilst then we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend, the dream sent by Jupiter to Agamemnon; neither shall we commend Aeschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage that

A comely offspring she shou'd raise,
From sickness free, of lengthen'd days :
Apollo, singing all my fate,
And praising high my Godlike state,
Rejoic'd my heart; and 'twas my hope,
That all was true Apollo spoke :

But he who at my marriage feast
Extoll'd me thus, and was my guest ;
He who did thus my fate explain
Is he who now my son hath slain.

When any one says such things as these of the Gods, we shall shew displeasure, and not afford the chorus: nor shall we suffer teachers to make use of such things in the education of the youth, if our guardians are to be godly and divine men as far as it is possible for man to be.

I agree with you, said he, perfectly, as to these models, and we may use them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK

THE THIRD BOOK

THESE things indeed then, said I, and such as these, are, as seems, what are to be heard and not heard, concerning the Gods, immediately from childhood, by those who are to honour the Gods and their parents, and who are not to despise friendship with one another.

And I imagine, reply'd he, that these things have appeared aright.

But what now? If they are to be brave, must not these things be narrated to them, and such other likewise as may render them least of all afraid of death? or do you imagine that any one can ever be brave whilst he hath this fear within him?

Not I, truly, said he.

But what? do you imagine that any one can be void of a fear of death whilst he imagines that there is another world, and that it is dreadful, and that in battles he will chuse death before defeat and slavery?

By no means.

We ought then, as appears, to give orders likewise to those who undertake to discourse about fables of this kind, and to entreat them not to reproach thus in general the things of the other world, but rather to commend them, as they say neither what is true, nor what is profitable to those who are to be soldiers.

We ought, indeed, said he.

Beginning then, said I, at this verse, we shall leave out all of such kind as this:

I'd rather, as a rustic slave, submit
To some mean man, who had but scanty fare,
Than govern all the wretched shades below.

And that,

The house, to mortals and immortals, seems
Horrible and squalid, and what Gods abhor,

And,

O wretched ! in the mansions of the grave
Is there a soul and shape, but ne'er a mind.

And,

Alone are wise—the shades all flutter round.

And,

The soul fled from the body to the grave,
And, leaving youth and manhood, wail'd its fate.

And,

The soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Went howling.

And,

As when, in hollow of a spacious cave,
The owls fly, screaming if one chance to fall
Down from the rock, they all confusedly fly,
So these together howling went.

We shall beg Homer and the other poets not to take it amiss if we raze these things, and such as these, not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to many to be heard, but the more poetical they are, the less ought they to be heard by children, and men who ought to be free and more afraid of slavery than of death.

By all means, truly.

Further, are not all dreadful and frightful names about these things likewise to be rejected? Cocytus, and Styx, those below, and the dead, and such other appellations in this style, such as terrify all who hear them. These may perhaps serve some other purpose; but we are afraid for our guardians, lest by such a terror they be rendered more effeminate and soft than they ought to be.

We are rightly afraid of it, said he.

Are these then to be taken away?

They are.

And they must speak and compose on a contrary model.
That is plain.

We shall take away likewise the bewailings and lamentations of illustrious men?

This is necessary, if what is above be so.

Consider then, said I, whether we rightly take away or not. And do not we say, that the worthy man will

imagine that to die is not a dreadful thing to the worthy man whose companion he is?

We say so.

Neither then will he lament over him, at least, as if his friend suffer'd something dreadful.

No, indeed.

And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all sufficient in himself, for to live happily and in a distinguished manner from others is least of all indigent.

True, said he.

It is to him, then, the least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, wealth, or any other of those things.

Least of all, indeed.

So that he will least of all lament, but endure in the mildest manner when any such misfortune befalls him.

Certainly.

We shall rightly then take away the lamentations of famous men, and assign them to the women, but not to the better sort, and to such of the men as are dastardly, that so those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country may disdain to make lamentations of this kind.

Right, said he.

We shall again then entreat Homer and the other poets not to say in their compositions that Achilles the son of a Goddess,

Lay sometimes on his side, and then anon
On back supine, then prone ; then rising up,
Lamenting wander'd on the barren shore.

Nor how,

——With both his hands,
He pour'd the burning dust upon his head ;

nor the rest of his lamentation and bewailing, such and so great as he hath composed. Nor that Priamus, so near to the Gods, so meanly supplicated and rolled himself in the dirt:

Calling on every soldier by his name.

But still much more must we entreat them not to make the Gods, at least, to bewail and say:

Oh ! wretched I, in bearing worthiest son.

And if they are not thus to bring in the Gods, far less

should they dare to represent the greatest of the Gods in so unbecoming a manner as this:

How dear a man, around the town pursu'd,
 Mine eyes behold ! and griev'd is my heart.
 Ah me ! 'tis fated that Patroclus kill
 Sarpedon, whom, of all men, most I love.

For if, friend Adimantus, our youth should seriously hear such things as these, and not laugh at them as spoken most unsuitably, hardly should any one think it unworthy of himself, of himself being a man, or check himself if he should happen either to say or to do any thing of the kind; but without any shame or endurance would, on small sufferings, sing many lamentations and moans.

You say most true, reply'd he.

They must not, therefore, do in this manner, as our reasoning now hath show'd us—which we must believe, till some one persuade us by some better.

They must not, indeed.

But surely neither ought we to be given to excessive laughter; for where one gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition commonly requires a violent change.

It seems so, said he.

Nor, if any one shall represent worthy men as overcome of laughter, must we allow it: much less if he thus represent the Gods.

Much less, indeed, said he.

Neither then shall we receive such things as these from Homer, concerning the Gods:

Excessive laughter rose among the Gods,
 When they beheld lame Vulcan hurrying round.

This is not to be admitted, according to your reasoning.

If you incline, said he, to call it my reasoning; this, indeed, is not to be admitted.

But surely the truth is much more to be valued. For if lately we reasoned aright, and if indeed a lye be unprofitable to the Gods, but useful to men in way of a drug, it is plain that such a thing is to be entrusted only to the physicians, but not to be touched by private persons.

It is plain, said he.

It belongs then to the governours of the city, if to any

others, to make a lye, with reference either to enemies or citizens, for the good of the city; but none of the rest must venture on such a thing. But for a private person to tell a lye to such governours, we will call it the same, and even a greater offence, than for the patient to tell a lye to the physician, or for the man who learns his exercises not to tell his master the truth as to the indispositions of his body; or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of things respecting the ship and sailors, in what condition himself and the other sailors are.

Most true, said he.

But if you find in the city any one else making a lye,

—Of those who artists are,
Or prophet, or physician, or who make
The shafts of spears,

you shall punish them, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as of a ship.

We must do so, if indeed it is upon speech that actions are compleated.

But what? shall not our youth have need of temperance? Certainly.

And are not such things as these the principal parts of temperance: that they be obedient to their governours; that the governours themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and in venereal pleasures? And we shall say, I imagine, that such things as these are well spoken, which Diomed says in Homer:

Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech.

And what follows; thus:

The Greeks went on in silence, breathing force,
Revering their commanders,—

and such like.

Well spoken.

But what as to these: Thou drunkard with dog's eyes and heart of deer, and all of this kind; are these, or such other juvenile things, which any private person may say against their governours, spoken handsomely?

Not handsomely.

For I do not imagine, that when they are heard, they

are fit to promote temperance in the youth; and though they may afford a pleasure of a different kind, it is no wonder. But what do you think?

Just the same way, said he.

But what say you of this: to make the wisest man say that he thinks it the most handsome thing of all,

—When tables are all full
Of meats and fleshs, and the butler bears
The wine in flagons, and fills up the cups;

Is the hearing of this proper for the youth towards having the command of himself? Or yet this:

Most miserable it is,
To die of famine and have adverse fate.

Or that Jupiter, through desire of love-pleasures, easily forgetting all those things which he alone awake revolved in his mind, whilst other Gods and men were asleep, was so struck on seeing Juno as not to chuse to come into the house, but wanted to embrace her in the field, telling he is possessed with such desire as exceeded what he felt on their first coming together,

—Hid from their parents dear.

Nor yet how Mars and Venus were bound by Vulcan, and other such things?

No, truly, said he; these things do not seem fit.

But if any instances of self-denial, said I, with respect to all these things be told, and practised by eminent men, these are to be beheld and heard. Such as this:

He beat his breast, and thus he chid his heart:
Bear up, my heart! who heavier fate hast borne.

By all means, said he, we should do thus.

Neither must we suffer men to receive bribes nor to be covetous.

By no means.

Nor must we sing to them that,

Gifts gain the Gods and venerable Kings.

Nor must we commend Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke in moderation in counselling him to accept of presents and assist the Greeks, but without presents not to desist from his wrath. Neither shall we commend

Achilles, nor approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon, and likewise a ransom to give up the dead body of Hector, but not to incline to do it otherwise.

It is not right, said he, to commend such things as these.

I grudge, said I, for Homer's sake, to say it, that neither is it lawful that these things, at least, be said against Achilles, nor that they be believed when said by others: how that he spoke thus to Apollo:

Me thou hast injur'd—thou, far-shooting God!
Of all the most destructive: but reveng'd
I sure shou'd be, were I possess'd of power.

And how disobedient he was to the river, though a divinity, and was ready to fight; and again, he says to the river Sperchius, with his sacred locks:

Thy lock to great Patroclus I cou'd give,
Who now is dead.

Nor are we to believe he did this. And the dragging Hector round the sepulchre of Patroclus, and the slaughtering the captives at his funeral pile, that all these things are true we will not say; nor will we suffer our people to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a Goddess and of Peleus, the most temperate of men and the third from Jupiter, and educated by the most wise Chiron, was full of such disorder as to have within him two distempers opposite to one another: the illiberal and covetous disposition, and a contempt both of Gods and of men.

You say right, reply'd he.

Neither, said I, let us be persuaded of these things, nor suffer any to say, that Theseus the son of Neptune, and Perithous the son of Jupiter, rushed so upon horrible rapines; nor that any child of other deity, nor any hero, would dare to do horrible and impious deeds, such as the lies of the poets ascribe to them: but let us compel the poets, either to say that these are not the actions of these persons, or that these persons are not the children of the Gods, and not to say both.

Nor let us suffer them to attempt to persuade our youth that the Gods create evil, and that heroes are no way better than men: for, as we said formerly, these things are neither holy nor true: for we have elsewhere shown

that it is impossible that evil should proceed from the Gods.

Why not?

And these things are truly hurtful, to the hearers at least; for everyone will forgive himself his own naughtiness when he is persuaded that even the near relations of the gods do and have done things of the same kind: such as are near to Jupiter,

Who, on the top of Ida, have up-rear'd
To parent Jupiter an altar;

And,

Whose Godlike blood is not yet quite extinct.

On which accounts, all such fables must be suppress'd, lest they create in our youth a powerful habit of wickedness.

We must do so, reply'd he, by all means.

What other species of discourses, said I, have we still remaining, now whilst we are determining what ought to be spoken and what not? We have already mentioned in what manner we ought to speak of the Gods, and likewise of daemons and heroes, and likewise of what relates to another world.

Yes, indeed.

Should not then what yet remains seem to be concerning men?

It is plain.

But it is impossible for us, friend, to regulate this at present.

How?

Because, I imagine, we will say that the poets and orators speak amiss concerning the greatest affairs of men—how that the most of men are unjust, and, notwithstanding, they are happy; and that the just are miserable; and that it is profitable for one to do unjustly when he is concealed; and that justice is gain indeed to others, but the loss of the just man himself—these, and innumerable other such things, we will forbid them to say, and enjoin them to sing and compose in fable the contrary to these. Do not you think so?

I know it well, said he.

If, then, you acknowledge that I say right, shall I not say that you have acknowledged what all along we seek for?

You judge right, said he.

Shall we not then acknowledge that such discourses are to be spoken concerning men, whenever we shall have found out what justice is, and how in its nature it is profitable to the just man to be such, whether he appear to be such or not?

Most true, reply'd he.

Concerning the discourses, then, let this suffice. We must now consider, as I imagine, the manner of discourse, and then we shall have completely considered both what is to be spoken, and the manner how.

Here Adimantus said, But I do not understand what you say.

But, reply'd I, it is needful you should, and perhaps you will rather understand it in this way: Is not everything told by the mythologists or poets a narrative of the past, present, or future?

What else? reply'd he.

And do not they execute it, either by simple narration, or imitation, or by both?

This, too, reply'd he, I want to understand more plainly.

I seem, said I, to be a ridiculous and obscure instructor; therefore, like those who are unable to speak, I will endeavour to explain, not the whole, but taking up a particular part, show my meaning by this particular. And tell me, do not you know the beginning of the Iliad—where the poet says that Chryses entreated Agamemnon to set free his daughter, but that he was displeased, that Chryses, when he did not succeed, prayed against the Greeks to the God.

I know.

You know then that down to these verses,

—The Grecians all he pray'd,
But chief the two commanders, Atreus' sons,

the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere as if any other person were speaking: but what he says after this he says as if he himself were Chryses, and endeavours as much as possible to make us imagine that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest,

an old man; and that in this manner he hath composed almost the whole narrative of what happened at Troy and in Ithaca, and all the adventures in the whole Odyssey.

It is certainly so, reply'd he.

Is it not then narration when he tells the several speeches, and likewise when he tells what interveens between the speeches?

Why not?

But when he makes any speech in the person of another, do not we say that then he assimilates his speech as much as possible to each person he introduces as speaking?

We say so, why do not we?

And is not the assimilating one's self to another, either in voice or figure, the imitating him to whom one assimilates himself?

Why not?

In such a manner as this then, it seems, both he and the other poets perform the narrative by means of imitation. Certainly.

But if the poet did not at all conceal himself, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation: And that you may not say you do not again understand how this should be, I shall tell you. If Homer—after telling how Chryses came with his daughter's ransom, beseeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings—had spoken afterwards, not as Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not have been imitation, but simple narration. And it would have been somehow thus (I shall speak without metre, for I am no poet): The priest came and prayed that the Gods might grant they should take Troy, and return safe, and begged them to restore him his daughter, accepting the presents, and revering the God. When he had said this, all the rest shew'd respect, and consented; but Agamemnon was enraged, charging him now to be gone, and not to return again, lest his sceptre and the garlands of the God should be of no avail; and told him, that before he would restore his daughter, she should grow old with him in Argos, but ordered him to be gone, and not to irritate him, that he might get home in safety. The old man, upon hearing this, was afraid, and went away in silence. And when he was retired from the camp he made many supplications to Apollo, rehearsing the names of the God, and

putting him in mind, and beseeching him, that if ever he had made any acceptable donation, in the building of temples or the offering of sacrifices, in return of these to avenge his tears upon the Greeks with his arrows. Thus, said I, friend, the narration is simple without imitation.

I understand, said he.

Understand then, said I, that the opposite of this happens when one, taking away the poet's part between the speeches, leaves the speeches themselves.

This, said he, I likewise understand, that the manner of tragedies is of such a kind.

You apprehend perfectly well, said I. And, I imagine, I now make plain to you what I could not before, that in poetry, and likewise in mythology, one kind is wholly by imitation, such as you say tragedy and comedy are; and another kind by the narration of the poet himself, and you will find this kind most especially in the Dithyrambus; and another again by both, as in Epic poetry, and in many other cases besides, if you understand me.

I understand now, reply'd he, what you meant before.

And remember too that, before that, we were saying that we had already mentioned what things were to be spoken, but that it yet remained to be considered in what manner they were to be spoken.

I remember, indeed.

This then is what I was saying: that it were necessary we agreed whether we shall suffer the poets to make narratives to us in the way of imitation, or partly in the way of imitation and partly not (and what in each way), or if they are not to use imitation at all.

I conjecture, said he, you are to consider whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into our city, or not.

Perhaps, reply'd I, and something more too, for I do not as yet know, indeed; but wherever our reasoning, as a gale, bears us, there we must go.

And truly, said he, you say well.

Consider this, now, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to practise imitation, or not. Or does this follow from what is above: that each one may handsomely perform one business, but many he cannot; or if he shall attempt it, in grasping at many things he shall fail in all, so as to be remarkable in none?

Why shall he not?

And is not the reason the same concerning imitation: that one man is not so able to imitate many things well, as one.

He is not.

Hardly then shall he perform any part of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an imitator, since the same persons are not able to perform handsomely imitations of two different kinds, which seem to resemble each other; as, for instance, they cannot succeed both in comedy and tragedy: or did you not lately call these two imitations?

I did; and you say true that the same persons cannot succeed in them.

Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors. True.

Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies: and all these are imitations, are they not?

Imitations.

The genius of man seems to me, Adimantus, to be shut up within still lesser bounds than these, so that it is unable to imitate handsomely many things, or do these very things of which even the imitations are the resemblances.

Most true, said he.

If therefore we are to hold to our first reasoning, that our guardians, unoccupied in any manufacture whatever, ought to be the most accurate manufacturers of the liberty of the city, and to mind nothing but what hath some reference to this, it were surely proper they neither did nor imitated any thing else; but if they shall imitate at all, to imitate immediately from their childhood such things as are correspondent to these—brave, temperate, holy, free men, and all such things as these—but neither to do, nor to be desirous in imitating, things illiberal or base, lest from imitating they come to be really such. Or have you not observed that imitations, if from earliest youth they be continued onwards for a long time, are established into the manners and natural temper, both with reference to the body and voice, and likewise the understanding?

Very much so, reply'd he.

We will not surely allow, said I, those we profess to take care of, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman,

Imitation

either young or old, either reviling her husband, or quarrelling with the Gods, or speaking boastingly, when she imagines herself happy; nor yet to imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in child-bed labour. We shall be far from permitting this.

By all means, reply'd he.

Nor to imitate man or maidservants in doing what belongs to servants.

Nor this, neither.

Nor yet to imitate naughty men, as it seems, such as are dastardly and do the contrary of what we have now been mentioning; reviling and railing at one another and speaking abominable things either drunk or sober, or any other things such as persons of this sort are guilty of, either in words or actions, either with respect to themselves or one another. Neither must they accustom themselves to resemble madmen, in words or actions. Even the mad and wicked are to be known, both the men and the women, but none of their actions are to be done or imitated.

Most true, said he.

But what? said I, are they to imitate such as work in brass or any other handicrafts, or such as are employed in rowing boats, or such as command these, or any thing else appertaining to these things?

How can they, said he, as they are not to be allowed to give application to any of those things?

But what? shall they imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things?

We have forbidden them, said he, to be mad, or to resemble madmen.

If then I understand, reply'd I, what you say, there is a certain kind of speech and of narration in which he who is truly a good and worthy man expresses himself when it is necessary for him to say any thing, and another kind again, unlike to this, which he who hath been born and educated in an opposite manner always possesseth, and in which he expresseth himself.

But of what kind are these? said he.

I imagine, said I, that the worthy man, when he comes in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will

willingly tell it as if he were himself the man, and will not be ashamed of such an imitation, most especially when he imitates a good man acting prudently and without a slip, and failing seldom, and but little, through diseases, or love, drunkenness, or any other misfortune. But when he comes to anything unworthy of himself, he will not be studious to resemble himself to that which is worse, unless for a short time when it produces some good, but will be ashamed, both as he is unpractised in the imitation of such characters as these, and likewise, as he grudges to degrade himself and stand among the models of baser characters, disdaining it in his mind, and doing it only for amusement.

It is likely, said he.

He will not then make use of such a narrative as we lately mentioned with reference to the compositions of Homer, but his composition will participate of both imitation and the other narrative, and but a small part of it imitation in a great deal of plain narrative. Do I seem to say anything, or nothing at all?

You express, reply'd he, perfectly well what ought to be the model of such an orator.

And on the other hand, will not the man, said I, who is not such an one, the more naughty he is, be the readier to rehearse everything whatever, and shall not think anything unworthy of him, so that he shall undertake to imitate everything in earnest, and likewise in presence of many and such things likewise as we now mentioned—thunderings and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles and wheels, and trumpets and pipes and whistles, and sounds of all manner of instruments, and voices of dogs too, and of sheep, and of birds; and the whole expression of all these things shall be by imitation in voices and gestures, having but a small part of it narration.

This too, said he, must happen of necessity.

These now, said I, I called the two kinds of diction.

They are so, reply'd he.

But has not the one of these small variations; and if the orator afford the becoming harmony and measure to the diction, where he speaks with propriety, the discourse is almost upon one and the same manner, and in one harmony, for the variations are but small, and in a measure which accordingly is somehow familiar?

It is indeed, reply'd he, entirely so.

But what as to the other kind? Does it not require the contrary, all kinds of harmony, all kinds of measure, if it be to be naturally expressed, as it hath all sorts of variations?

It is perfectly so.

Do not, now, all the poets, and such as speak in any kind, make use of either one or other of these models of diction, or of one compounded of both?

Of necessity, reply'd he.

What then shall we do? said I. Whether shall we admit into our city all of these, or one of the unmixed, or the one compounded?

If my opinion, reply'd he, prevail, that uncompounded one which is imitative of what is worthy.

But, surely, Adimantus, the mixed is pleasant at least; and the opposite of what you chuse is by far the most pleasant to children and pedagogues and the crowd.

It is most pleasant.

But you will not likely, said I, think it suitable to our government, because with us no man is to mind two or more employments, but to be quite simple, as every one does one thing.

It is not indeed suitable.

Shall we not then find, that in such a city alone, a shoemaker is only a shoemaker, and not a pilot along with shoemaking, and that the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge along with husbandry, and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker besides; and all others in the same way?

True, reply'd he.

And it would appear that if a man who through wisdom were able to become everything, and to imitate everything, should come into our city, and should want to show us his poems, we should revere him as a sacred, admirable and pleasant person, but we should tell him that there is no such person with us in our city, nor is there any such allowed to be, and we should send him out to some other city, pouring oil on his head and crowning him with wool; but we use a more austere poet and mythologist for our advantage, who may imitate to us the diction of the worthy manner, and may say whatever he says according to those

models which we established by law at first, when we undertook the education of our soldiers.

So we should do, reply'd he, if it depended on us.

It appears, said I, friend, that we have now thoroughly discussed that part of music respecting oratory and fable, for we have already told what is to be spoken, and in what manner.

It appears so to me likewise, said he.

Does it not yet remain, said I, that we speak of the manner of song and of melodies?

It is plain.

May not any one find out what we must say of these things, and of what kind these ought to be, if we are to be consistent with what is above-mentioned?

Here Glauco, laughing, said: But I appear, Socrates, to be a stranger to all these matters; for I am not able at present to guess at what we ought to say: I suspect, however.

You are certainly, said I, fully able to say this in the first place, that melody is made up of three things, of sentiment, harmony, and measure.

Yes, reply'd he, this I can say.

And that the part which consists in the sentiment differs in nothing from that sentiment which is not sung, in this respect, that it ought to be done upon the same models as we just now said, and in the same manner.

True, said he.

And surely, then, the harmony and measure ought to correspond to the sentiment.

Why not?

But we observed there was no occasion for wailings and lamentations in compositions.

No occasion, truly.

Which then are the wailing harmonies? Tell me, for you are a musician.

The mixt Lydian, reply'd he, and the sharp Lydian, and some others of this kind.

Are not these then, said I, to be rejected, for they are unprofitable even to women, such as are worthy, and much more to men?

Certainly.

But drunkenness is most unbecoming our guardians, and effeminacy and idleness.

Why not?

Which then are the effeminate and gossiping harmonies?

The Ionic, reply'd he, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing.

Can you make any use of these, my friend, for military men?

By no means, reply'd he: but, it seems, you have yet remaining the Doric and the Phrygian.

I do not know, said I, the harmonies; but leave that harmony which may in a becoming manner imitate the voice and accents of a truly brave man going on in a military action, and every rough adventure, and bearing his fortune in a determinate and persevering manner when he fails of success, goes against wounds or deaths, or falls into any other distress; and that kind of harmony, likewise, which is suited to what is peaceable, where there is no violence, but all voluntary—where one either persuades or beseeches any one about anything, either God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition; or, on the other hand, where one submits himself to another who beseeches, instructs, and persuades, and, upon all these things, acts according to intelligence, and does not behave haughtily, demeaning himself soberly and moderately, gladly embracing whatever befalleth. Leave then these two harmonies, the vehement and the gentle, which in the most handsome manner imitate the voice of the misfortunate and of the fortunate, of the moderate and of the brave.

You desire, reply'd he, to leave no others but those I now mentioned.

We shall not then, said I, have any need of a great many strings, nor a variety of harmony in our songs and melodies.

It appears to me, reply'd he, we shall not.

We shall not breed, then, such workmen as make harps and spinets, and all those instruments which have many strings and a variety of harmony.

No, as appears.

But what? Will you admit into your city such workmen as make pipes, or pipers? for are not the instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings, and have all sorts of harmony, imitations of the pipe?

It is plain, reply'd he.

There is left you still, said I, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city, and there might likewise be some reed for shepherds in the fields.

Thus reason, said he, shows us.

We then, reply'd I, do nothing strange if we prefer Apollo and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas and the instruments of that eminent musician.

Truly, reply'd he, we do not appear to do it.

And I swear, said I, we have unawares cleansed again our city, which we said was become luxurious.

And we have wisely done it, reply'd he.

Come then, said I, and let us cleanse what remains; for what concerns the measure, should be suitable to our harmonies, that our citizens pursue not such measures as are diversified and have a variety of cadencies, but observe what are the measures of a decent and manly life, and whilst they observe these, to make the foot and the melody subservient to sentiment of such a kind, and not the sentiment subservient to the foot and melody. But what these measures are is your business to tell, as you have done the harmonies.

But truly, reply'd he, I cannot tell. That there are three species of which the notes are composed, as there are four in sounds, whence the whole of harmony, I can say, as I have observed it; but which are the imitations of one kind of life, and which of another, I am not able to tell.

But these things, said I, we must consider with Damon's assistance, what notes are suitable to illiberality and insolence, to madness or other ill disposition, and what notes are proper for their opposites. And I remember, but not distinctly, to have heard him calling a certain warriour, composite, a dactyle, and heroic measure, ornamenting him I do not know how, making him equal above and below, in breadth and length, and called one, as I imagine, Iambus, and another Trochaeus. He adapted, besides, the lengths and shortnesses, and in some of these, I believe, he blamed and commended the measure of the foot no less than the numbers themselves, or something compounded of both, for I cannot speak of these things; for these things, as I said, are to be thrown over upon

Damon: to speak distinctly on these matters, would require no small discourse; do not you think so?

Not a small one, truly.

But can you determine this, that the propriety and impropriety corresponds to the good or ill measure?

Why not?

But with respect to the good or ill measure, the one corresponds to handsome expression, conforming itself to it, and the other to the reverse. And, in the same way as to the harmonious and the discordant, since the measure and harmony are subservient to the sentiment, as hath been now said, and not the sentiment to these.

These indeed, said he, are to be subservient to the sentiment.

But what, said I, as to the manner of expression, and as to the sentiment itself? must it not correspond to the temper of the soul?

Why not?

And all other things correspond to the expression?

Yes.

So that the beauty of expression, fine consonancy, and propriety and excellence of numbers, are subservient to the good disposition—not that stupidity which in complaisant language we call good temper, but an understanding truly adorned with a beautiful and fine temper.

By all means, reply'd he.

Must not these things be always pursued by the youth if they are to mind their business?

They are indeed to be pursued.

But painting too is, somehow, full of these things, and every other workmanship of the kind; and weaving is full of these, and carving, and architecture, and all workmanship of every kind of vessels—as is, moreover, the nature of bodies and of all vegetables: for in all these there is propriety and impropriety; and the impropriety, discord and dissonance are the sisters of ill expression and ill sentiment, and their opposites are the sisters and imitations of sober and good sentiment.

'Tis entirely so, reply'd he.

Are we then to give injunctions to the poets alone, and oblige them to work into their poems the image of the good sentiment, otherwise not to compose at all with us; or are

we to enjoin all other workmen likewise, and restrain this ill, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent manner, that they exhibit it neither in the representations of animals, in buildings, nor in any other workmanship; or that he who is not able to do this be not suffered to work with us, lest our guardians, being educated in the midst of ill representations, as in an ill pasture, whereby every day plucking and eating a deal of different things, by little and little they contract imperceptibly some mighty evil in their soul. But we must seek out such workmen as are able by the help of a good natural genius to trace the nature of the beautiful and the decent, that our youth, dwelling as it were in a healthful place, may be profited at all hands; whence from the beautiful works something will be conveyed to the sight and hearing, as a breeze bringing health from salutary places, imperceptibly leading them on directly from childhood to the resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason.

They should thus, said he, be educated in the most handsome manner by far.

On these accounts therefore, Glauco, said I, is not education in music of the greatest importance, because that the measure and harmony enter in the strongest manner into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it, introducing decency along with it into the mind, and making every one decent if he is properly educated, and the reverse if he is not. And, moreover, because the man who hath here been educated as he ought, perceives in the quickest manner whatever workmanship is defective, and whatever execution is unhandsome, or whatever productions are of that kind; and being disgusted in a proper manner, he will praise what is beautiful, rejoicing in it, and receiving it into his soul, be nourished by it, and become a worthy and good man; but whatever is ugly, he will in a proper manner despise and hate, whilst yet he is young, and before he is able to understand reason; and when reason comes, such an one as hath been thus educated will embrace it, recognising it perfectly well from its intimate familiarity with him.

It appears to me, reply'd he, that education in music is for the sake of such things as these.

Just as with reference to letters, said I, we are then suffi-

ciently instructed when we are not ignorant of the elements, which are but few in number, wherever they are concerned, and when we do not despise them more or less as unnecessary to be observed, but by all means give diligence to understand them thoroughly, as it is impossible for us to be men of letters till we do thus.

True.

And if the images of letters appeared anywhere, either in water or in mirrors, should we not know them before we knew the letters themselves? or does this belong to the same art and study?

By all means.

Is it indeed then according as I say, that we shall never become musicians, neither we ourselves nor those guardians we say we are to educate, before we understand the images of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and the other sister virtues; and on the other hand again, what is the reverse of these, which are everywhere to be met with, and observe them wheresoever they are, both the virtues themselves and the images of them, and despise them neither in small nor in great instances, but let us believe that this belongs to the same art and study?

There is, said he, great necessity for it.

Must not then, said I, the person who shall have in his soul fine dispositions, and in his appearance whatever is proportionable and corresponding to these, partaking of the same impression, be the most beautiful spectacle to any one who is able to behold it?

Exceedingly so.

But what is most beautiful is most desirable.

Why not?

He who is musical should surely love those men who are most eminently of this kind, but if one be unharmonious he shall not love him.

He shall not, reply'd he, if the person be any way defective as to his soul; if, indeed, it were in his body, he would bear with it, so as to be willing to associate with him.

I understand, said I, that your favourites are, or have been of this kind; and I agree to it. But tell me this: is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure?

How can there, said he, for this pleasure discomposeth no less than grief?

But hath it communion with any other virtue?

By no means.

But what, hath it communion with insolence and intemperance?

Most of all.

Can you mention a greater and more vehement pleasure than that respecting sensual love?

I cannot, said he, nor yet one that is more furious.

But the right love is of such a nature as to love the beautiful and the handsome in a temperate and a musical manner?

Certainly.

Nothing then which is furious, or akin to intemperance, is to approach to a right love. Neither must pleasure approach to it, nor must the lover and the persons he loves have communion with it, where they love and are beloved in a right manner.

No, truly, said he, they must not, Socrates, approach to these.

Thus then, as appears, you will establish by law in the city which is to be settled that the lover is to love, to converse, and associate with his loves, as with his son, for the sake of virtue, if he gain the consent; and as to every thing besides, that every one so converse with him whose love he sollicitates, as never at all to appear to associate for any thing beyond what is now mentioned, and that otherwise he shall undergo the reproach of being unmusical and unacquainted with the beautiful.

It must be thus, reply'd he.

Does then, said I, the discourse concerning music seem to you to be finished? for it hath terminated where it ought to terminate, as the affairs of music ought, somehow, to terminate in the love of the beautiful.

I agree, said he.

But after music, our youth are to be educated in exercise. But what?

It is surely necessary that in this likewise they be accurately disciplined, from their infancy, through the whole of life. For the matter, as I imagine, is somehow thus; but

do you also consider. For I indeed do not imagine that whatever body is found doth by its own virtue render the soul good, but contrarywise, that a good soul, by its virtue, renders the body the best which is possible. But how does it appear to you?

In the same manner to me, likewise, reply'd he.

If then, when we have sufficiently cultivated the understanding, we shall commit to it the accurate management of the concerns of the body, shall not we, as we are only laying down models (that we may not enlarge), act in a right manner?

Entirely so.

We say then that they are to abstain from drunkenness; for it is more allowable to any than to a guardian to be drunk and not to know where he is.

It were ridiculous, said he, that the guardian should stand in need of a guardian.

But what as to meats—for these men are wrestlers in the noblest combat, are they not?

They are.

Would not then the bodily plight of the wrestlers be proper for such as these?

Probably.

But, said I, it is of a drowsy kind, and ticklish as to health: or do you not observe that they sleep out their life, and if they depart but a little from their appointed diet, such wrestlers become greatly and extremely sick?

I perceive it.

But some more elegant exercise, said I, is requisite for our military wrestlers, who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and to see and to hear in the most acute manner, and in their expeditions to put up with many changes of water and of food, of heat and of cold, that so they may not have a ticklish state of health.

To me it appears so.

Is not then the best exercise a kind of sister to the simple music which we a little ago described?

How do you say?

That the exercise is to be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which pertaineth to war.

Of what kind?

Even from Homer, said I, one may learn these things;

for you know, that in their warlike expeditions, at the entertainments of their heroes, he never feasts them with fishes—and that even whilst they were by the sea at the Hellespont—nor yet with boiled flesh, but only with roast, as what soldiers can most easily get; for, in short, one can everywhere more easily make use of fire than carry vessels about with them.

Yes, indeed.

Neither does Homer, as I imagine, anywhere make mention of seasonings: and this is what the other wrestlers understand, that the body which is to be in good habit must abstain from all these things.

They rightly understand, said he, and abstain.

You do not then, friend, as appears, approve of the Syracusan table and the Sicilian variety of meats, since this other appears to you to be right?

I do not, as appears.

You will likewise disapprove of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for them who are to be of a good habit of body.

By all means, truly.

And likewise of those delicacies, as they are reckoned, of Attic confections.

Of necessity.

For all feeding and dieting of this kind, if we compare it to melody and song, which are composed in a harmony and measure diversified all manner of ways, shall not the comparison be just?

Why not?

And doth not the diversity in that case create intemperance, and here disease; but simplicity as to music creates in the soul temperance, and, as to exercise, creates health in the body.

Most true, said he.

And when intemperance and diseases multiply in the city, shall we not have many halls of justice and of medicine opened, and the arts of justice and of medicine be in request, when many free persons shall earnestly apply to them?

Why not?

But can you pitch upon any greater mark of an ill and base education in a city than that there should be need of physicians and supreme magistrates, and that not only

for the contemptible and low handicrafts, but for those who boast of having been educated in a liberal manner? Or doth it not appear to be base, and a great sign of want of education, to be obliged to observe justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and to have no sense of it in ourselves?

Of all things, this, reply'd he, is the most base.

And do you not, said I, deem this to be more base still, when one not only spends a great part of life in courts of justice, as defendant and plaintiff, but from his ignorance of the beautiful imagines that he becomes renowned for this very thing, as being dextrous in doing injustice, and able to turn himself through all sorts of windings, and using every sort of subterfuge, thinks to get off, so as to evade justice, and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things, being ignorant how much better and more handsome it were so to regulate his life as not to stand in need of a sleepy judge?

This, reply'd he, is still more base than the other.

And to stand in need of the medicinal art, said I, not on account of wounds, or some epidemical distempers incident, but through sloth and such a diet as we mentioned, filled with rheums and wind, like lakes, obliging the skilful sons of Esculapius to invent new names to diseases, such as dropsies and catarrhs—do not you think this abominable?

These are truly, reply'd he, very new and strange names of diseases.

Such, said I, as were not, I imagine, in the days of Esculapius. And I conjecture so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with a deal of flour in it, with cheese added to it (all which seem to be phlegmatic), the sons of Esculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reprehended Patroclus who had presented the cure.

And surely the potion, said he, is absurd for one in such a case.

No, said I, if you consider that, as they tell us, the descendants of Esculapius did not, before the days of Herodicus, practise this method of cure, now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen. But Herodicus, being a teacher of youth, and at the same time infirm in his health,

mixing exercise and medicine together he made himself most uneasy, in the first place, and afterwards many others besides.

As how? said he.

In procuring to himself, said I, a lingering death; for whilst he was constantly attentive to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself, though, neglecting every thing besides, he was still using medicines. And thus he passed his life, still in the greatest uneasiness if he departed in the least from his accustomed diet, and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old-age.

A mighty reward, said he, he reaped of his art!

Such as became one, said I, who did not understand that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure that Esculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because that he knew, that in all well regulated states there was some certain work enjoined every one in the city, which was necessary to be done, and no one allowed to have the leisure of being sick the whole of life, and attentive only to the taking of medicines. This we may pleasantly observe in the case of labouring people, but we do not observe it in the case of the rich, and such as are counted happy.

How? said he.

A smith, reply'd I, when he falls sick, thinks it fit to take from the physician some potion, to throw up his disease or purge it downwards, or by means of caustic or amputation to get quit of the trouble; but if any one prescribe for him a long regimen, putting caps on his head, and other such things, he quickly tells him that he hath not leisure to lye sick, nor doth it avail him to live in this manner, attentive to his trouble and negligent of his proper work; and so, bidding such a physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet, and, if he recovers his health, he continues to manage his own affairs; but if his body be not able to support, he dies, and is freed from troubles.

It seems proper, said he, for such an one to use the medicinal art in this manner.

Is it not, said I, because he hath a certain business, which, if he doth not perform, it is not for his advantage to live?

It is plain, reply'd he.

But the rich man, as we say, hath no such work allotted him, from which, if he be obliged to refrain, life is not worth the having.

He is surely said at least to have none.

For you do not, said I, attend to what Phocylides says, that one ought still, whilst there is life, to practise virtue.

I think, reply'd he, we attended to that formerly.

Let us by no means, said I, differ from him in this, but let us inform ourselves whether this excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich, and that life is not worth keeping if he does not give this attention; for that such a life is indeed a hinderance of the mind's application to masonry and other arts, but with respect to the exhortation of Phocylides it is no hinderance.

Yes, truly it is, said he, and that in the greatest degree, when this excessive care of the body goes beyond proper exercise. Neither does it agree with attention to private economy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies in the city. But what is of the greatest moment is, that such application to health is ill-fitted for any sort of learning, and enquiry, and study by one's self, whilst one is perpetually dreading certain pains and swimmings of the head, and blaming philosophy as occasioning them; so that where there is this attention to health, it is a great obstacle to the practice of virtue and improvement in it, for it makes us always imagine that we are ill, and always complain of the body.

That is likely, said he.

And shall we not say that Esculapius too understood these things, when, to persons of a healthful constitution, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and to such a constitution he prescribed medicine, repelling their diseases by drugs and incisions, and enjoined them their accustomed diet, that the public might suffer no damage? But he did not attempt, by extenuating or nourishing diet, to cure such constitutions as were wholly diseased within, as it would but afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and the descendants which would spring from him would probably be of the same kind; for he did not imagine the man ought to be cured who could not live in the ordinary

course, as he would be neither profitable to himself nor to the state.

You make Esculapius, said he, a politician.

It is plain, said I, and his sons may show that he was so. Or do you not see that at Troy they excelled in war, and likewise practised medicine in the way I mention? Or do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, they

Wash'd off the blood, and soft'ning drugs applied.

But as to what was necessary for him to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylus, deeming external applications sufficient to heal men who before they were wounded were healthful and moderate in their diet, whatever mixture they happened to have drunk at the time; but they judged, that to have a diseased constitution, and to live an intemperate life, was neither profitable to the men themselves nor to others, and that their art ought not to be employed on these, nor to minister to them, not even though they were richer than Midas.

You make, said he, the sons of Esculapius truly ingenious.

It is proper, reply'd I—though, in opposition to us, the writers of tragedy, and Pindar, call indeed Esculapius the son of Apollo, but say that he was prevailed on by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man who was already in a deadly state, for which, truly, he was even struck with a thunderbolt. But we, agreeably to what hath been formerly said, will not believe them as to both these things, but will aver, that if he was the son of the God, he was not given to filthy lucre; or if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a son of the God.

These things, said he, are most right. But what do you say, Socrates, as to this: Is it not necessary to provide good physicians for the state? and must not these, most likely, be such who have been conversant with the greatest number of healthy and of sickly people? and these, in like manner, be the best judges who have been conversant with all sorts of dispositions?

I mean now, said I, those who are very good. But do you know whom I deem to be such?

If you tell me, reply'd he.

I shall endeavour to do it, said I; but you enquire in one question about two different things.

As how? said he.

Physicians, reply'd I, would become most expert if, beginning from their infancy, they would in learning the art be conversant with the greatest number of bodies, and these the most sickly, and laboured themselves under all manner of diseases, and by natural constitution were not quite healthful; for it is not by the body, I imagine, that they cure the body (else their own bodies could at no time be admitted to be of an ill constitution), but they cure the body by the soul, which, whilst it is of an ill constitution, is not capable to perform well any cure.

Right, said he.

But the judge, friend, governs the soul by the soul; which, if from its childhood it hath been educated with bad souls, and hath been conversant with them, and hath itself done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them so as accurately by itself to judge of the evils of others, as happens in the diseases of the body; but it must in its youth be unexperienced and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itself, and to judge soundly of what is just. And hence the virtuous in their youth appear simple and easily deceived by the unjust, as they have not within themselves dispositions similar to those of the wicked.

And surely this at least, said he, they do often suffer extremely.

For which reason, said I, the good judge is not to be a young man, but an old, having been late in learning wickedness what it is; perceiving it not as a kindred possession residing in his own soul, but as a foreign one in the souls of others, which he hath for a long time studied, and hath understood what sort of an evil it is, by the help of science, rather than by proper experience.

Such an one, said he, is like to be the most able judge.

And likewise a good one, said I, which was what you required, for he who hath a good soul is good. But the other notable and suspicious man, who hath committed many pieces of iniquity himself, when indeed he converseth with his like, being thought to be subtle and wise, he

appears a notable man, being extremely cautious, having an eye to those models which he hath within himself; but when he approacheth the good and the more aged, he appears foolish, suspicious out of season, and ignorant of integrity of manners, as having within no models of such a kind. But, however, being more frequently conversant with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, to be more wise rather than more ignorant.

This, said he, is perfectly true.

We must not, therefore, said I, look for such an one to be a wise and good judge, but the former one; for indeed vice can never at all know both itself and virtue; but virtue, where the temper is instructed by time, shall attain to the knowledge of both itself and vice. This one, then, and not the wicked, as it appears to me, is the wise man.

And I, reply'd he, am of the same opinion.

Will you not then establish in the city such a method of medicine as we have mentioned, along with such a method of judicature as shall carefully preserve for you those of your citizens who are of goodly constitutions both in mind and in body; and with respect to those who are otherwise, such as are so in their bodies, they shall suffer to die, but such as are of naughty and incurable constitutions in their soul, these they shall themselves put to death.

This, said he, hath appeared to be best, both for those who suffer it, and for the city.

And it is plain, said I, that your youth will be afraid of needing this justiciary, whilst they are employed in that simple music which, we say, generateth temperance.

Why will they not? said he.

And according to the very same steps of reasoning, the musician who takes a fancy to perform exercises will chuse to do it so as not to require any medicine unless there be necessity.

I imagine so.

And he will perform his exercises and his labours, studying the sprightliness of his temper and the animating it, rather as bodily vigour, and not as the other wrestlers, who take meats and drinks to promote bodily strength.

Most right, said he.

Why then, said I, Glauco, they who propose to teach

music and exercise, propose these things, not for what the generality imagine, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other.

What then? reply'd he.

They seem, said I, to propose them both chiefly on the soul's account.

As how?

Do not you perceive, said I, how these are affected as to their understanding who have all their life been conversant in exercises, but have never applied to what is musical? or how these are affected who have lived in a method the reverse of this?

Whom, said he, do you speak of?

Of rusticity, said I, and fierceness, and again of softness and mildness.

I know, said he, that these who are conversant in nothing but mere exercises turn out to be more rustic than is becoming; and they, again, who mind music alone are more soft than is for their honour.

And surely, said I, this rusticity, at least, may generate a sprightliness of temper, and, when rightly disciplined, may turn to fortitude; but when carried further than is becoming, may, as is likely, be both more fierce and troublesome.

So I imagine, said he.

But what, doth not the philosophic temper partake of the mild? and when this disposition is carried too far, may it not prove more soft than is becoming, but when rightly disciplined, be really mild and comely?

These things are so.

But we say that our guardians ought to have both these dispositions.

They ought.

Ought not then these to be adapted to one another?

Why not?

And the soul in which they are thus adapted is temperate and brave.

Certainly.

But the soul in which they are not adapted is cowardly and savage.

Extremely so.

And when one yields up himself to be soothed with the

charms of music, and pours into his soul through his ears, as through a pipe, those we denominated the soft, effeminate, and plaintive harmonies, and spends the whole of his life chanting and ravished with melody, such an one, at the first, if he have any thing high spirited, softens it like iron, and from being useless and fierce, renders it profitable. But when he, still persisting, does not desist, but enchants his soul, after this it melts and dissolves him, till it thoroughly soften his spirit and cut out, as it were, the nerves of his soul, and render him an effeminate warrior.

It is certainly so indeed, said he.

But if, said I, he had from the beginning a spiritless temper, this he quickly effectuates, but if high spirited, it renders the mind weak and easily turned, so as instantly to be enraged at trifles, and again the rage is extinguished: so that from being high spirited, they become outrageous and passionate, full of the morose.

So indeed it happens.

But what now, if one labour much in exercises, and feast extremely well, but apply not to music and philosophy, shall he not, in the first place, being in good plight of body, be filled with courage and spirit, and become more courageous than he was before?

Certainly so.

But what? When he doth nothing else, nor participates in any thing which is music like, though there were any love of learning in his soul, as it neither tastes of any study, nor bears a share in any inquiry nor reasoning, nor any thing besides which is musical, must it not become feeble and deaf and blind, as his perceptions are neither awakened nor nourished nor refined?

Just so.

Such an one then becomes, as I imagine, a reason-hater, and unmusical, and by no means can be persuaded to any thing by reasoning, but is carried to everything by force and savageness, as a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure and unpolished.

It is, said he, entirely so.

Corresponding then to these two tempers, I would say that some God, as appears, hath given men two arts, those of music and exercise, in reference to the sprightly and the philosophic temper, not for the soul and body, otherwise

than as a by-work, but for that other purpose, that those two tempers might be adapted to one another, being stretched and slackened to the proper pitch.

So indeed it appears.

Whoever then shall in the most handsome manner mingle exercise with music, and have these in the justest measure in his soul, him we shall most properly call the most completely musical and of the best harmony, far more than the man who adjusts to one another musical strings.

Most reasonably, said he, Socrates.

Shall we not then, Glauco, always have need of such a president for our state, if our government is to be preserved?

We shall most especially have need of this.

Out of guardians come selection of Rulers

Those then may be the models of education and discipline. For why should one go over the dances, the huntings of wild beasts, both with dogs and with nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races proper for such persons, for it is quite manifest that these naturally follow of course, and it is no difficult matter to find them out.

It is indeed, said he, not difficult.

Be it so, said I; but what follows next? What was next to be determined by us? Was it which of these shall govern, and be governed?

What else?

Is it not plain that the elder ought to be governours, and the younger to be the governed?

It is plain.

And is it not likewise plain that the best of them are to govern?

This too is plain.

But are not the best husbandmen the most assiduous in agriculture?

They are.

If now our guardians are the best, will they not be most vigilant over the city?

They will.

Must we not, for this purpose, make them prudent, and able, and careful likewise of the city?

We must do so.

→ Rulers to be made

But one would seem to be most careful of that which he happens to love?

Undoubtedly.

And one shall most especially love that to which he thinks the same things are profitable which are so to himself, and with whose good estate he thinks his own connected; and where he is of a contrary opinion he will be contrary-wise affected.

Just so.

We must chuse then from the other guardians such men as shall most of all others appear to us, on observation, to do with the greatest cheerfulness, through the whole of life, whatever they think advantageous for the state, and what appears to be disadvantageous they will not do by any means.

These are the most proper, said he.

It truly appears to me that they ought to be observed through every stage of their life, if they be tenacious of this opinion, so as that neither fraud nor force make them inconsiderately throw out this opinion: that they ought to do what is best for the state.

What throwing out do you mean? said he.

I will tell you, said I. An opinion seemeth to me to go out of the understanding voluntarily or involuntarily: a false opinion goes voluntarily from the mind which unlearns it, but every true opinion goes involuntarily.

The case of the voluntary one, reply'd he, I understand, but that of the involuntary I want to learn.

What now? Do not you think, said I, that men are involuntarily deprived of good things, but voluntarily of evil things? Or is it not an evil to miss of the truth, and a good to form true opinion? Or does it not appear to you that to conceive of things as they really are is to form true opinion?

You say rightly indeed, reply'd he; they do seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion.

Do not they then suffer this, either in the way of theft, flattery, or force?

I do not now, said he, understand you.

I seem, said I, to speak theatrically. But, I say, those have their opinions stolen away who are persuaded to change their opinions, and those who forget them: in the

one case they are imperceptibly taken away by time, and in the other by reasoning. Do you now understand in any measure?

Yes.

And those, I say, have their opinions forced from them whom grief or agony obliges to change them.

This, said he, I understand, and you say right.

And those, I imagine you will say, are beguiled out of their opinions, who change them, being bewitched by pleasure or seduced by fear, being afraid of something.

It seems, said he, that everything beguiles which deceives us.

That then which I was now mentioning must be sought for: who are the best guardians of this opinion—that that is to be done which is best for the state—and they must be observed immediately from their childhood, setting before them such pieces of work in which they may most readily forget such a principle and be deluded; and he who is mindful and hard to be deluded is to be chosen, and he who is otherwise is to be rejected. Is it not so?

Yes.

And we must appoint them trials of labours and of pains, in which we must observe the same things.

Right, said he.

Must we not, said I, appoint them a third contest, that of the mountebank kind, and observe them as those do who, when they lead on young horses against noises and tumults, observe whether they are frightened. So must they, whilst young, be led into dreadful things, and again be thrown into pleasures, trying them more than gold in the fire, whether one is hard to be beguiled with mountebank tricks, and appear composed amidst all, being a good guardian of himself and of that music which he learned, showing himself in all these things to be in just measure and harmony. Being of such a kind as this, he would truly be of the greatest advantage both to himself and to the state. And the man who in childhood, in youth, and in manhood hath been thus tried, and hath come out pure, is to be appointed governour and guardian of the state, and honours are to be paid him whilst alive, and when dead he should receive the highest rewards of public funeral and other memorials; and he who is not such an

one is to be rejected. Of such a kind, Glauco, said I, as it appears to me, is to be the choice and establishment of our governours and guardians, as in a sketch and not accurately.

And I, said he, am of the same opinion.

Is it not then truly most just to call these the most complete guardians, both with reference to enemies abroad and to friends at home, so as that the one shall not have the will, nor the other have the power, to do any mischief? And the youth (whom we now called guardians) will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governours.

I imagine so, reply'd he.

What now, said I, may be the contrivance of those lies, which are made on occasion, and of which we were lately saying that it is a most generous part in making lies, to persuade the governours themselves most especially, or if not these, the rest of the state?

What sort do you mean?

Nothing new, said I, but somewhat Phoenician, which hath frequently happened heretofore, as the poets tell us, and have persuaded us, but hath not happened in our times, nor do I know if ever it shall happen: to persuade one of it surely requires a subtle persuasion.

How like you are, said he, to one who grudges to speak out!

I shall appear, said I, to grudge with very good reason after I tell it.

Speak, said he, and do not fear.

I speak then, though I know not with what courage, and using what expressions, I shall tell it. And I shall attempt, first of all, to persuade the governours themselves and the soldiers, and afterwards the rest of the state, how that whatever things we educated and instructed them in seemed to happen to them, and to befall them all as dreams, but that they were in truth at that time formed and educated within the earth, both they themselves, and their armour, and their other utensils likewise fabricated, and after that they were completely fashioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to be affected towards the country where they are, as to their mother and nurse, to defend her if any invade her, and to consider the rest of the citizens as being their brothers and sprung from their mother earth.

It was not without reason, said he, that a while ago you was ashamed to tell this falshood.

I had truly reason, said I: but hear, however, the rest of the fable. All of you now in the state are brothers (as we shall tell them in way of fable), but the God, when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern, therefore are they the most honourable; and silver in such as are auxiliaries, and iron and brass in the husbandmen and other handicrafts. As you are all of the same kind, you for the most part resemble one another, and it sometimes happens that of the gold is generated the silver, and of the silver there is a golden descendant, and thus every different way are they generated of one another. The God gives in charge, first of all, and chiefly to the governours, that of nothing are they to be so good guardians, nor are they so strongly to keep watch over any thing as over their children, to know what of those principles is mixed in their souls; and if their descendant shall be of the brazen or iron kind, they shall by no means have compassion, but assigning him honour proportioned to his natural temper, they shall push him down to the craftsmen or husbandmen. And if, again, any from among these shall be born of a golden or silver kind, they shall pay them honour and prefer them, those to the guardianship, and these to the auxiliary rank—it being pronounced by the oracle that the state is then to perish, when iron or brass shall have the guardianship of it. Have you now any contrivance to persuade them of this fable?

None, said he, to persuade these men themselves; but I can contrive how that their sons and posterity, and all mankind afterwards, shall believe it.

Even this, said I, would do well towards making them more concerned about the state and one another; for I almost understand what you say, and this truly will lead the same way as the oracle. But let us, having armed these earth-born sons, lead them forwards under their leaders, and when they are come into the city, let them consider where it is best to place their camp, so as best to keep in order those who are within, if any one should want to disobey the laws, and likewise defend against those without, if any enemy, as a wolf, should come upon the

fold. And when they have marked out their camp, and performed sacrifices to the proper Divinities, let them erect their tents—or how are they to do?

Just so, said he.

Shall they not be such as may be sufficient to defend them both from winter and summer?

Why not? for you seem, said he, to mean houses.

Yes, said I, but military ones, not such as are costly.

What do you say, reply'd he, is the difference between the one and the other?

I will endeavour, said I, to tell you; for of all things it is the most dreadful, and the most shameful to shepherds, to breed such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as auxiliaries of the flocks, as either through intemperance or famine, or some other ill disposition, the dogs themselves should attempt to hurt the sheep, and, instead of dogs, resemble wolves.

That is dreadful, said he; why, is it not?

Must we not then, by all means, take care lest our allies do such a thing towards our citizens, as they are more powerful, and instead of generous allies resemble savage lords?

We must take care, said he.

Would they not be prepared, as to the greatest part of the care, if they were really well educated?

But they are so at least, reply'd he.

And I said: That is not proper to be confidently affirmed, friend Glauco, but that is proper which we were now saying, that they ought to have good education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is of the greatest consequence towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those who are guarded by them.

Very right, said he.

Besides then this education, any one of understanding would say that their houses, and all their other substance, ought to be so contrived as not to hinder their guardians from being the very best of men, and not to stir them up to injure the other citizens.

And he will say true.

If then they intend to be such, consider, said I, whether they ought to live and dwell in some such manner as this: First then, let none possess any substance privately, unless

there be the greatest necessity for it; next, let none have any dwelling or store-house into which whoever inclines may not enter; as for necessities, let them be such as temperate and brave warriors may require, and as they are instituted by the other citizens, let them receive such a reward of their guardianship as to have neither overplus nor deficiency at the year's end. Let them have public meals, as in encampments, and live in common. They must be told that they have from the Gods a divine gold and silver at all times in their souls, and have no need of the human, and that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine kind by mixing it with the possession of this mortal gold, because the money of the vulgar hath produced many wicked deeds, but that of these men is incorruptible. And of all the men in the city, they alone are not allowed to handle nor to touch gold nor silver, nor to bring it under their roof, nor carry it about with them, nor to drink out of silver or gold, and that thus they are to preserve themselves and the state. But whenever they shall possess lands, and houses, and money in a private way, they shall become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, hateful lords instead of allies to the other citizens, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they shall pass the whole of their life, much oftener, and more afraid of the enemies from within than from without, they and the rest of the state hastening speedily to destruction. For all which reasons, said I, let us affirm that our guardians are thus to be constituted, with reference both to their houses and to other things. And let us settle these things by law. Shall we?

By all means, said Glauco.

Justice

THE FOURTH BOOK

ADIMANTUS hereupon replying, What now, Socrates, said he, will you say in your own defence, if one shall say that you do not make these men very happy, though it is owing to these men that the city really exists, yet they enjoy no advantage in the city, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices at their own expence, give public entertainments to strangers, and possess what you was now mentioning, gold and silver, and every thing which is reckoned to contribute towards the rendering men happy; but one may readily say that, like hired auxiliaries, they seem to possess nothing in the city but the employment of keeping guard.

Yes, said I, and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, as all others do, any reward besides. So that they are not allowed so much as to travel privately anywhere abroad, though they should incline it, nor to bestow money on others, nor to spend it in such other methods as these do who are counted happy. These and many such things you leave out of the accusation.

But let these things too, said he, be charged against them.

You ask then what we shall say in our defence?

I do.

Whilst we go on in the same road, we shall find, as I imagine, what may be said; for we shall say that it were nothing strange if these men, even in these circumstances, should be the happiest possible; yet it was not with an eye to this that we established the city, to have any one tribe in it remarkably happy beyond the rest, but that the whole city might be in the happiest condition. For we judged that in such an one we should most especially find justice, and injustice in the city the worst established, and that upon thoroughly examining these we should deter-

mine what we have for some time been in quest of. Now then, as I imagine, we are forming a happy state, not picking out some few persons to make them alone happy, but are establishing the universal happiness of the whole; and we shall next consider a state which is the reverse. As if, then, we were painting human figures, and one approaching should blame us, saying that we do not put the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the creature, for that the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but with black, would not we seem to say tolerably well, in our defence to him, when we said, Wonderful critic! do not imagine that we ought to paint the eyes beautiful, in such a way as that they would not appear to be eyes, and so with reference to all other parts, but consider whether in giving each particular part its due we make the whole beautiful. And so now, do not oblige us to confer such a happiness on our guardians as shall make them any thing rather than guardians. For we know too how to array the husbandmen in rich and costly robes, and to enjoin them to cultivate the ground only with a view to pleasure; and in like manner those who make earthen ware, to lye at their ease by the fire, to drink and feast, neglecting the wheel, and working only so much as they incline; and we know how to confer a felicity of this nature on every individual, in order to render the whole state happy. But do not advise us to act after this manner, since, if we obey you, neither would the husbandman really be a husbandman, nor the potter be a potter, nor would any other really be of any of those professions of which the city is composed. But as to others it is less matter; for when shoe-makers become bad, and are degenerate, and profess to be shoemakers when they are not, no great mischief happens to the state; but when the guardians of the law and of the state are not so in reality, but only in appearance, you see how they entirely destroy the whole constitution, if they alone shall have the privilege of an affluent and happy life. If we then are for appointing men who shall be really guardians of the city, the least of all hurtful to it, and he who makes the objection, is for having them rather as certain farmers, and as in a festival-meeting, not in a city, certain public entertainers indulging in jollity, he must

mean something else than a city. We must then consider whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may have the greatest happiness; or if we establish them with a view to the happiness of the whole city. Let us see whether this takes place, and let us oblige these allies and guardians to do this, and we must persuade them they shall thus become the best performers of their own particular work; and we must deal with all others in the same manner. And thus the whole city being increased and well constituted, let us allow the several tribes to participate of happiness as their natures admit.

You seem to me, said he, to say well.

Shall I appear to you, said I, to speak right in what is akin to this?

What is that?

Consider whether other artificers are corrupted by these things, so as to be made bad workmen.

What things do you mean?

Riches, said I, and poverty.

As how?

Thus: does the potter after he becomes rich seem still to mind his art?

By no means, said he.

But will he not become more idle and careless than formerly?

Much more so.

Shall he not then become a more unskilful potter?

Much more so likewise, said he.

And surely, being unable through poverty to furnish himself with tools, or any thing else requisite to his art, his workmanship shall be more imperfectly executed, and his sons or those others whom he instructeth shall be inferior artists.

How should they not?

Through both these now, poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts is rendered less perfect, and the artists themselves become less expert.

It appears so.

We have then, it seems, discovered other things, which our guardians must by all means watch against, that they may nowise escape their notice and steal into the city.

What kind of things are these?

Riches, said I, and poverty: as the one is productive of luxury, idleness, and a love of novelty, and the other, besides a love of novelty, is illiberal and productive of mischief.

They are entirely so, said he. But consider this, Socrates: How shall our city be able to engage in war, since she is possessed of no money, especially if she be obliged to wage war against a great and opulent state?

It is plain, said I, that to fight against one of this kind is somewhat difficult, but to fight against two is a more easy matter.

How say you, reply'd he?

First of all now, said I, if they have at all occasion to fight, will they not, being expert in the art of war, fight against rich men?

They will, said he.

What then, said I, Adimantus, do not you think that one boxer, who is fitted out in the best manner possible for this exercise, is easily able to fight against two who are not expert boxers, but on the contrary are rich and unwieldy?

He would not easily fight with both at once? said he.

No?—though he had it in his power to retire a little, and then turn on the one who should be the furthest advanced towards him, and strike him, and by doing this frequently in the fun and heat, might not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these?

To be sure, said he, that would be no great wonder.

But do not you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of the military art?

I do, said he.

Easily then, as it plainly appears, will our boxers combat with double and triple their number.

I will agree with you, said he, for you seem to me to say right.

But what if they should send an embassy to another state, informing them of the true situation of the affair, telling we make no use of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, but with you it is lawful; if then you become our allies in the war, you will receive the spoils of all the other states: do you imagine that any, on hearing these things, would chuse to fight against strong and

resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep?

I do not think it; but if the riches of others be amassed into one state, see that it does not endanger that which is poor.

You are happy, said I, that you imagine any other deserves to be called a state besides such an one as we have established.

Why not? said he.

We must give others, said I, a more magnificent appellation, for each of them consists of many states, and is not one, as is said in way of irony; for there are always in them two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many, to which, if you apply as to one, you are mistaken entirely; but if, as to many, you put one part in possession of the goods and power of another, or even deliver up the one to the other, you shall always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies. And so long as your state shall continue temperately, as now established, it shall be the greatest. I do not say it shall be accounted so, but shall be really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for one state so great you will not easily find, neither among the Greeks nor Barbarians, but many which are accounted many times larger than such an one as this. Are you of a different opinion?

No truly, said he.

Might not this then, said I, be the best mark for our rulers how large to make the city, and what extent of ground to mark off for it in proportion to its bulk, without minding any thing more?

What mark? said he.

I imagine, said I, this one: so long as the city on its increase continues to be one, so long it may be increased, but not beyond it.

Very right, said he.

Shall we not then lay this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and be one city?

We shall probably, said he, enjoin them a trifling affair.

A more trifling affair still than this, said I, is that we mentioned above, when we observed, that if any descend-

ant of the guardians be naughty, he ought to be dismissed to the other classes; and if any descendant of the others be worthy, he is to be raised to the rank of the guardians. And this was intended to show that all the other citizens ought to apply themselves each to that particular art for which he hath a natural genius, that so everyone minding his own proper work may not be many, but be one, and so likewise the whole state may become one and not be many.

This indeed, said he, is still a more trifling matter than the other.

We do not here, said I, good Adimantus, as one may imagine, enjoin them many and great matters, but such as are all trifling, if they take care of one grand point, as the saying is, or rather that which is sufficient in place of the grand.

What is that? said he.

Education, said I, and nurture; for if, being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we omit at present, respecting women, marriages, and the propagation of the species. For these things ought all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends.

That, said he, would be the rightest way.

And surely, said I, if once a Republic is set a-going, it proceeds happily, increasing as a circle. And whilst good education and nurture are preserved, they produce good geniuses; and good geniuses, partaking of such education, produce still better than the former, as well in other respects, as with reference to propagation, as in the case of other animals.

It is likely, said he.

To speak then briefly, this the guardians of the state must oppose, that it may not, escaping their notice, hurt the constitution; nay, above all things, they must guard against this, not to make any innovations in the exercise and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but to maintain this order as much as possible. Being afraid lest that whilst one says that poetical expression,

—Men most admire that song
Which hath the most of novelty,

one should frequently imagine that the Poet means not new songs, but a new method of the song, and should commend this. Such a thing is neither to be commended nor admitted: for to receive a new kind of music is to be guarded against as endangering the whole of the constitution; for never are the measures of music altered without the greatest politic laws, according to Damon, with whom I agree.

You may place me likewise, said Adimantus, among those who are of that opinion.

We must erect then, said I, some barrier, as would seem, somewhere here for our guardians themselves, with regard to music.

A transgression here, said he, easily indeed steals in imperceptibly.

It does, said I, in the way of diversion, and as productive of no mischief.

For neither indeed does it produce any other, said he, but that becoming familiar by degrees it insensibly runs into the manners and pursuits; and from thence, in intercourse of dealings one with another, it becomes greater; and from this intercourse it enters into laws and policies with a deal of impudence, Socrates, till at last it overturn all things, both private and public.

Well, said I, let it be allowed to be so.

It appears so to me, reply'd he.

Ought not then our children, as I said at the beginning, to receive directly from their infancy an education more agreeable to the laws of the constitution? because if their education be such as is contrary to law, and the children be of such a nature themselves, it is impossible that they should ever grow up to be worthy men and observant of the laws.

Why is it not? said he.

But when handsome amusements are appointed them from their infancy, and when by means of the music they embrace that amusement which is according to law (contrarywise to those others), this music attends them in everything else, and grows with them, and raiseth up in the city whatever formerly was fallen down.

It is true indeed, said he.

And these men, said I, discover those establishments which

appear trifling, and which those others destroyed altogether.

What establishments?

Such as these: silence of the younger before the elder, which is proper, and the giving them place, and rising up before them, and reverence of parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes, shoes, with the whole dress of the body, and everything else of the kind. Are you not of this opinion?

I am.

But to establish these things by law would, I imagine, be a silly thing, nor is it done anywhere, nor would it stand, though established both by word and writing.

For how is it possible?

It seems then, said I, Adimantus, that a man's character and conduct will always be according to his education, let him apply himself afterwards to what he will; or does not the like always produce the like?

Why not?

And we may say, I imagine, that at last it arrives at somewhat complete and vigorous, either good or what is the reverse.

Why not? said he.

I would not then, said I, for these reasons, as yet, undertake to settle by law such things as these.

Right, said he.

But what truly now, said I, as to those laws relative to matters of exchange, and to their traffic one with another at mercat, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their scandals, bodily hurt, and raising of lawsuits, their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as may be necessary either at mercats or at shores, or in general whatever laws are municipal, civil, or of the marine, or what other laws there may be of this kind—shall we dare to establish any of these?

It is improper, said he, to prescribe these to good and worthy men, for they will easily find out the most of them, such as ought to be established by law.

Yes, said I, friend, if at least God grant them the preservation of the laws we formerly explained.

And if not, said he, they will spend the whole of their life,

making and amending many such laws as these, imagining that they shall thus attain to that which is best.

You say that such as these shall lead a life, said I, like those who are sick, and at the same time unwilling, through intemperance, to quit an unwholesome diet.

Entirely so.

And these truly must live very pleasantly! For though they deal with physicians, they gain nothing, but render their diseases greater and more complex; and they still hope that, when any one recommends any medicine to them, they shall by means of it be made whole.

This is entirely the situation of such diseased persons as these.

But what, said I, is not this pleasant in them? to count that man the most hateful of all who tells them the truth: that, 'till one give over drunkenness, and gluttony, and unchaste pleasure, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor amputations, nor charms, nor applications, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail.

That, said he, is not quite pleasant; for to be enraged at one who tells us what is right hath nothing pleasant in it.

You are no admirer, said I, as it would seem, of this sort of men.

No truly.

Neither then, though the whole of the city (as we were lately saying) should do such a thing, would you commend them; or is not the same thing which is done by these people done by all those cities which, being ill-governed, enjoin their citizens not to alter any part of the constitution, for that whoever shall do such a thing is to be put to death, but that whoever shall with greatest cheerfulness pay reverence to those who govern in this fashion, and shall gratify them in the most obsequious manner, and anticipating their desires, be most dextrous in satisfying them, shall be reckoned both worthy and wise in matters of highest importance, and be held by them in the greatest honour?

They seem to me at least, said he, to do the very same thing, and by no means do I commend them.

But what again as to those who desire to have the management of such states, and are even fond of it? are you not delighted with their courage and dexterity?

I am, said he, excepting such as are imposed on by them and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are commended as such by the multitude.

How do you mean? Do you not pardon those men? said I. Or do you even think it is possible for a man who cannot measure himself, when he hears many other such men telling that he is four cubits, not to believe this of himself?

It is impossible, said he.

Then be not angry in this case; for such men as these are of all the most ridiculous, always making laws about such things as we now mentioned, and always amending. They imagine that they shall find some period of these frauds respecting commerce, and those other things I now spoke of, being ignorant that they are in reality attempting to destroy a hydra.

They are surely, said he, doing nothing else.

I imagine then, said I, that a true law-giver ought not to give himself much disturbance about such a species of laws and police, either in an ill or well-regulated state: in the one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because any one can find out some of the laws, and others of them show of course from the habits arising from their early education.

What part then of the institutions of law, said he, have we yet remaining?

And I said, that to us indeed there is nothing remaining; but however, to the Delphian Apollo there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions.

Of what kind? said he.

The institutions of temples, sacrifices, and other worship of the Gods, Daemons, and heroes; likewise the depositing the dead, and what other rites ought to be performed to them, so as to make them propitious. For truly such things as these we ourselves neither know, nor in founding the state will we intrust them to any other, if we be wise, nor will we make use of any other interpreter besides our own God; for this God is the supreme interpreter to all men in these things, who interpreteth to them sitting on the middle of the earth.

And it is well established, said he, and we must do accordingly.

Thus now, son of Aristo, said I, is the city established for you. And in the next place, having procured somehow sufficient light, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and on Polemarchus, and these others to assist us, if by any means we may at all perceive where justice is, and where injustice, and in what respect they differ from each other, and which of them the man ought to acquire who proposes to himself to be happy, whether he be concealed or not concealed both from Gods and men.

But you say nothing to the purpose, reply'd Glauco; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, deeming it impious for you not to assist the cause of justice by every possible means.

It is true, said I, what you put me in mind of, and I must do accordingly; but it is proper that you too should assist in the inquiry.

We shall do so, said he.

I hope then, said I, to find it out in this manner. I imagine that our city, if it be rightly established, is perfectly good.

Of necessity, said he.

Then it is plain that it is wise and brave and temperate and just.

It manifestly is so.

Whichever then of these we shall find in it, shall there not remain behind that which is not found?

Why not?

For as if we were in quest of one of any other four, in any thing whatever, if we discovered this one at the first we would be satisfied; but if we should first discover the other three from this itself, that which we were inquiring after would be known, for it is plain it would be no other but that which remained.

You say right, said he.

Since then there are in our state those four above-mentioned, shall we not inquire about them according to the same manner?

It is plain we ought.

First of all then, to me at least, wisdom appears to be conspicuous in it; and concerning it there appears something very uncommon.

What is that? said he.

Surely this city which we have described appears to me to be wise, for its councils are wise, are they not?

They are.

And surely this very thing, the ability of counselling well, is plainly a certain science; for men nowhere counsel well through ignorance, but through science.

It is plain.

But there are many and various species of science in the state.

Why are there not?

Is it then from the science of the carpenters that the state is to be denominated wise and well-counselled?

By no means from this, said he, is it said to be wise, but to be mechanical.

Is then the state to be denominated wise when it consults wisely through its knowledge in utensils of wood, how to have these in the best manner possible?

Nor this neither.

But what, is it for its knowledge of these in brass, or for anything else of this kind?

For none of these, said he.

Nor yet for its knowledge of the fruits of the earth is it said to be wise, but to be skilled in agriculture.

It seems so to me.

But what, said I, is there any science among any of the citizens in this city which we have founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may in the best manner behave towards itself and towards other cities?

There is truly.

What is it, said I, and among whom is it to be found?

This very guardianship, said he, is it, and it is among these governours whom we lately denominated complete guardians.

What now do you denominate the state on account of this knowledge?

Well-counselled, said he, and really wise.

Whether then, said I, do you imagine the brass-smiths or these true guardians will be most numerous in the state?

The brass-smiths, said he, will be much more numerous.

And of all, said I, as many as having any knowledge are

of any account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number?

By much.

From this smallest tribe, then, and part of the state, and from that presiding and governing knowledge in it, is the whole city wisely established according to nature, and this tribe, as appears, is by nature the smallest to whom it belongeth to share in this knowledge, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom.

You say, reply'd he, perfectly true.

This one, then, of the four we have found, I know not how, both what it is, and in what part of the state it resides.

And it seems to me, said he, to be sufficiently described.

But surely as to fortitude, at least, it is no difficult matter both to find out itself and the particular part of the city in which it resides, on account of which virtue the city is denominated brave.

As how?

Doth any one, said I, call a city brave or cowardly, with reference to any other than that particular part of it which makes war and fights in its defence?

No one, said he, calls it such with reference to any other part.

For I do not imagine, said I, that the other tribes who are in it, whether they be cowardly or brave, have power to render the city either the one or the other.

No, indeed.

The city then is brave likewise in one particular part of itself, because it hath within it a power of such a nature as shall always preserve their opinions about things which are dreadful, that they are both these very things, and of the very same kind which the law-giver inculcated on them in their education? Do not you call this fortitude?

I have not, said he, entirely comprehended what you say; but tell it over again.

I call fortitude, said I, a certain preservative.

What sort of preservative?

A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things which are dreadful, what these are and of what kind. I called it a preservative at all times, because they were to preserve it in pains and in pleasures,

in desires and fears, and never to cast it off; and, if you please, I shall liken it to what in my opinion it bears a near resemblance.

I am pleased.

Do not you know then, said I, that the dyers, when they want to dye their wool so as to be a purple colour, out of all the colours they first make choice of the white, and then, with no small preparation, they prepare and manage it so as best of all to take on the purest colour, and thus they dye it: and whatever is tinged in this manner, is of an indelible dye, and no washing, neither without or with soap, is able to take away the pure colour. But such wool as is not managed in this manner, you know what sort it proves, whether one is dying other colours or this one, without the due preparation beforehand.

I know, said he, that they are easily washen out, and are ridiculous.

Imagine then that we too, according to our ability, were aiming at such a thing as this, when we were chusing out our soldiers and were instructing them in music and exercise; and do not imagine we had anything else in view but that, in obedience to us, they should in the best manner imbibe the laws as a colour, in order that their opinion about what is dreadful, and about other things, might be indelible, both by means of natural temper and suitable education, and that these washes, however powerful in effacing, may not be able to wash away their dye, pleasure, which is more powerful in effecting this than all soap and ashes, pain, and fear, and desire, which exceed every other cosmetic. Such a power now, and perpetual preservation of right opinion, and such as is according to law, about things which are dreadful, and which are not, I call and constitute fortitude, unless you offer something else.

But I offer, said he, nothing else; for you seem to me to reckon that such right opinion of these things as arises without education is both savage and servile, and not at all according to law, and you call it something other than fortitude.

You say most true, said I.

I admit then that this is fortitude.

Admit it further, said I, to be political fortitude, and you

*usage = ability to stick to convictions
in spite of pain or pleasure*

shall admit rightly; but if you please, we shall inquire about it more perfectly another time, for at present it is not this, but justice we were seeking; and with regard to the inquiry concerning this, it hath, in my opinion, been carried far enough.

You speak very well, said he.

There yet remains, said I, two things in the city which we must search out: both temperance, and that for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, to wit, justice.

By all means.

How now can we find out justice, that we may not be further troubled about temperance?

I truly neither know, said he, nor do I wish it to appear first, if we are to drop altogether the consideration of temperance; but if you please to gratify me, consider this before the other.

I am indeed pleased, said I, if I be not doing an injury.

Consider then, said he.

We must consider, reply'd I, and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble symphony and harmony more than those things formerly mentioned.

How?

Temperance, said I, is somehow a kind of symmetry and a government, as they say, of certain pleasures and desires, and to appear superior to one's self, I do not know how; and other such things are mentioned as characters of it, are they not?

These are the principal characters of it, said he.

Is not then the expression "superior to one's self" ridiculous? For he who is superior to himself must somehow be likewise inferior to himself, and the inferior be the superior, for the same person is spoken of in all these cases.

Why not?

But to me, said I, the expression seems to denote that in the same man, with respect to his soul, there is one part better, and another worse, and that when the part more excellent in its nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when through ill education, or any kind of converse, that better part, which is smaller, is

conquered by the crowd, the worst part. This, by way of reproach, both expresses blame and denotes the person thus affected to be inferior to himself, and altogether licentious.

So it appears, said he.

Observe then, said I, our new city, and you shall find one of these in it; for you will own it may justly be said to be superior to itself, if where the better part governs the worse, that state is said to be temperate and superior to itself.

I observe, said he, and you say true.

And surely one may find a great many and various desires and pleasures and pains, more especially among children and women and domestics, and among the greatest and most naughty part of those who are called free.

It is perfectly so.

But the simple and the moderate desires, and such as are truly governed with understanding and the judgment of right opinion, you will meet with both in the few, and of the best natural temper, and of the best education.

True, said he.

And do not you see those things in our city, that there too the desires of the many, and of the baser part, are governed by the desires and by the prudence of the smaller and more moderate part.

I see it, said he.

If then any city ought to be called superior to pleasures and desires and to itself, this one is to be called so.

By all means, said he.

And is it not on all these accounts temperate?

Very much so, said he.

And if in any other city there is the same opinion in the governours and the governed about this point, who ought to govern, it is to be found in this one; do not you think so?

I am strongly of that opinion.

In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus affected in the governours or the governed?

In both of them somehow, said he.

You see then, said I, that we justly conjectured of late that temperance resembles a kind of harmony.

For what?

Because not as fortitude and wisdom, which reside each of them in a certain part, the one of them making the city wise, and the other courageous—not after this manner doth it render the city temperate, but it is naturally diffused through the whole, connecting the weakest, and those in the middle, all in one symphony, either as to wisdom, if you will, or if you will in strength, or in substance, or in any other of those things; so that most justly may we say that this concord is temperance—a symphony of that which is naturally the worse and the better part, with reference to this, which of them ought to govern in the city and in every individual.

I am entirely, said he, of the same opinion.

Be it so then, said I. There are now three things in the city, it would seem, clearly discovered; but now with respect to that other species which remains, by which the city partakes of virtue, what at all can it be? Is it not plain that it is justice?

It is plain.

Ought we not now, Glauco, like some huntsmen, to surround the thicket carefully, attending lest justice somehow escape, and, disappearing, remain undiscovered. For it is plain that she is somewhere here. Look and be eager to perceive her, if anyhow you spy her sooner than I, and point her to me.

I wish I could, said he; but if you employ me as an attendant rather, and one who is able to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will treat me perfectly well.

Follow, said I, after you have offered prayers along with me.

I will do so, only, said he, lead you the way.

To me this seems, said I, to be a place somehow of difficult access and shady: it is truly dark, and difficult to be scrutinized; we must, however, go on.

We must go, said he.

I then perceiving, said, Iō! Iō! Glauco, we seem to have somewhat which appears to be a footstep, and I imagine that something shall not very long escape us.

You tell good news, said he.

We are truly, said I, of a slow disposition.

As how?

...tend to your own business.

It appears, happy friend, to have been long since rolling at our feet, from the beginning, and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure: like those who seek sometimes for what they have in their hand, so we did not perceive it, but were looking somewhere off at a distance, and in this way perhaps it escaped us.

How do you say? reply'd he.

Thus, said I, that we seem to me to have been speaking and hearing of it long since, and not to understand ourselves that in some measure we expressed it.

A long preamble to one who is eager to hear.

Hear then, said I, if I say anything. For that which we at first established, when we regulated the city, as what ought always to be done, that, I imagine, or a species of it, is justice. For we somewhere established it, and often spoke of it, if you remember, that every one ought to apply himself to one thing relating to the city to which his genius was naturally most adapted.

We did speak of it.

And that to do one's own affairs, and not to be pragmatical, is justice. This we have both heard from many others, and have often spoken of it ourselves.

We have indeed spoken of it.

This then, friend, said I, appears to be in a certain manner justice: to do one's own affairs. Do you know whence I conjecture this?

No, but tell, said he.

Besides those things we have already considered in the city, viz., temperance, fortitude and wisdom, this, said I, seems to remain, which gives power to all these both to have a being in the state, and, whilst they exist in it, to afford it safety; and we said too, that justice would be that which would remain, if we found the other three.

There is necessity for it, said he.

But if, said I, it be necessary to judge which of these, when subsisting in the city, shall in the greatest measure render it good, it would be difficult to determine whether the agreement between the governours and the governed, or the maintaining of sound opinion by the soldiers about what things are dreadful and what are not, or wisdom and guardianship in the rulers, or whether this, when it exists in the city, renders it in the greatest measure good, viz.,

3 } 4 } wisdom } ~~justice~~ } justice
bravery } temperance }

when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate and subject, when every one does their own affairs, and is not pragmatical.

It is difficult to determine, said he, why is it not?

This power then, by which everyone in the city performs his own office, is co-rival it seems for the perfection of the city along with its wisdom, temperance and fortitude.

Extremely so, said he.

Will you not then constitute justice to be this co-rival with these for the perfection of the city?

By all means.

Consider it likewise in this manner, whether it shall thus appear to you. Will you injoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment?

Why not?

But will they give just judgment if they aim at anything preferable to this, that no one shall have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of his own?

No, but they can only give just judgment when they aim at this.

And do they not aim at this as being just?

Yes.

And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and natural work.

It is so.

See then if you agree with me. If a carpenter take in hand to do the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker the work of a carpenter, or exchange either their utensils or prices, or if the same man take in hand to do both, and all else be exchanged, do you imagine the state would be any way greatly injured?

Not very much, said he.

But I imagine, that when one who is a craftsman, or who is born to any lucrative employment, shall afterwards, being puffed up by riches, by the mob, or by strength, or any other such thing, attempt to go into the rank of counsellor and guardian, when unworthy of it, and when these shall exchange utensils and prices with one another, or when the same man shall take in hand to do all these things at once, then I imagine you will be of opinion that this interchange of these things, and this variety of em-

ployments practised by one, is the destruction of the state.

By all means.

Pragmaticalness then in these three species, and their change into one another, is the greatest hurt to the state, and may most justly be called its naughtiness.

It may so truly.

But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill of the state?

Why not?

This then is injustice. But let us again speak of it in this manner. When the craftsman, the auxiliary, and the guardian-band do their proper work, each of them doing their own work in the city, this is the contrary of the other, that is justice, and renders the city just.

It seems to me, said he, to be no otherwise than thus.

But let us not, said I, affirm it very strongly; but if it shall be allowed us that this species of these, when it enters into any individual, is likewise justice in him, we shall then be agreed (for what shall we say?); if not, we shall consider something else. But now let us finish that speculation which we thought proper, when we judged, that if we attempted first to contemplate justice in some of the greater objects which possess it, it would more easily be seen in one man. And a city appeared to us to be the most proper object of this kind, and so we established the very best one we could, well knowing that justice would be in a good one. Let us now transfer and apply to a single person what hath there appeared to us with respect to a whole city, and if the same things correspond, it shall be well; but if any thing different appear in the individual, going back again to the city we shall put it to the proof, and instantly considering them, when placed by one another, and striking them, we shall make justice shine out as from flints, and when it is become manifest, we shall firmly establish it among ourselves.

You say quite in the right way, said he, and we must do so.

Why then, said I, when we denominate any thing the same, though different in degrees, is it dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar?

It is similar, said he.

The just man then, said I, will differ nothing from the just city, according to the idea of justice, but will be similar to it.

He will be similar to it, said he.

But indeed with respect to this inquiry, the city at least appeared then to be just, when the three species of dispositions in it did each of them its own work, viz., the temperate, the brave, and the wise, by virtue of their own proper natures, and not according to any other affections and habits.

True, said he.

And shall we not, friend, judge it proper that the individual, who hath in his soul the same principles (viz., temperance, fortitude, wisdom), shall, from having the same affections with those in the city, be called by the same names.

By all means, said he.

We have again, rare friend, fallen into no mean speculation concerning the soul, whether it hath in it those three principles or not.

Into no mean one, as I imagine, said he. And it is likely, Socrates, that the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult.

It appears, said I. But know well, Glauco, that according to my opinion we shall never comprehend this matter accurately in the methods we are now using in these reasonings, for the road leading to it is greater and longer. We may however, it is likely, speak of it in such a manner as may be worthy of our former disquisitions and speculations.

Is not that desirable? said he. This would satisfy me for my own part, at present at least.

This, said I, shall to me too be quite sufficient.

Do not then give over, said he, but pursue your inquiry.

Are we not then under a necessity, said I, of acknowledging that there are in every one of us the same principles and dispositions which are in the city? for from nowhere else did they get thither. For it were ridiculous if one should imagine that the irascible disposition did not arise from the individuals in cities, who have this blemish, as those of Thrace, Scythia, and in some measure almost all the higher region. And the same thing may be said with

respect to the love of learning, which one may chiefly ascribe to this country; or with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phenicians and the inhabitants of Egypt.

Very much so, said he.

This then is so, said I, nor is it difficult to be known.

No indeed.

But this is difficult to determine, whether we perform each of these by the same power, or, as they are three, we perform one by one power, and another by another; that is, we learn by one, we are angry by another, and by a certain third we desire those pleasures relating to nutrition and propagation, and the other pleasures of affinity to these. Or do we in each of these, when we apply to them, act with the whole soul? These things are difficult to be determined in a manner worthy of the subject.

So it seems to me, said he.

Let us then in this manner attempt to determine these things, whether they are the same with one another or different.

How are we to do it?

It is plain that one and the same thing cannot at one and the same time do or suffer contrary things in the same respect, and with reference to the same object; so that if we anywhere find these circumstances existing among them, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several.

Be it so.

Consider then what I am saying.

Proceed, reply'd he.

Is it possible for the same thing to stand and to be moved at once in the same respect?

By no means.

Let us settle this more accurately still, lest as we proceed we be any way uncertain about it. For if one should say, that when a man stands, yet moveth his hands and his head, that the same person at once standeth and is moved, we would not, I imagine, think it proper to speak in this manner, but that one part of him stood, and another part was moved. Would not we speak in this manner?

In this manner.

But if one who says these things should, in a more jocose

humour still, and factiously cavilling alledge that tops stand wholly and are moved at once, when their centre is fixed on one point and they are whirled about, or that anything else going round in a circle in the same position doth this, we would not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they stand still and are moved; but we would say that they have in them the perpendicular and the periphery, and that with relation to the perpendicular they stood (for towards no side they declined), but with relation to the periphery they moved in a circle. But when its perpendicularity declineth either to the right or left hand forwards or backwards, whilst it is at the same time whirling round, then in no respect doth it stand.

Very right, said he.

Nothing then of this kind shall move us when it is said; nor shall anyone persuade us, as if anything, being one and the same thing, could do and suffer contraries at one and the same time, with reference to the same object, and in the same respect.

He shall not persuade me, said he.

But, however, said I, that we may not be obliged to be tedious in going over all these quibbles, and in evincing them to be false, let us proceed on this supposition that so it is, after we have agreed that, if at any time these things appear otherwise than as we now settle them, we shall yield up again all we shall gain by it.

It is necessary, said he, to do so.

Would not you then, said I, deem these things among those which are opposite to one another, whether they be actions or passions, for in this there is no difference: to assent, to wit, and to dissent; to desire to get a thing, and to reject it; to bring towards one's self, and to push away?

I would deem these, said he, among the things which are opposite to each other.

What then, said I, with respect to thirsting, to hungering, and, in general, with respect to all the passions—and further, to desire, to will, and all these—may they not somehow be placed among those species which have now been mentioned? As for example, will you not always say that the soul of one who has desire goes out after that which it desires, or bringeth near to it that which it wisheth

to have; or again, in so far as it wants something to be afforded it, like one who only sees an object, intimates by signs to have it brought near, desiring the actual possession of it?

I would say so.

But what, to be unwilling not to wish, nor to desire, shall we not deem these of the same kind as to push away from the soul, and drive off, and everything else which is opposite to the former?

Why not?

This being the case, shall we say there is some species of the desires? and that the most conspicuous are to thirst and to hunger?

We shall say so, reply'd he.

Is not the one the desire of drinking, and the other of eating?

Yes.

Is it then, when considered as thirst, a desire in the soul of something further than of drink? It is according to the nature of the thirst. Is there then a thirst of a hot drink, or of a cold, of much or of little, or in short of some particular kind of drink? for if there be any heat accompanying the thirst, it readily occasions a desire of a cold drink, but if cold accompanies it, then there is excited a desire of a warm drink. If the thirst be great, through many circumstances, it occasions a desire of a great drink, but if small a desire of a small one, but the desire itself to thirst never creates the desire of any thing else, but of drink itself, as its nature prompteth, and in like manner of the appetite of hunger with relation to meat.

Thus every desire, said he, in itself is of that alone of which it is the desire; but to be a desire of such or such a particular species are adventitious circumstances.

Let not then any one, said I, create us any trouble, as if we were inadvertent, that no one desired drink, but good drink, or meat, but good meat, for indeed all men desire that which is good. If then thirst be a desire, it is of what is good, whether it be of drink, or of whatever else it is the desire. And in the same way of all the other desires.

Perhaps, reply'd he, the man who should mention these things would seem to say something material.

But, however, said I, whatever things are of such a

nature, as to belong to any genus, have a general reference to the genus; but each particular of these refers to a particular species of that genus.

I have not understood you, said he.

Have you not understood, said I, that greater is of such a kind as to be greater than somewhat?

Yes indeed.

Is it not greater than the lesser?

Yes.

And that which is considerably greater than that which is considerably lesser, is it not?

Yes.

And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly lesser, and that which is to be greater than that which is to be lesser?

What else? said he.

And after the same manner, what is more numerous with respect to what is less numerous, and what is double with reference to what is half, and all such like things; and further, what is heavier with respect to lighter, and swifter to slower; and further still, hot to cold, and all such like things, are they not after this manner?

Entirely so.

But what as to the sciences? Is not the case the same? For science in general is the science of learning in general, or of whatever else you think proper to make it the science; but a certain particular science, and of such a particular kind, refers to a certain particular object, and of such a kind. What I mean is this: After the science of building houses arose, did it not separate from other sciences, so as to be called architecture?

What else?

Was it not from its being of such a kind as none of the others were?

Yes.

Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing that itself became such a particular art? and all other arts and sciences in like manner?

They are so.

Allow then, said I, that this is what I wanted to express, if you have now understood it: where things are considered as having reference to other things, generals alone

refer to generals, and particulars to particulars. I do not, however, say that the science altogether resembles that of which it is the science (as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly, or that the science of good and evil were itself good and evil). But as science is not constituted the science of that thing in general of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it (to wit, of its healthy and sickly state), so itself comes to be a certain particular science, and this causeth it to be called no longer simply a science, but the medicinal science, the particular species it is of being superadded.

I have understood you, said he, and it appears to me to be so.

But will not you, said I, make thirst now, whatever it be, to be one of those things which respect somewhat else, considered as what it is, and it is surely thirst?

I will, said he, and it respecteth drink.

And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink? But thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind, but of drink in general alone is thirst in general naturally the desire.

Entirely so, indeed.

The soul of the man, then, who thirsteth inclines for nothing further than to drink; this he desireth, to this he hasteth.

It is plain.

If then at any time any thing pull back the thirsting soul, it must be some different part of it from that which thirsteth, and leadeth it as a wild beast to the drink; for have we not said that it is impossible for the same thing, in the same respects, and with the same parts of it, to do at once contrary things?

It is indeed impossible.

In the same manner, I imagine, as it is not proper to say of an archer that his hands at once push out, and likewise pull in the bow, but that the one hand is that which pusheth out, and the other that which pulleth in.

Entirely so, said he.

But whether may we say that there are some who when athirst are not willing to drink?

Yes, indeed, said he, there are many, and many times that is the case.

What now, said I, may one say of these persons? Might it not be said that there was in their soul somewhat prompting them to drink, and likewise something hindering them, different from the other, and superior to the prompting principle.

It seems so to me, said he.

Doth not then the restraining principle arise from reason when it ariseth; but those which push and drive forwards proceed from passions and diseases?

It appears so.

We shall then, said I, not unreasonably account these to be two, and different from one another, calling the one part which reasoneth the rational part of the soul, but that part with which it loves and hungers and thirsts, and those other appetites, the irrational and concupiscible part, the friend of certain gratifications and pleasures.

We shall not, said he, but we may most reasonably consider them in this light.

Let these then, said I, be allowed to be distinct species in the soul. But as to that of anger, ^{SPRIT} is it a third principle, or has it affinity to one of those two?

Perhaps it is, said he, to the concupiscible part.

But I believe, said I, what I have somewhere heard, how that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, as he returned from the Pyraeum, perceived some dead bodies lying in the sewer, below the outside of the north wall, and had both a desire to look at them, and at the same time was averse from it, and turned himself away; and for a while he struggled with his desire and covered his eyes; but at last, being overcome by his appetite, with eager eyes, running towards the dead bodies, lo now, said he, you wretched eyes! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle.

I too, said he, have heard it.

This speech now, said I, shows that anger sometimes opposes the appetites, as being different one from another.

It shows it, indeed, said he.

And do not we often perceive, said I, when the appetites compel any one contrary to reason, that he reproacheth himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him, and when the rational and concupiscible are in a

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state of sedition, ^{anger} in such a person becomes as it were an ally to reason? but when the appetite goes along with reason, then anger gives no opposition. You will say, I imagine, that you have perceived nothing of this kind in yourself, at any time, nor yet in any other.

No truly, said he.

What now, said I, when one imagines he does an injury, the more generous he is, is he not so much the less apt to be angry when he suffers hunger and cold, or any other such things from one who inflicts, as he imagines, these things with justice? And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one.

True, said he.

But what, when one imagines he is injured, doth not anger in such an one burn, and has he not indignation, and fights as an ally on the side of what appears to be just; and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and such like, bears up, and conquers, and ceaseth not from its generous toils till either it accomplish them or dies, or is restrained by the rational principle within him, like a dog by the shepherd, and is rendered mild?

It perfectly resembles, said he, what you say; for in our city we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient as dogs, to the rulers of the city, as to shepherds.

You rightly understand, said I, what I would say. But have you besides considered this?

As what?

That here the reverse appears concerning the irascible from that in the former case; for there we were deeming it the same with the concupiscible, but now we say it is far from it, or that in the sedition of the soul it much rather joins its arms with the rational part.

Entirely so, said he.

Is it then as something different from it, or as a species of the rational, so as that there are not three species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscible? Or as there were three species which completed the city, the lucrative, the auxiliary, the legislative, so in the soul this irascible is a third thing, naturally an auxiliary to the rational, if it be not corrupted by bad education?

Of necessity it is, said he, a third.

Yes, said I, if at least it appear to be any way different

from the rational, as it appeared to be distinct from the concupiscible.

But that is not difficult, said he, to be seen, for one may see this even in little children, that immediately from their infancy they are full of anger; but some appear to me at least never at all to participate of reason, and the most arrive at it but late.

Yes, truly, said I, you say right; and one may yet further observe in the brute creatures that what you say is really the case. And besides this, it is likewise attested by what we formerly mentioned from Homer,

Striking his breast, his heart he thus reproved.

For in that passage Homer hath plainly made one part reprehend another—the part which reasoneth about good and evil reprehend the part which is unreasonably angry.

You say perfectly right, said he.

These things, said I, we have with difficulty agreed to, and it is now sufficiently acknowledged that the same species of principles as are in a city are in every individual, and in the same number.

They are so.

Must it not therefore of necessity follow that, after what manner the city was wise, and in what respect, after the same manner, and in the same respect is the individual wise also.

Why not?

And in what respects, and after what manner the individual is brave, in the same respect, and after the same manner is a city brave; and so in all other respects both of them are the same as to virtue.

Of necessity.

And I fancy, Glauco, we shall say that a man is just in the same way as we said a city was so?

This likewise is quite necessary.

(But have we not somehow forgot this, that the city was just, when every one of the three species in it did each its own work?

We do not appear to me, said he, to have forgot it.

We must then remember likewise, that each one of us will

be just, and do his own work, when he doth his own affairs within himself.

We must, said he, carefully remember it.

Is it not then proper that the rational part should govern, as it is wise, and hath the care of the whole soul? and that the irascible part should be obedient and an auxiliary of the other?

Certainly.

Shall not then the mixture, as we observed, of music and exercise make these two harmonious, raising and nourishing the one with worthy reasonings and learning, and unbending the other, soothing and sweetening it by harmony and measure?

Most perfectly, said he.

And when those two are in this manner nourished, and have been truly taught and instructed in their own affairs, let them be set over the concupiscible part, which in every one is the greater part of the soul, and in its nature most insatiably desirous of being gratified: they are to take care of this part, lest being filled with these bodily pleasures, as they are called, it become great and vigorous, and do not its own work, but attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and overturn the whole life of all in general.

Entirely so, said he.

And might he not, said I, by this principle guard likewise in the best manner against enemies from without, by its influence both over the whole soul and body likewise, the one deliberating, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the things deliberated.

It is so.

And I imagine that we call one brave when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the ^{spirited} irascible part preserves the opinion dictated by reason concerning what is terrible and what is not.

Right, said he.

And we call him wise, from that small part which governs in him, and dictates these things, having in it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each one, and for the whole community of the three themselves.

Perfectly so.

But what, do we not call him temperate, moreover, from

the friendship and harmony of these very things, when the governing and governed agree in one, that reason ought to govern, and when they do not raise sedition?

Temperance, said he, is no other than this, both as to the city and the individual.

But as we have often said, he shall be just by these things and in this manner.

It is quite necessary.

What then, said I, hath any thing blunted us, that we should fancy justice to be anything else than what it hath appeared to be in a city?

Nothing appears to me at least, said he, to have done it.

But in this manner, let us by all means confirm ourselves, if there yet remains any doubt in the soul that can be an objection to this principle, by bringing the man into difficult circumstances.

As what?

Such as this: if we were obliged to declare concerning such a city, and concerning a man born and educated conformably to it, whether we thought such a one, when entrusted with gold or silver, would embezzle it, do you imagine that anyone would think such a one would do it sooner than those who are not of such a kind?

No one, said he.

Will not such a one then be free of sacrileges, thefts, treacheries, against companions in private, or the city in public?

He will be free.

Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths or other declarations?

How can he.

Adulteries, and neglect of parents, impiety against the Gods, will belong to every one else sooner than to such a one.

They will belong to every one else truly, said he.

And is not this the cause of all these things, that of all within him, each one thing doth its own work as to governing and being governed?

This is it, and nothing else.

Do you desire justice to be any thing else but such a power as produces such men and cities?

Not I truly, said he, for my part.

Our dream, then, which we conjectured is at last accomplished: that when we first began to build our city, we seemed by some God's assistance to have got to a beginning and pattern of justice.

Entirely so.

And that, Glauco, was a certain image of justice, according to which it behoved the man who was fitted by nature for the office of a shoemaker to perform properly that office, and to do nothing else, and he who is a carpenter to perform that office, and all others in the same way.

It appears so.

And of such a kind truly was justice, as it appeared to us, I do not mean as to external action, but concerning that which is really internal, relating to the man himself and those things which are properly his own; not allowing any principle in himself to attempt to do what belongs to others, nor the principles to be pragmatistical, engaging in one another's affairs; but having well established his own proper affairs, and holding the government of himself, adorning himself, and becoming his own friend, and attuning those three principles in the most natural manner, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may chance to intervene—to combine all these together, and become of many an entire one, temperate and attuned, and in that manner to perform whatever is done either in the way of acquiring wealth, or concerning the management of the body, or any public affair or private bargain; and in all these cases to account and call that action just and handsome which always sustains and promotes this habit; and to call the knowledge which presides over this action, wisdom, but to call that an unjust action which dissolveth this habit, and the opinion which presides over this, folly.

You say perfectly true, Socrates, said he.

Be it so, said I. If then we should say that we have found out a just man and city, and what justice is in them, I don't imagine we should seem to be altogether telling a lye.

No truly, said he.

May we say so?

We may say it.

Be it so, said I. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice.

That is plain.

Must it not then be some sedition among the three principles, some pragmatism and intermeddling in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of some one principle against the whole soul, to govern in it when it does not belong to it, but which is of such a nature, as what really ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we shall call their tumult and mistake by such names as these, injustice, intemperance, cowardice and folly, and, in general, all vice.

These things, said he, are quite so.

To do injustice then, said I, and to be injurious, and likewise to do justly, all these must be very manifest if, to wit, injustice and justice are so.

As how?

Because they are no way different from what is salutary or noxious: as these are in the body, so are the others in the soul.

How? said he.

Such things as are healthy constitute health, and such as are noxious produce disease.

Yes.

And must not the doing justly produce justice, and doing unjustly produce injustice?

Of necessity.

But to produce health is to establish all in the body according to nature, to govern and to be governed of one another; and to produce disease is to govern and be governed, one part by another, contrary to nature.

It is indeed.

Then, again, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul according to nature, to govern and be governed by one another? and injustice is to govern and be governed by one another contrary to nature.

Plainly so, said he.

Virtue then, it seems, is a sort of health, and beauty, and good habit of the soul, and vice the disease, and deformity, and infirmity.

It is so.

Do not then honourable pursuits lead to the acquisition of virtue, but dishonourable ones to that of vice?
Of necessity.

What remains then for us, as seems, to consider is, whether it be profitable to do justly, and to pursue what is honourable, and to be just, whether one under such a character be unknown or not; or to do unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, nor by chastisement become better?

But, said he, Socrates, this speculation seems now, to me at least, to be ridiculous. For if when the nature of the body is corrupted it be thought that life is not worth having, not even though one had all kinds of meats and drinks, all kind of wealth, all kind of dominion, when the nature of that by which we live is disordered and thoroughly corrupted, shall life then be worth having, though one can do everything else which he inclines besides this, how he shall get quit of vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since, to wit, both these things have appeared as we have represented?

It would be truly ridiculous, said I. But however, as we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not give over.

We must not at all truly, said he, give over.

Come then, said I, that you may likewise see how many principles vice hath, principles which, as I imagine, are worthy of attention.

I attend, said he: only tell me.

And truly now, said I, since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears now to me, as from a summit, that there is one principle of virtue, but those of vice are infinite, of which there are four which deserve to be mentioned.

How do you say? reply'd he.

There seem to be as many species of soul as there are of republics.

How many then?

There are five, said I, of republics, and five of the soul.

Tell, said he, what these are.

I say, reply'd I, that this which we have gone through is one species of a republic, and it may have a twofold appel-

lation; for if among the rulers there be one surpassing the rest, it may be called a Monarchy; if there be several, an Aristocracy.

True, said he.

I call this then, said I, one species; for whether they be several, or but one who govern, they will never alter the principal laws of the city, observing the nurture and education we have described.

It is not likely, said he.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK

Communism²

THE FIFTH BOOK

I DENOMINATE then indeed both such a city and republic, and such a man as we have described, good and upright; and if this republic be an upright one, I deem the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in cities, and the establishing the temper of soul of individuals, and that in four species of illness.

Of what kind are these? said he.

I was then proceeding to mention them in order, as they appeared to me to rise out of one another, but Polemarchus, stretching out his hand (for he sate a little further off than Adimantus), caught him by the robe at his shoulder and drew him near, and bending himself towards him, spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this:

Shall we let pass then? said he, or what shall we do?

Not at all, said Adimantus, speaking now aloud. And I reply'd, What then will not you let pass?

You, said he.

As I had said what?

You seem to us to be growing negligent, and to steal a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least considerable, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you imagine that you escaped our notice when you made this speech so simply, viz., that both as to wives and children, it is manifest to every one that these things will be common among friends.

Did not I say right, Adimantus?

Yes, said he; but this, which was rightly said, like other parts of your discourse, requires explanation, to show what is the manner of their being common, for there may be many kinds of it. Do not omit then to tell which is the method you spoke of; for we have been in expectation for some time past, imagining you would on some occasion

make mention of the propagation of children, in what way they should be propagated, and when they are born, how they should be nurtured, and everything relative to what you spoke concerning wives and children being in common; for we imagine that it is of considerable, nay, of the utmost importance to the state, when this is rightly performed or otherwise. But now when you are entering on the consideration of another constitution, before you have sufficiently discussed these things, it seemed proper to us what you now heard, not to let you pass before you went over all these things as you did the others.

And you may count me too, said Glauco, as joining in this vote.

You may easily judge, Socrates, said Thrasymachus, that this is the opinion of us all.

What is this, said I, you have done, laying hold of me? What a mighty discourse do you again raise, as you did at the beginning about a republic, in which I was rejoicing as having now completed it, being fond, if any one would have let these things pass, and been content with what was then said. But you know not what a swarm of reasonings you raise by what you now challenge, which I foreseeing, passed by at that time, lest it should occasion great disturbance.

What then, said Thrasymachus, do you imagine that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings?

Yes, said I, but in measure.

The whole of life, Socrates, said Glauco, is with the wise the measure of hearing such reasonings as these. But pass what relates to us, and do not at all grudge to explain your opinion concerning what we inquire about—what sort of community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and concerning the nurture the latter are to have while very young, in the period between their generation and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Endeavour then to tell us in what manner it should be done.

It is not easy, happy Glauco, said I, to go through these things, for there are many of them hard to be believed, whether the things we say be possible; and though they could easily be done, whether they would be for the best

might still be doubted. Wherefore, dear companion, I grudge somewhat to touch on these things, lest our reasoning appear to be rather what were to be wished for than what could take place.

Do not at all grudge, said he, for your hearers are neither stupid, nor incredulous, nor ill-affected towards you.

Then, I said, do you say this, most excellent Glauco, with a desire to encourage me?

I do, said he.

Then your discourse has a quite contrary effect, said I; for if I trusted to myself that I understood what I am to say, your encouragement would do well. For one who understands the truth about the greatest and the most interesting affairs, speaks with safety and confidence among the wise and friendly; but to be diffident of one's self and doubtful of the truth, and at the same time to be haranguing as I do now, is both dreadful and dangerous, not only lest he should be exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest that, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about things in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I adore therefore Adrastia for what, Glauco, I am going to say; for I trust it is a smaller offence to be a man-slayer without intention, than to be an impostor with regard to what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and it were better to hazard such a thing among enemies than friends; so that you must give me better encouragement.

Then Glauco, laughing: But Socrates, said he, if we suffer any thing amiss from your discourse, we shall acquit you as clear of any man-slaughter, and as no impostor; so proceed boldly.

But indeed, said I, he who is acquit at a court of justice, is deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, 'tis reasonable it should be so in this.

For this reason then, said he, proceed.

We must now, said I, return again to what it seems should, according to method, have been recited before; and perhaps it is right to proceed in this manner, that after having entirely finished the drama respecting the men, we go over that which concerneth the women, especially since you challenge me to proceed in this manner.

For in my opinion, men who have been born and educated in such a manner as we have described can have no right profession and enjoyment of children and wives but in pursuing the same tract in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we have endeavoured in our reasoning to form somehow men as the guardians of a flock

We have.

Let us proceed then, having established likewise affairs relating to propagation and education in a manner similar to that of the males; and let us consider whether it be proper for us to do so or not.

How do you mean? reply'd he.

Thus. Whether shall we judge it proper for the females of our guardian dogs, to watch likewise in the same manner as the males do, and to hunt along with them, and do every thing else in common; or shall we judge it proper for them to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being unable for the other exercises, because of the bringing forth, and the nursing the whelps, and the males to labour and to have the whole care of the flocks?

They are to do all, said he, in common. Only we are to employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

Is it possible then, said I, to employ any creature for the same purposes with another, unless you give it the same nurture and education as you give the other?

It is not possible.

If then we shall employ the women for the same purposes as we do the men, must we not likewise teach them the same things?

We must.

Were not both music and exercise bestowed on the males?

They were.

These two arts therefore, and those likewise relating to war, must be bestowed also on the women, and they must be employed about the same things.

It is reasonable, said he, from what you say.

Yet as these things, said I, are contrary perhaps to custom, many of these things we are now speaking of may appear ridiculous, if practised in the way we mention.

Extremely so, reply'd he.

What, said I, do you perceive as the most ridiculous

part? Or is it plainly because that you see the women naked in the Palaestra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even the more advanced in years, in the same manner as old men in the wrestling schools, when they are wrinkled, and not at all handsome to the eye, yet still fond of the exercises?

Yes, truly, said he; because it might indeed appear ridiculous, at least, as matters stand at present.

Must we not therefore, said I, since we have entered upon this discourse, be afraid of the raileries of the men of pleasantry, whatever things they may say with regard to such a revolution being introduced, as well in the exercises as in music, and particularly in the use of arms, and the management of horses.

You say right, reply'd he.

But since we have entered on this discourse, we must go to the rigour of the law, and beg these men not to follow their own customs, but to think seriously and remember that it is not long ago since these things appeared base and ridiculous to the Greeks, which are only so now to the most of the Barbarians, such as to see naked men. And when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedaemonians, began their exercises, it was in the power of the men of humour of that time to turn all these things into ridicule. Do not you think so?

I do.

But I imagine, that when upon experience it appeared better to strip themselves of all these things than to be wrap'd in them, what was ridiculous indeed to the eye was removed by the idea of best, mentioned in our reasoning; and this too show'd manifestly that he is a fool who deems anything ridiculous but what is bad, and attempts to rally upon any other idea of the ridiculous but that of the foolish and the vicious, or to be serious in any other pursuit but that of the good.

By all means, said he.

Is not this then first of all to be agreed on, whether these things be possible or not? And we must allow it to be a matter of dispute, if any one, either in jest or earnest, inclines to doubt whether the human genius in the female sex be able in everything to bear a share with the male, or if it be not in any one thing, or if it be able in some things

but not in others, and among which of these are the affairs of war? Would not the man who thus sets out in the most handsome manner conclude too, as it seems, most handsomely?

By far, said he.

Are you willing then, said I, that we ourselves, instead of others, dispute about these things, that the opposite side may not be destitute of a defence?

Nothing hinders, said he.

Let us then say this for them. That there is no need, Socrates and Glauco, of others to dispute with you about this matter, for yourselves, in the beginning of your establishment, when you established your city, agreed that it was necessary for each individual to practise one business, according to their several genius. I think we acknowledged it; for why should they not? Does not then the genius of the male differ widely from that of the female? Why does it not differ? And is it not fit to enjoin each a different work, according to their genius? Why not? Are not you then in the wrong now, and contradict yourselves, when you say that men and women ought to do the same things, whilst their genius is extremely different? Can you in answer to these objections, admirable Glauco, make any defence?

It is not quite an easy matter, said he, to do it immediately; but I will entreat you, and do now entreat you, to go through the arguments on our side, whatever they may be.

These are the things, Glauco, reply'd I, and many other such like, which I long ago foreseeing, was both afraid and backward to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives and the education of children.

It is not easy indeed, reply'd he.

It is not, said I. But the case is thus. If one falls into a small fish-pond, or into the middle of the greatest sea, he must still swim in the one no less than in the other.

Entirely so.

Must not we swim then, and endeavour to escape from this reasoning, expecting that either some dolphin is to carry us out, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance?

It seems we must do so, reply'd he.

Come then, said I, if we can anywhere find an out-gate; for we did acknowledge that different geniuses ought to study different things; but the genius of man and woman is different; yet now we say that different geniuses ought to study the same things: these are the things which you accuse us of.

Certainly.

How strong, Glauco, said I, is the power of the art of cavilling?

How?

Because, reply'd I, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, and imagine that they are not cavilling, but reasoning truly, because they are not able to understand the subject, by dividing it into its proper parts, and under this arguing will pursue the opposite of their subject, using cavilling instead of reasoning.

This is indeed, said he, the case with many; but doth it at present extend likewise to us?

Entirely so, said I, we seem then unwillingly to have fallen into a contradiction.

How?

Because we have very strenuously and very keenly asserted, that when the genius is not the same, they ought not to have the same employments; but we have not in any respect considered what is the characteristic of the sameness or diversity of genius, nor to what it points: we stop'd then, when we had assigned different pursuits to different geniuses, and to the same geniuses the same pursuits.

We have never indeed, said he, considered it.

It is therefore, reply'd I, still in our power, as appears, to question ourselves whether the genius of the bald, or of those who wear their hair, be the same, and not different. And after we should agree that it was different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should allow those who wear hair to make them; or if those who wear hair made them, whether we should allow the others.

That were ridiculous, reply'd he.

Is it in any other respect, said I, ridiculous then that we did not wholly determine the sameness and diversity of genius, but attended only to that species of diversity and sameness which respects the employments themselves?

just as we say that the physician and the man who hath a medical soul have one and the same genius? Do not you think so?

I do.

But that the physician and architect have a different. Entirely.

And so, reply'd I, of the genius of men and of women, if it appear different, in respect to any art, or other employment, we shall say that this different employment is to be assigned to each separately. But if their genius appear different only in this, that the female brings forth and the male begets, we shall not say that this hath at all shown the man to be different from the woman in the respect we speak of, but we shall still be of opinion that both our guardians and their wives ought to pursue the same employments.

And with reason, said he.

Shall we not then henceforth desire any one who says the contrary to instruct us in this point: What is that art or study respecting the establishment of a city, where the genius of the man and woman is not the same, but different?

It is reasonable truly.

Possibly someone may say, as you was saying a while ago, that it is not easy to tell this sufficiently on the sudden, but that it is not all difficult to one who has considered it.

One might indeed say so.

Are you willing then that we desire such an opponent to listen to us, if by any means we shall show him that there is in the administration of the city no employment peculiar to the women?

By all means.

Come on then (shall we say to him), answer us. Is not this your meaning: that one man has a good genius for any thing, and another a bad, in this respect, that the one learns anything easily, and the other with difficulty; and the one with a little instruction discovers a great deal in what he learns, but the other, when he gets a great deal of instruction and care, does not retain even what he hath learned: with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; with the other, it opposes its improvement. Are there any other marks than these by which you would

determine one to have a good genius for anything, and another to have a bad one?

No one, said he, would mention any other.

Know you then of any thing which is managed by mankind, with reference to which the men have not all these marks in a more excellent degree than the women? Or should we not be tedious if we mentioned particularly the weaving art, and the dressing pot herbs and victuals, in which the female genius seems to be somewhat considerable, and is most ridiculous where it is surpassed.

You say true, said he, that in the general, in every thing the one genius is superior to the other, yet there are many women who in many things excel many men; but on the whole, it is as you say.

There is not then, my friend, any office among the whole inhabitants of the city peculiar to the woman, considered as woman, nor to the man, considered as man; but the geniuses are indiscriminately diffused through both: the woman is naturally fitted for sharing in all offices, and so is the man; but in all the woman is weaker than the man.

Perfectly so.

Shall we then commit everything to the care of the men, and nothing to the care of the women?

How shall we do so?

It is therefore, I imagine, as we say, that one woman too is fitted by natural genius for being a physician, and another is not; one is naturally a musician, and another is not?

What else?

And one is naturally fitted for the exercises, and another is not, one is fitted for war, and another is not.

I at least am of this opinion.

And is not one likewise a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it? one of high spirits, and another of low?

This likewise is true.

And has not one woman a natural genius for being a guardian, and another not? And have not we made choice of such a genius as this for our guardian men?

Of such a genius as this.

The genius then of the woman and of the man for the guardianship of the city is the same, only that the one is weaker, and the other stronger.

It appears so.

And such women as these are to be chosen to dwell with these men, and be guardians along with them, as they are naturally fit for them, and of a kindred genius.

Entirely so.

And must not the same employments be assigned to the same geniuses?

The same.

We are now come in a roundabout way to what we formerly mentioned; and we allow that it is not contrary to nature to appoint for the wives of our guardians music and exercise.

By all means.

We are not then establishing things impossible, or such as can only be wished for, since we establish the law according to nature; and what is at present contrary to these things is contrary to nature rather, as appears.

It seems so.

Was not our inquiry to hear of what was possible and best?

It was.

And we have agreed that these things are possible.

We have.

And we must next agree that they are best.

It is plain we must.

In order therefore to make a guardian woman, at least the education will not be different from that of the men, especially as she has received the same natural genius.

It will not be different.

What do you think then of such an opinion as this?

Of what?

That of imagining with yourself one man to be better, and another worse, or do you deem them to be all alike?

By no means.

In the city now which we establish, whether do you judge that our guardians, with this education we have described, or shoemakers with education in their art, will be rendered the better men?

The question, reply'd he, is ridiculous.

I understand you, said I. But what, of all the other citizens, are not they the best?

By far.

But what, will not these women too be the best of women?

They will be so, reply'd he, by far.

Is there anything better in a city than that both the women and the men be rendered the very best?

There is not.

This then will be effected by music and exercise being afforded them according as we have described.

Why will it not?

We have then established a law which is not only possible, but moreover best for the state.

We have.

The wives, then, of our guardians must be unclothed, since they are to put on virtue for clothes, and they must bear a part in war and the other guardianship of the city, and do nothing else: but the lightest part of these services are to be allotted to the women rather than to the men, on account of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women, whilst performing the exercises for the sake of what is best, reaps the empty fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and in no respect knows, as appears, at what he laughs, nor why he does it. For that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, That what is most advantageous for the public is handsome, and what is hurtful is ugly.

By all means.

Let us say, then, that we have got over one wave, as it were, having thus settled the law with respect to the women, without being wholly overwhelmed, ordaining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: but our reasoning hath been consistent with itself, as it respecteth both what is possible and likewise advantageous.

It is truly no small wave you get over.

You will not, reply'd I, call it a great one, when you see what comes after it.

Mention it, said he, that I may see.

That law, reply'd I, and those others formerly mentioned, are followed, as I imagine, by this one.

Which?

That these women must all be common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately; and that their children likewise be common; that neither the parent know his own children, nor the children their parent.

This is much greater than the other, as to the incredibility both of its being possible and at the same time advantageous.

I do not believe, reply'd I, that anyone will doubt of its utility, at least, as if it were not the greatest good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible. But I imagined the greatest question will be, whether it be possible or not?

One may very readily, said he, dispute as to both.

You mention, reply'd I, a croud of disputes. But I thought that I should at least have escaped from the one, if its utility had been agreed on, and that it should have only remained to consider its possibility.

But you have not, said he, got off unobserved; give then an account of both.

I must then, said I, submit to a trial. But however, indulge me thus far: allow me to feast myself, as those are wont to feast themselves who are slow in understanding, when they walk alone. For men of this sort, sometimes, before they find out how they shall attain what they desire, waving that inquiry, that they may not fatigue themselves in deliberating about the possibility or impossibility of it, suppose they have obtained what they desire, and then go through what remains; and they delight in running over what they will do when their desire is obtained, rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still. I am now effeminate after this manner, and wish to put off those debates, and to inquire afterwards whether these things be possible; but at present, holding them possible, if you allow me, I will consider in what manner our rulers shall regulate these things, when they take place, that they may be done in the most advantageous manner both to the state and the guardians. These things I shall endeavour, in the first place, to go over with your assistance, and the others afterwards, if you allow me.

I allow, said he, and inquire accordingly.

I imagine then, said I, that if our rulers are worthy of that name, and in like manner these who are their auxiliaries, their ministers in the government, the latter will be disposed to do whatever is enjoined them, and the former will be ready to command; enjoining them some things in direct obedience to the law, and imitating the law in whatever things are entrusted to them.

It is likely, said he.

Do you now, said I, who are their lawgiver, in the same manner as you have chosen out the men, chuse out likewise the women, making their genius as similar as possible: and as they dwell and eat together in common, and as no one possesses any of these things privately, they will meet together; and being mingled in their exercises and other conversation, they will be led from an innate necessity, as I imagine, to mutual embraces. Do not I seem to say what will necessarily happen?

Not, reply'd he, by any geometrical, but concupiscible necessity, which seems to be more pungent than the other to persuade and draw the bulk of mankind.

Much more, said I. But after this, Glauco, to mix together in a disorderly manner, or to do anything else, is neither holy in a city of happy persons, nor will the rulers permit it.

It were not just, said he.

It is plain then, that after this they shall make marriages as much as possible sacred; but the most advantageous would be sacred.

By all means.

How then shall they be most advantageous? Tell me that, Glauco, for I see in your houses dogs of chace, and a great many excellent birds. Have you then indeed ever attended at all, in any respect, to their marriages, and the propagation of their species?

How? said he.

First of all, that among these, although they be excellent themselves, are there not some who are most excellent?

There are.

Whether then do you breed from all of them alike, or are you careful to breed chiefly from the best?

From the best.

But how? from the youngest or from the oldest, or from those who are most in their prime?

From those in their prime.

And if the breed be not of this kind, you reckon that the race of birds and dogs greatly degenerates.

I reckon so, reply'd he.

And what think you as to horses, said I, and other animals? is the case any otherwise with respect to these?

That, said he, were absurd.

Strange! said I, my friend, how extremely perfect governours must we have, if the case be the same with respect to the human race.

But it is so, reply'd he; but what then?

Because there is a necessity, said I, for their using many medicines: for where bodies have no occasion for medicines, but are ready to subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we reckon that a weaker physician may suffice; but when there is a necessity for medicines, we know that a more able physician is then requisite.

True; but with what view do you say this?

With this view, reply'd I. It appears that our rulers are obliged to use a deal of fiction and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere that all these things were useful in the way of medicines.

And rightly, said he.

This piece of right now seems not to be the most inconsiderable in marriages and the propagation of children.

How, now?

It is proper, said I, from what we have acknowledged, that the best men embrace for the most part the best women, and the most naughty men, on the contrary, the most naughty women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not that of the latter, if you desire to have the flock of the most perfect kind; and this must be performed in such a manner as to escape the notice of all but the governours themselves, if you would have the whole herd of the guardians to be as free from sedition as possible.

Curse luck & not govern

Most right, said he.

Shall there not then be some festivals by law established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms? Sacrifices too must be performed, and hymns

composed by our poets suitable to the marriages which are making. But the number of the marriages we shall commit to the rulers, that as much as possible they may preserve the same number of men, having an eye to the wars, diseases, and everything else of this kind, and that as far as possible our city may be neither too great nor little.

Right, said he.

And certain lots too, I imagine, should be made so artificial, that the naughty man may, on every embrace, accuse his fortune, and not the governours.

By all means, said he.

And those of the youth who distinguish themselves, whether in war or anywhere else, ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of embracing women, that so under this pretext likewise the greatest number of children may be generated of such persons.

Right.

And shall the children always as they are born be received by magistrates appointed for these purposes, whether men or women, or both; for the magistracies are in common to women as to men.

They are so.

And when they receive the children of worthy persons, they will carry them, I imagine, to the nursery, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain place of the city. But the children of the more naughty, and such others as are any way lame, they will hide in some secret and obscure place as is proper.

If they want, said he, the race of guardians to be pure.

And shall not these take care likewise of their nursing, in bringing to the nursery the mothers when their breasts are full, practising every art, that no one know her own child, and in providing others who have milk, if these shall prove insufficient, and they shall likewise take care of these nurses, that they suckle a competent time: and they shall appoint the nurses and keepers to be wakeful, and to take every other necessary toil.

You speak, said he, of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children.

It is fit, reply'd I. But let us go over what comes next,

which we chiefly intended. We took notice that good children ought to be generated of persons in their prime. Are you then of opinion with me, that the proper season of prime is twenty years to a woman, and thirty to a man?

Of what continuance are these primes? said he.

The woman, reply'd I, beginning at twenty, is to bear children to the state until the age of forty; and the man, after he hath passed the most raging part of his course, from that period, is to beget children to the state until the age of fifty-five.

This indeed is the prime, reply'd he, in both sexes, both of body and of mind.

If then any one who is older or younger than these shall meddle in generating for the public, we shall say the trespass is neither holy nor just, as he begets to the state a child which, if it be concealed, is born and grows up without sacrifices and prayers (which upon every marriage the priestesses and priests, and the whole of the city shall offer, that the descendants of the good may be still more good, and from useful descendants still more useful may arise), but is born in darkness, and from a dreadful intemperance.

Right, said he.

And the law, said I, must be the same, if any of those men, who are yet of the age for generating, shall touch women of a proper age, without the concurrence of the magistrate, we shall consider him as having raised to the state a bastardly, illegitimate and unhallowed child.

Most right, said he.

And I imagine, that when the women and men exceed the age of generating, we will allow the men at liberty to cohabit with any woman they incline, besides their daughter and mother, and these who are the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother; and so likewise the women to embrace any, but a son and father, and the children of these, either downwards or upwards: all this liberty we will allow them, after we have enjoined them to attend carefully, in the first place, if any thing should be conceived not to bring it to the light; but if by any accident it should be brought forth, to expose it as a creature for which no provision is made.

All these things, said he, are reasonably said.

But how shall fathers and daughters, and those other relations you now mentioned, be known of one another?

They shall not be known at all, said I. But from the day on which any one is a bridegroom, whatever children are born in the tenth or in the seventh month after it, all these he shall call the male his sons, and the female his daughters, and they shall call him father. And in the same way again, he shall call the children of these grandchildren, and they again shall call them grandfathers and grandmothers: and those who were born in that period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, so as not to touch each other, as I just now said. But the law shall allow brothers and sisters to live together, if their lot to fall out, and the oracle give consent.

Most right, said he.

This, Glauco, and such as this, is the community of women and children among your city guardians; and that it is both consonant to the other parts of our polity, and by far the best, we must in the next place establish from reason; or how shall we do?

Just so indeed, said he.

Did not we then agree on this at the beginning: to inquire what we can mention as the greatest good with relation to the establishment of a state, with an eye to which the law-giver ought to enact the laws, and what is the greatest evil; and then to inquire whether what we have hitherto gone over contributes towards leading us in the steps of this good, and away from that evil?

By all means, said he.

Is there then any greater ill to a city than that which rents it in pieces, and instead of one, maketh it many? Or is there any greater good than that which bindeth it together and maketh it one?

There is not.

Does not then one common feeling of pleasure and pain bind them together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in the same manner for the same things when they are obtained, and when they are lost?

By all means so, reply'd he.

But a separate feeling of these things destroys it, when some of the citizens are extremely grieved, and others extremely glad at the same sufferings of the city, or of those who are in it.

Why not?

Does not then such an evil arise from this that follows, when they do not all jointly in the state pronounce these words, mine, and not mine? And will not that city be best regulated, when every individual, with regard to the concerns of another, in the same way with him pronounces these words, mine, and not mine?

By far.

And it is such as comes nearest to one man. As, when our finger is anyhow hurt, the whole common feeling spread through the body to the soul, with one symphony of its governing part perceives it, and the entire whole mourns along with the distressed part; and so we say that the man is distressed in his finger: and the reasoning is the same as to any other part of a man, both with respect to grief, when any part is in pain, or with respect to pleasure, when any part is at ease.

It is the same, said he. And to return to your question, the city which comes nearest to this is governed in the best manner. When any one of the citizens receives any good or ill, such a city, I imagine, will most especially say that she herself receives it, and the whole city rejoice or mourn together.

Of necessity, said he, this must prevail in a city governed by good laws.

It may be time for us to go back to our city, and consider how those things are in it which we have agreed on in our reasoning, whether they prevail most in our city, or more in some other.

We must do so, reply'd he.

What now, are there not in other cities governours and people? and are there not likewise in this?

There are.

And will not all these call one another citizens?

Why not?

But besides this of citizens, what does the people call their governours in other states?

Masters or Lords in most states and in democracies, this very name, Governours.

But in our city, besides that of citizens, what does the people call their Governours?

Their Preservers, said he, and Helpers.

And what do they call the people?

Rewarders, reply'd he, and Nourishers.

And in other cities, what do the governours call their people?

Slaves, reply'd he.

And what do the governours call one another?

Fellow rulers, said he.

And ours, what?

Fellow guardians.

Can you tell whether any one of the governours in other cities can address one of their fellow governours as his kinsman, and another as a stranger?

Very many so.

Does he not then reckon and call the kindred one his own, and the stranger one as not his own?

Just so.

But how is it with your guardians? Is there so much as any one of them who can deem and call any one of their fellow guardians a stranger?

By no means, reply'd he; for with whomsoever any one meets, he reckons he meets with a brother or sister, a father or mother, a son or daughter, or the descendants or ancestors of these.

You say most nobly, reply'd I. But further, tell me this likewise: whether will you only establish among them, by law, these kindred names, or will you also enjoin them to perform all their actions suitable to these names?—with respect to parents, whatever the law enjoins to be performed to parents, such as reverence, and care, and obedience—and that otherwise it will not be for his advantage, neither in the sight of Gods nor of men, as he acteth what is neither holy nor just, if he do other things than these. Shall these, or any other speeches from all our citizens, resound directly in the ears of our children, both concerning their parents, whom any one shall point out to them, and concerning other relations?

These things shal. be said, reply'd he; for it were ridicul-

ous if friendly names alone resounded, without any actions accompanying them.

Of all cities then, there will be the greatest harmony in it, when any one individual is either well or ill, as to the expression we lately mentioned, viz., mine is well, or mine is ill.

Most true, said he.

Did not we say too, that their common pleasures and pains will accompany this opinion and expression?

And we said rightly.

Will not then our citizens most especially have this in common which they call my own; and having this in common, they will of all others most especially have in common pleasure and pain?

Extremely so.

And along with the other parts of the constitution, is not the community of women and children among the guardians the cause of these things?

This is it most especially, reply'd he.

But we agreed, that this was the greatest good of a city, likening a well established city to a body in its being affected with the pleasure and pain of any part.

And we rightly, said he, agreed on this.

This community then of women and children among our auxiliaries, hath appeared to us to be the cause of the greatest good to the city.

Extremely so, reply'd he.

And surely we agree at least with what went before; for we somewhere said that they ought neither to have houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession, but receiving their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, they should all spend it in common, if they intended really to be guardians.

Right, said he.

Do not therefore, as I say, both these things which were formerly mentioned, and still more what we now speak of, render them real guardians, and prevent the city from being rent in pieces by their not at all calling one and the same thing their own, but one one thing, and another another; one drawing to his own house whatever he can possess separate from others, and another to his, which is different from the other, and having both wives and

children different, which occasion different pleasures and pains, which are private, as belonging to private persons, but being of one opinion concerning their home, and all of them pointing towards the same thing, as far as possible, to have one common feeling of pleasure and pain.

Extremely so, reply'd he.

But what, shall law-suits and accusations against one another be banished from among them, so to speak, by their possessing nothing as private property but their body, and everything else being common, from whence they shall be free of all those disturbances which men raise about money, children or relations.

They will of necessity be free of these.

Neither indeed can there be reasonably among them any actions raised for violence or unseemly treatment. For, making the protection of their persons a necessary thing, we will own it to be handsome and just for those of equal age to help one another.

Right, said he.

And this law, said I, hath this right in it likewise: that if any one be in a passion, gratifying his passion in this manner he is less apt to raise greater seditions.

It is entirely so.

The elder shall be enjoined both to govern and to chastise the younger.

That is plain.

And surely the younger, as becomes them, shall never attempt to beat the elder, or in any other way to offer violence to him, unless appointed by the governours. Nor will they, I imagine, in any sort dishonour them, for there are sufficient guardians to hinder it, both fear and reverence. Reverence on the one hand restraining them from assaulting, as it were, their parents, and fear on the other, lest others shall assist the sufferer, some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers.

It happens so, said he.

In every respect then, as far as relates to the laws, the men shall live peaceably with one another.

Very much so.

And while these have no seditions among themselves, there is no danger in any other cities raising disturbance against these, or that they shall split into factions.

There is not.

As for the lesser evils, from which surely they will be freed, I do not chuse, because of the impropriety of it, so much as to mention them—what flattery of the rich, what indigence and sollicitude in the education of their children, and in making money for the necessary support of their family the poor have; sometimes borrowing, and sometimes being despised, and sometimes using all manner of shifts in procuring provisions, which they give to the management of their wives and domestics—how many slavish and mean things, my friend, they suffer in all these respects, are not even worthy to be mentioned.

And they are manifest, said he, to one blind.

They shall be delivered from all these things, and shall live happier than that happiest life which these enjoy who gain the prize in the Olympic games.

How?

Those are esteemed happy on account of a small part of what these enjoy. But the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance from the public is more complete; for the victory they gain is the safety of the whole city, and both they and their children are crowned with their maintenance, and all the other necessities of life, as laurels, and receive honour from their city while alive, and at their death an honourable funeral.

The most noble rewards, said he.

Do you remember then, said I, that in our former reasonings, I do not know who it was objected to us that we were not making our guardians happy, who, though they had it in their power to have the whole wealth of their citizens, had nevertheless nothing at all? and we proposed to consider of this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at the present we were making our guardians only guardians, and the city itself as happy as possible, but without regarding one particular tribe in it, with a view to make it happy.

I remember it, said he.

What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those who gain the prize at the Olympic games? It does not at all appear to resemble the life of the leather cutter, the handicraft, or farmer.

I do not think it, said he.

But however, it is proper that I mention here what I likewise said on a former occasion, that if the guardian shall attempt to be happy in such a way as to be no longer a guardian, nor be content with this moderate, and steady, and, as we say, best life, but, being seized with a foolish and youthful opinion about happiness, shall, because he has it in his power, be driven to make himself the master of everything in the city, he shall know that Hesiod was truly wise in saying that the half is somehow more than the whole.

If he take me, said he, for his counsellour he will remain in such a life.

You allow then, said I, that the women act in common with the men, as we have explained, with respect to education and the breeding of children, and the guardianship of the other citizens, both remaining in the city and in going forth to war, and that along with the men they ought to keep guard, and to hunt like dogs, and in every case to take a share in all things as far as they can; and that while they do these things, they will do what is best, and no way contrary to the nature of the female, with respect to the male, by which nature they are made to act jointly with one another.

I agree, said he.

Does not then this, said I, remain to be discussed, whether it be possible that this community take place among men likewise, as among other animals, and how far it is possible?

You have prevented me, said he, in mentioning what I was going to ask.

For with relation to warlike affairs, it is plain, I imagine, said I, how they will fight.

How? said he.

That they will jointly go out on their military expeditions, and besides will carry along with them such of their children as are grown up, that like these of other artists they may see those things which it will be necessary for them to practise when they are grown up; and besides, seeing that they may serve and administer in every thing with relation to the war, and assist both their fathers and mothers. Or have you not observed what happens in the common arts? how that the children of the potters,

ministring to them for a long time, look on before they apply themselves to the making earthen ware?

Yes, indeed.

Whether now are these or our guardians to instruct their children with greater care, by the practice and view of what belongs to their office?

To suppose those, reply'd he, should take greater care than our guardians, were ridiculous.

But every creature fights more remarkably in presence of its offspring.

The case is so; but there is no small danger, Socrates, when they are defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children as well as themselves are cut off, it shall be impossible to raise another city.

You say true, reply'd I; but you imagine we ought, first of all, to take care never to run any risk.

No, by no means.

What then, if they are at all to hazard themselves in any case, is it not where, if they succeed, they shall become better men?

That is plain.

But do you imagine it a small matter, and not worthy of the risk, whether children, who yet are to be military men, see affairs relating to war or not?

No; it is a matter of consequence with respect to what you mention.

We must then, first, endeavour to make our children spectators of the war, but contrive for them a place of safety—and then it shall do well, shall it not?

Yes.

And shall not then, said I, our parents, in the first place, as being men, not be ignorant, but understand which of the camps are, and which are not dangerous?

It is likely, said he.

And they shall bring them into the one, but with respect to the other they will be on their guard.

Right.

And they will probably set governours over them, said I, not such as are the most naughty, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and pedagogues.

It is very proper.

But we will say many things have happened contrary to expectation.

Very many.

With reference therefore to such events as these, it is proper that whilst they are children they get wings, that so, in any necessity, they may escape by flight.

How do you mean? said he.

They must, when extremely young, be mounted on horses, and taught to ride on horse-back, and brought to see the battle, not on high mettled and warlike horses, but on the fleetest and those that are the most obedient to the rein; for thus they shall in the best manner observe their proper work, and, on any necessity, shall escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders.

You seem to me, said he, to say right.

But what, said I, as to the affairs of war? how are you to manage your soldiers, both with respect to one another and their enemies? Have I imagined rightly or not?

As to what? said he.

That whoever of them, said I, leaves his rank, throws away his arms, or does any such thing from cowardice, must he not be made a handicraft, or land-labourer?

By all means.

And shall not the man who is taken alive by the enemy be given gratis to any who incline to employ him in the country as they have a mind?

By all means.

And are you of opinion that he who gains a character, and excels, ought, in the first place, in the expedition itself, to be crowned in some measure by every one of the youths and boys who are his fellow soldiers? or think you otherwise?

I am of opinion, for my part, they ought to be crowned.

But what, and get the right hand likewise?

This likewise.

But this further, I imagine, said I, you are not yet satisfied about.

What?

That they embrace and be embraced by everyone.

They should most of all others; and I will add to this law, that whilst they are upon this expedition, no one shall

be allowed to refuse them, whoever they incline to embrace, that if any happen to be in love with any one, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the prizes.

Very well, said I; for we have already said that there are more marriages provided for the good citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in such matters allowed them than others, that the descendants of such an one may be as numerous as possible.

We have already said so, reply'd he.

But surely, even according to Homer's opinion, it is just that such of the youth as are brave be honoured in this way. For Homer says that Ajax, who excelled in war, was rewarded with a large share at the entertainments, this being the most natural reward to a brave man in the bloom of youth, by which he at the same time acquired honour and strength.

Most right, said he.

We shall then obey Homer, said I, at least in these things. And we shall honour the good, both at our sacrifices, and all such occasions, in as far as they appear to be deserving, with hymns likewise, and with those things we lately mentioned: and besides these things, with seats, and dishes, and full cups, that at the same time we may both honour and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women.

You say most admirably well, reply'd he.

Be it so. If any one of those who die in the army shall have distinguished himself, shall we not, in the first place, say that he is of the golden kind?

Most especially.

And shall we not believe Hesiod telling us, that when any of these die,

They blameless deities become on earth,
Beneficent, all evil warding off;
Guardians of men?—

We shall believe him.

And we shall ask the oracle in what manner we ought to bury divine and god-like men, and with what marks of distinction, and thus shall we bury them in that very manner which shall be explained.

Why shall we not?

And we shall in all after time reverence and worship their tombs as those of Deities. And we shall enact by law

that the same things be performed, and in the same manner, to any who shall have been deemed to have remarkably distinguished themselves in life, when they die of old age or anything else?

It is right, said he.

But what now, how shall our soldiers behave towards enemies?

As to what?

First, as to bringing into slavery. Do you think it just that Greeks should enslave Greek cities? or, rather, as far as they are able, not suffer any other to do it, and accustom themselves to this, to be sparing of the Grecian tribe, being greatly on their guard against being enslaved by the Barbarians?

It is, said he, in general, and in every particular case, best to be sparing.

Are they not to acquire any Grecian slave themselves, and to counsel the other Greeks to act in the same manner?

By all means, said he. They will the more, at least, by such a conduct, turn themselves against the Barbarians, and abstain from one another.

But what, to strip the dead, said I, of anything but their arms, after they conquer them, is it handsome or not? It gives a pretence to cowards not to go against the enemy who is alive, as being necessarily occupied when they are thus employed about the one who is dead; and many armies have been lost by this plundering.

Very many.

And does it not appear to you to be illiberal and sordid, and the part of a womanish and little mind to strip the dead body, and deem the body of the deceased an enemy, when the enemy is fled off, and there is only left behind that with which he fought? Or do you imagine that they who act in this manner do any way different from dogs, who are in a rage at the stones they throw at them, not touching the man who throws them?

Not in the least, said he.

We must let alone then this stripping the dead, and these hinderances arising from the carrying off booty.

Truly, said he, these must be banished.

Nor shall we at any time bring the arms into the temples.

as if we were to dedicate them, at least not the arms of Grecians. if we have any concern to have the good liking of the other Greeks; but we shall rather be afraid, lest it should be a kind of profanation to bring into the temple such things as these from our own kinsman, unless the oracle shall say otherwise.

Most right, reply'd he.

But what, with reference to the laying waste Grecian lands and burning of houses, how shall your soldiers behave towards their enemies?

I should be glad, said he, to hear you signifying your opinion.

Truly then, said I, in my opinion, neither of these ought to be done, but only one year's produce to be carried off. And would you have me tell you the reason why this should be done?

By all means.

It appears to me that as these two words, war and sedition, are different, so they are two different things which are signified by them: I call them two different things, the one is domestic and akin, the other foreign and strange. When hatred is among ourselves, it is called sedition; when it respects foreigners, it is called war.

What you say, reply'd he, is no way unreasonable.

But consider now, if I say this likewise reasonably: for I aver that the Greek nation is friendly and akin to itself, but is foreign and strange to the Barbarian.

This too is right.

When then the Greeks fight with the Barbarians, and the Barbarians with the Greeks, we shall say they wage war, and are naturally enemies; and this hatred is to be called war. But when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we shall say that they are friends by nature, and that Greece in such a case is distempered and in sedition; and such a hatred is to be called a sedition.

I agree, said he, to account of it in the same manner.

Consider then, said I, that in the sedition now mentioned, wherever such a thing happens, and the city is disjointed, if they sequester the lands, and burn the houses of one another, how destructive the sedition appears, and neither of them seems to be lovers of their country; for otherwise they would never dare to lay waste

their nurse and mother; but it would suffice the victors to carry off the fruits of the vanquished, and to consider they are to be reconciled, and not perpetually to be at war.

This indeed is by much a more mild sentiment than the other.

But what now? said I. Is not this city you are establishing a Greek one?

It should be so, reply'd he.

And shall not they be good and mild?

By all means.

And shall they not be lovers of Greeks? And shall they not account Greece akin to them? And shall they not have the same religious rites with the rest of the Greeks?

By all means.

A difference then with Greeks, as with kinsmen, will they not denominate a sedition, and not a war?

They will.

And they will behave as those who are to be reconciled?

By all means.

They shall then be mild and moderate, not punishing so far to enslave or destroy, since they are moderate and not hostile.

Just so, said he.

Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they sequester Grecian lands, nor burn their houses, nor will they allow that in every city all are their enemies, men, women, and children, but that always a few only are enemies, the authors of the quarrel. And on all these accounts they will neither chuse to lay waste lands, as the greatest number are their friends, nor will they overturn the houses, but will carry on the war so far as till the guilty be obliged by the innocent, whom they distress, to make reparation.

I agree, said he, that we ought to behave so towards our own citizens when we are set against one another; and to behave so towards the Barbarians as the Greeks at present do to one another.

Let us then likewise establish this law for our guardians, neither to lay waste the lands, nor burn the houses.

Let us establish it, said he, and this further, that these things, and those too you mentioned formerly, are right.

But it appears to me, Socrates, if one is to allow you to speak in this manner, that you will never remember what

you formerly passed by when you entered on all this you have now said—this, to wit, how far such a government is possible? and in what way it is at all possible? For if it be at all possible, I will allow that all these good things will belong to that city, and these likewise which you have omitted; that they will in the best manner fight against their enemies, and of all others least abandon one another, recognizing these names, and calling one another by these, fathers, sons, and brothers. And if the female shall encamp along with them, whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, to strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time to assist if ever there be necessity for it, I know that in this way they will entirely be invincible. And I plainly see too what advantages they have at home, which we have omitted. But speak no more about this government, as I allow that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to it, if it actually exist. But let us endeavour to persuade one another of this itself, whether it be possible, and in what respect it is so, and let us omit those other things.

You have suddenly, said I, made an assault on my reasoning, and make no allowance for one who is fighting; for perhaps you do not advert that with difficulty I am escaped from two waves, and now you are bringing upon me the greatest and most dangerous of the three. After you have seen and heard this, you will entirely forgive me, allowing that I with reason grudged and was afraid to mention so great a paradox, and undertake to examine it.

The more, said he, you mention these things, the less will you be freed from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then, and do not spend time.

Must not this then, said I, in the first place, be remembered, that we are come hither in search of justice, what it is, and what injustice is?

It must, said he. But what is this to the purpose?

Nothing. But if we find out what justice is, shall we then judge that the just man ought in no respect to differ from it, but in every respect to be such as justice is? and shall we be satisfied if he approach the nearest to it, and, of all others, partake of it the most?

We shall, said he, be satisfied so.

As a model then, said I, we were inquiring into this, what

kind of thing justice is, and we likewise were in quest of a just man, and considered what sort of man he should be, if he did exist. We likewise inquired what injustice is, and what too the most unjust men, in order that looking into these two models, what sort of men they appeared with respect to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves, that whoever should most resemble them in character, shall have a fortune the most resembling theirs; and not for this end, to shew that these things are possible or not.

In this, said he, you say true.

Do you imagine then that the painter is in any degree the less excellent, who having painted a model of the most beautiful man, and brought every thing fully into his piece, is yet unable to shew that such a man does really exist?

Truly, said he, I do not.

What then, have we not made in our reasonings (shall we say) a model of a good city?

Yes indeed.

Have we then spoken any thing the worse, do you imagine, on this account, that we are not able to shew, that it is possible for a city to be established such as we have described?

No indeed, said he.

This then, said I, is the truth in the case. But if truly I must now likewise, on your account, hasten to this, to shew how especially and in what respects it is most possible, in order to this discovery you must again grant the same things as formerly.

What things?

Is it possible for any thing to be executed so perfectly as it is described? or is such the nature of practice that it approacheth not so near the truth as theory, though some may think otherwise? But whether will you allow this or not?

I allow it, said he.

Do not then oblige me to shew you all these things, and in every respect existing in fact, so perfectly as we have described in our reasoning; but if we be able to find out how a city may be established the nearest possible to what we have mentioned, you'll say we have found out that

these things which you require are possible? Or will you not even be satisfied if this be obtained? for my own part I should be satisfied.

And I too, said he.

We are now it seems, in the next place, to endeavour to find out and to shew what at all is the evil which is now practised in cities through which they are not established in this manner we have described; and what is that smallest change which, if made, would bring the city to this model of government, and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing; if not, by the change of two; if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number and the smallest in power.

By all means, said he.

Upon the change then of one thing, said I, I am able, I think, to shew that the state can fall into this model of government; but the change is not indeed small nor easy, yet it is possible.

What is it? said he.

I am now come, said I, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, though, like a breaking wave, it should overwhelm us with excessive laughter and unbelief. But consider, what I am going to say.

Proceed, reply'd he.

Unless either philosophers, said I, govern in cities, or those who are at present called kings and governours philosophize really and thoroughly, and these two, the political power and philosophy, unite in one, and 'till the bulk of those who at present pursue each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there shall be no end, Glauco, to the miseries of cities, nor yet, as I imagine, to those of the human race; nor till then shall ever this republic, which we have gone over in our reasonings, spring up to a possibility, and behold the light of the sun. But this is that which all along made me grudge to mention it, that I saw what a paradox I was to utter: for it is difficult to be convinced that no other but this republic can enjoy happiness, whether public or private.

You have thrown out, Socrates, said he, such an expression and argument as you may imagine will bring on you a great many, and these courageous to such a degree as to

put off their clothes, and naked to snatch whatever weapon fortune affords each of them, and, as if they were to perform prodigies, rush upon you in battle array. And unless mowing them down with argument you make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering most severe ridicule.

And are not you the cause of all this? said I.

But in acting handsomely at least, reply'd he. However, in this affair, I will not betray you, but defend you with such things as I am able, and I am able, both by my good-will, and by encouraging you, and probably I will answer your questions more carefully than any other; only do you endeavour, with the help of such an assistant, to show those who are backward to believe these things that the case really is as you represent it.

I must endeavour, said I, since even you afford so great an alliance. And here it seems to me to be necessary, if we are anyhow to make our escape from those you mention, accurately to define to them what kind of men these are we call philosophers, when we dare to assert that they alone ought to govern; in order that when they are made perfectly manifest, any one may be able to defend himself when he asserts that to these it naturally belongs both to apply themselves to philosophy, and likewise to take upon them the government of the state: but others are to apply themselves neither to philosophy nor government, but to obey their leader.

It is proper, said he, to define them.

Come then, follow me this way, if together anyhow we shall sufficiently explain this matter.

Lead on then, said he.

Will it then be needful, said I, to put you in mind, or do you remember it, that when we say of any one that he loveth any thing, when we speak with propriety, he must not appear to love one part of it and not another, but to have an affection for the whole?

I need, it seems, reply'd he, to be put in mind, for I do not understand it perfectly.

It might become another, Glauco, reply'd I, to say what you say; but it does not become a man who is a lover to forget that all those who are in their bloom sting somehow, and give emotion to one who is amorous and a lover, as

they are deemed worthy both of respect and of being saluted. Or do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because flat-nosed, shall be called agreeable, and be commended by you; and the hook-nose of the other, you say, is princely; and that which is in the middle of these is according to the exactest symmetry: the black are said to be manly to behold, and the fair to be the children of the Gods; but this appellation of pale green, do you imagine it is the invention of any other than of a flattering lover, and one who easily bears with the paleness, provided it is in the bloom of youth? And, in one word, you make all sort of pretences, and say everything so as never to reject anyone who is of a blooming age?

If you incline, said he, to judge by me of other lovers, that they do in this sort, I agree to it for the sake of the argument.

And what, said I, with respect to the lovers of wine; do you not observe them acting in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine upon every pretext?

Yes, indeed.

And you perceive, as I imagine, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of a whole army, will take the third command; and if they cannot be honoured by greater and better men, are content if they be honoured by the lower and more contemptible, being desirous of honour at any rate?

It is perfectly so.

Agree to this or not: if we say one is desirous of anything, shall we say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another?

The whole, reply'd he.

Shall we not then likewise say that the philosopher is desirous of wisdom, and that not of one part only, but of the whole?

True.

He then who hath a dislike of learning, especially if he be young, and hath not at all understanding to discern what is good, and what is otherwise, shall not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher; in the same manner as we say of one who is disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, nor is a lover but a hater of them.

And we shall say right.

But the man who readily inclines to taste of every piece of learning, and with pleasure enters on the study of it, and is insatiable of it, this man we shall with justice call a philosopher, shall we not?

On this Glauco said, You shall have a great many such philosophers as those very absurd: for all your lovers of shows appear to me to be of this kind, from their taking a pleasure in learning, and your story lovers are the most stupid of all, to be reckoned among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend on such reasonings, and such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every chorus, they run about to the Bacchanalia, omitting neither those of cities nor villages. Shall all these then, and others studious of such things, and those who apply to the inferior arts, be called by us philosophers?

By no means, said I, but resembling philosophers?

But whom, said he, do you call the true ones?

Those, said I, who are desirous of discerning the truth.

This likewise, said he, is right; but how do you mean?

It is not easy, said I, to tell it to another; but you, I imagine, will agree with me in this.

In what?

That since the beautiful is opposite to the deformed, these are two things.

Why are they not?

And if they are two, then each of them is one.

This also is granted.

And the reasoning is the same concerning justice and injustice, good and evil. And concerning every other species of things, the argument is the same. That each of them is one in itself, but appears to be many, being everywhere diversified by their communication with action and body, and with one another.

You say right, said he.

In this manner then, said I, I separate these, and set apart those you now mentioned, the lovers of public shows, of handicrafts, and mechanics, and then apart from these, I set those of whom we discourse at present, whom alone we may properly call philosophers.

How do you say? reply'd he.

The lovers of common stories and of spectacles delight in fine sounds, colours, and figures, and everything which is compounded of these; but the real nature of beauty itself their understandings are incapable to discern and admire.

Indeed the case is so, said he.

But as to those then who are able to approach this beauty itself, and to behold it as it is in itself, must they not be few in number?

Extremely so.

He then who accounts some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself, nor is able to follow, if one were to lead him to the knowledge of it, does he seem to you to live in a dream, or to be awake? Consider now, what is it to dream. Is it not this, when one, whether asleep or awake, imagines the similitude of a thing is not the similitude, but really the thing itself which it resembleth?

I for my part would averr, reply'd he, that such a person is really in a dream.

But what now as to him who judgeth opposite to this, who understandeth both what beauty is itself, and is able to discern both it and such things as participate of it, and neither deemeth the participants to be beauty, nor beauty to be the participants? whether doth such an one seem to you to live awake, or in a dream?

Perfectly awake, said he.

May we not then properly call this man's perception, as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, as he only imagines?

By all means.

But what if the person who we say only imagines things, but does not really know them, be enraged at us, and dispute with us, alledging that what we say is not true, shall we have any method of soothing and persuading him, in a gentle manner, by concealing that he is not in a sound state?

At least there is need of it, reply'd he.

Come now, consider what we shall say to him. Or do you incline we shall thus interrogate him, telling him that if he knows any thing, no one envies him for it, but we shall gladly see him possessed of some knowledge? But only tell

us this: does the man who has knowledge know something or nothing? Do you now answer me for him?

I will answer, said he, that he knows something.

Whether something which really exists, or which does not?

What does really exist; for how can that be known which has no real existence?

We have then examined this sufficiently, though we might have considered it more fully: that what really is may be really known, but what does not at all exist cannot at all be known.

We have examined it most sufficiently.

Be it so. But if there be anything of such a kind as both to be and not to be, must it not lye between that which perfectly is, and that which is not at all?

Between them.

As to what really is, then, is there not knowledge, and as to that which is not at all, is there not of necessity ignorance; and for that which is between these we must seek for something between ignorance and knowledge, if there be any such thing.

By all means.

Do we say then that opinion is anything?

Why not?

Whether is it a different power from knowledge, or the same?

Different.

Is opinion then conversant about one thing, and knowledge about another, by virtue of the same power, or each of them by virtue of a power of its own?

This last.

Is not the power of knowledge conversant about what really exists, to know that it is? Or rather it seems to me to be necessary to distinguish in this manner.

How?

We shall say that powers are a certain species of real existences, by which both we can do whatever we can do, and every being else whatever it can do. Thus, I say that seeing and hearing are among these powers, if you understand what I mean to call a species.

I understand, said he.

Hear then what appears to me concerning them, for I do

not see any colour of a power, nor figure, nor any of such qualities, as of many other things, in regard to which I distinguish some things with myself, that they are different from one another. But as to power, I regard that alone about which it is conversant, and what it effects, and on this account I have called each of these a power. And the power which is conversant about, and effects, one and the same thing, I call the same power, but that conversant about, and effecting a different thing, I call a different power. But what say you? In what manner do you?

Just so, reply'd he.

But come again, excellent Glauco, whether do you say that knowledge is itself a certain power, or to what class do you refer it?

I refer it to this class of power, said he, as it is of all powers the most strong.

But what now? Shall we refer opinion to power, or to some other species?

By no means to power, said he; for that by which we form opinions, is nothing else but opinion.

But you owned a little ago that knowledge and opinion were not the same.

How, said he, can ever anyone who hath understanding reduce under one that which is infallible and that which is not infallible?

You say right, said I. And it is plain that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from knowledge.

A different.

Each of them then hath naturally a different power over a different thing.

Of necessity.

Knowledge hath a power over being itself, in knowing real existence, how it exists.

Yes.

But we say that opinion imagines.

Yes

Whether does it imagine the same thing which knowledge understands? and shall that which is known and that which is imagined be the same? or is this impossible?

Impossible, said he, from what we have allowed, since they are naturally powers of different things, and both of them are powers, opinion and knowledge, and each of

them different from the other, as we have said. From these things it cannot be that that which is imagined is the same with that which is known.

If then real existence itself be known, must it not be different from the existence which is imagined?

Different.

Does he then imagine that which has no existence? Or is it impossible even to imagine that which doth not exist at all? Consider now, does not the man who imagines, refer his opinion to somewhat? Or is it possible to imagine, and yet imagine nothing at all?

Impossible.

But whoever imagines, imagines some one thing.

Yes.

But surely that which does not exist cannot be called any one thing, but most properly nothing at all.

Certainly so.

But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which does not exist, but knowledge to real existence.

Right, said he.

Therefore neither existence, nor what does not exist imagines.

No indeed.

Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance.

It appears it is not.

Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity?

It does neither.

But does opinion, said I, seem to you to be more obscure than knowledge, but more perspicuous than ignorance?

A great deal, said he.

But does it lye between them both then?

It does.

Opinion then is in the middle of these two.

Entirely so.

And have we not already said that if anything appeared of such a kind as at the same time to be and yet not to be, such a thing would lye between that which has really an existence, and that which does not at all exist, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be conversant about it, but that which appeared to be between ignorance and knowledge.

Right.

And now that which we call opinion hath appeared to be between them.

It hath appeared. †

It yet remains for us, as appears, to find out that which participates of both these, of existence and of non-existence, and which with propriety can be called neither of them perfectly, that if it appear to be what is imagined, we may justly call it so, assigning to the extremes what is extreme, and to the middle what is in the middle. Shall we not do thus?

Thus.

These things being settled, let this worthy man, I will say, tell and answer me, he who reckons that beauty, and a certain idea of beauty, there is none, always the same, and in the same respects; but this lover of beautiful objects reckons there are many beautiful things, but can never bear it, if any one tells him that there is one beautiful, and one just, and so of others. Of all these many things, excellent man, shall we say to him, where is there any which will not appear ugly, and of those just which will not appear unjust, of those holy which will not appear profane?

No, but of necessity, said he, the beautiful things themselves must in some respects appear even ugly, and others in like manner.

But what, many things which are double, or twofold, do they less really appear to be halves than doubles?

No less.

And things great and small, light and heavy, shall they be denominated what we call them, any more than the opposite?

No, but each of them, said he, always participates of both.

Whether then is each of these many things that which it is said to be, or is it not?

It is like their riddles at feasts, said he, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, puzzling one another in what manner and how far he strikes it. For all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately that they are, or are not, that they are both, or neither of the two.

How can you do with them then, said I, or have you a better class for them than a medium between existence and non-existence? For nothing seems more obscure than non-existence in respect of having no being at all, nor more perspicuous than existence in respect of real being.

Most true, said he.

We have then discovered, it seems, that the most of the maxims of the generality of mankind concerning the beautiful, and those other things, roll somehow between existence and non-existence.

We have accurately discovered it.

But we formerly agreed that if any such thing should appear, it ought to be called that which is imagined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two to be perceived by the power between the two.

We agreed.

Those then who contemplate many beautiful things, but who never perceive beauty itself, nor are able to follow another leading them to it and many just things, but never justice itself, and all other things in like manner, we will say that they imagine all things, but of all that they imagine they know none.

Of necessity, said he.

But what now? Those who perceive each of the things themselves, always existing in the same manner and in the same respect, will we not say that they know, and do not imagine?

Of necessity this likewise.

And will we not say that these embrace and love these things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they have opinion? Or do we not remember that we said they beheld and loved fine sounds and colours, and such things, but that beauty itself they do not admit of as any real existence?

We remember.

Shall we then commit any wrong in calling them lovers of opinion, rather as philosophers? Yet they will be greatly enraged at us, if we call them so.

No, if they be persuaded by me, said he; for it is not lawful to be enraged at the truth.

They think the things

These then who admire everything which hath a real existence, are to be called philosophers, and not lovers of opinion.

By all means.

abstraction - the real

existence.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK

THE SIXTH BOOK

THESE now who are philosophers, said I, Glauco, and these who are not, have, through a long compass of discourse, with difficulty, discovered themselves what they severally are

Because, perhaps, it was not easy, said he, in a short one.

So it appears, said I. But I still think they would have better discovered themselves, if we had been to speak to no other point than this, and not have gone through all those other things, when we were to consider what difference there is between a just life and an unjust.

What then, said he, are we to treat of next?

What else, said I, but of what is next in course. Since those are philosophers who are able to attain to the knowledge of that which exists always, and in all respects the same, but those who are not able to attain to this, but who wander amidst many things, and such as are every way shifting, are not philosophers, which of these ought to be the governours of the city?

Which way, said he, shall we determine in this, and determine reasonably?

Whichever of them, said I, appears capable of preserving the laws and institutions of cities, these are to be made guardians.

Right, said he.

This now, said I, is certainly plain, whether a blind or quick-sighted guardian be proper for guarding anything.

Why, is it not plain? said he.

Whether then do those appear to you to differ from the blind, who are wholly deprived of the knowledge of each particular being, and have neither a clear model in their soul, nor are able, as painters looking up to the truest model, and always referring themselves thither, and contemplating it in the most accurate manner possible, to establish here too in like manner just maxims of the beautiful, and just and good, if there be occasion to estab-

lish them, and to guard and preserve such as are already established?

No, surely, said he, they do not differ much.

Shall we then appoint those to be guardians, or those who know each being, and who in experience are nothing behind those others, nor inferior to them in any other part of virtue?

It were absurd, said he, to chuse others, at least if these are not behind in other things; for in this, which is almost the greatest, they excel.

Shall we not then speak to this point? In what manner the same persons shall be able to have both the one and the other of those things?

By all means.

It is then first of all necessary, as we observed in the beginning of this discourse, thoroughly to understand their genius, and I imagine, if we sufficiently agree as to it, we shall likewise agree that the same persons are able to have both of these things, and that no others but these ought to be the governours of cities.

How so?

Let this now be agreed among us concerning the philosophic geniuses, that they are always desirous of such learning as may discover to them that being which always exists, and is not changed by generation or corruption.

Let it be agreed.

And likewise, said I, that they are desirous of the whole of such learning, and that they will not willingly omit any part of it, neither small nor great, more honourable, or more dishonourable, as we formerly observed concerning the ambitious, and concerning lovers.

You say right, said he.

Consider then, in the next place, if besides what we have mentioned, it be necessary that this also should subsist in the genius of those who are to be such as we have described.

As what?

That they be void of falshood, nor willingly at any time receive a lye, but hate it, and love the truth.

It is likely, said he.

It is not only likely, friend, but must be so of necessity, that one who is naturally in love with any thing should

love everything akin and belonging to the objects of his affection.

Right, said he.

Can you then find any thing more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can we, said he?

Is it possible then that the same genius can be philosophic, and at the same time a lover of falshood?

By no means.

He then, who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be in the greatest measure desirous of all truth.

By all means.

But we know, somehow, that whoever hath his desires running vehemently after any one thing, hath them upon this very account weaker as to other things, as a current diverted from its channel.

Why are they not?

But whosoever hath his desires running out after learning, and everything of this kind, would be conversant, I imagine, about the pleasure of the soul itself, and would forsake those pleasures which arise from the body—provided he be not a counterfeit, but some real philosopher.

This of necessity must be the case.

And such an one is moderate, and by no means a lover of money; for the reasons why money is with so much trouble sollicitously sought after, have weight with any other than such an one to make him sollicitous.

Assuredly.

And surely somehow you must likewise consider this, when you are to judge what is a philosophic genius, and what is not.

As what?

That it do not without your knowledge partake of an illiberal turn; for littleness of soul is most opposite to a mind which is always to pursue earnestly the whole, and everything divine and humane.

Most true, said he.

Do you then imagine that any understanding which hath a greatness of mind, and is fitted for the contemplation of the whole of time, and the whole of being, can possibly think human life a great matter?

It is impossible, said he.

Such an one then will not account death any thing terrible.

Least of all.

A cowardly and illiberal genius then will not it seems readily participate of true philosophy.

No, as I imagine.

What now, can the moderate man, and one who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor boasting, nor cowardly, ever possibly be an ill co-partner or unjust?

It is impossible.

And you will likewise consider this, when you are viewing from its infancy what is the philosophic soul, and what is not, whether it be just and mild, or unsocial and savage.

By all means.

Neither indeed, as I imagine, will you omit this.

What?

Whether it be docile or undocile? Or do you expect that ever anyone will at all love anything to purpose, in performing which he performs with uneasiness and with difficulty, making small progress?

It cannot be.

But what if he can retain nothing of what he learns, being quite forgetful, is it possible for him not to be void of knowledge?

How is it possible?

And when he labours unprofitably, do you not imagine he will be obliged at last to hate both himself and such practice?

Why must he not?

We shall never then reckon a forgetful soul among those who are thoroughly philosophic, but we shall require it to be of a good memory.

By all means.

But never shall we say this at least, that an unmusical and indecent genius leads anywhere else but towards intemperance.

Where else?

But whether do you reckon truth akin to intemperance, or to temperance?

To temperance.

Let us require then among other things an understanding

naturally temperate and graceful, as a proper guide towards attaining the real idea of each particular being, according to its own nature.

Why not?

What now? Do we not in some measure seem to you to have gone through the necessary qualifications, and such as are consequent on one another, in a soul which is to apprehend being sufficiently, and to perfection.

The most necessary, said he.

Is it possible then for you in any measure to find fault with such a study as this, which one can never be able sufficiently to apply to, unless he be naturally possessed of a good memory, be docile, generous, graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude and temperance?

Not even Momus himself, said he, could find fault with such a study.

But, said I, will it not be to these alone, when they are perfected by education and age, that you will entrust the city?

mental

Here Adimantus said, Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your reasoning on each question, through their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all these little are collected together, at the close of your reasonings, they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions: and like those who play at talus with such as are dextrous, but are themselves unskilful, they are in the end shut up and can do no more, so your hearers have nothing to say, shut up by this other kind of game, not with pieces, but with your reasonings, though the truth at least is not by this any way advanced. I say this with reference to the present inquiry: for one may tell you that he hath nothing to oppose to each of your questions by way of argument, but that in fact he sees, that all those who plunge into philosophy, applying to it not with this view, that being early instructed they may give it over when in their prime, but that they may continue in it much longer, become the most of them quite awkward, not to say altogether naughty, and those

of them who appear the most worthy do yet suffer this much from this study you so much commend, that they become useless to the public.

When I had heard this, do you imagine then, said I, that such as say these things are telling a falshood?

I do not know, said he, but would gladly hear your opinion.

You would then hear that they appear to me to say true.

How then, reply'd he, is it right to say that the miseries of cities shall never have an end till they be governed by philosophers, whom we are now acknowledging to be useless to them?

You ask a question, said I, which needs an answer by a comparison.

And you, said he, are not wont, I imagine, to talk by comparisons.

Be it so, said I. You joke now, when you have brought me on a subject which is so hard to be explained. But hear now my comparison, that you may see further with what difficulty I make one; for the sufferings of the most worthy philosophers, in the management of public affairs, are so grievous, that there is not any one other suffering so severe; but in making our comparison, and in apologising for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same manner as painters mix the figures of two different animals together, and paint a creature which is both goat and stag in one, and others of this kind.

Imagine now that such an one as this is the pilot of a fleet, or of a single ship, one who exceeds all in the ship, both in bulk and in strength, but is somewhat deaf, and sees in like manner but a short way, and whose skill in sea affairs is much of the kind. And imagine that the sailors are all in sedition among themselves, contending for the pilotship, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never at all learned the art, nor is able to shew who was his master, nor what time he learned it. That besides this, all of them say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says that it can. Imagine, further, that they continually surround the pilot himself, begging and doing everything that he may put the helm into their hands; and even sometimes, when they are not so successful in persuading him as others are,

they either kill these others, or throw them overboard: and after they have by mandragora, or wine, or some other thing, rendered the real pilot incapable, they manage the ship with the assistance of the crew, and whilst they drink and feast in this manner, they fail as it may be expected of such people. And besides these things, if anyone be dextrous in assisting them to get the government into their own hands, and in setting aside the pilot, either by persuasion or force, they commend such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and intelligent in navigation, but they condemn as useless everyone who is not of this kind—whilst it never enters into their thought that the true pilot must have regard to the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and everything belonging to the art, if he mean to be a governour of a ship in reality; but the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think impossible for one to attain along with the art of navigation. Whilst affairs are in this situation with regard to the ships, do you not imagine that the true pilot will be called by the sailors aboard of ships fitted out in this manner, a stargazer, insignificant, and unprofitable to them?

Undoubtedly, said Adimantus.

I imagine then, said I, that you will not want any explanation of the comparison, to see that it represents how they are affected in cities towards true philosophers, but that you understand what I say?

Perfectly, said he.

First of all then with respect to this, if any one wonders that philosophers are not honoured in cities, teach him our comparison, and endeavour to persuade him that it would be much more wonderful were they held in greater honour.

I will teach them so, reply'd he.

And further, that it is indeed true, what you now was observing, that the best of those who apply to philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind; but however, for this, bid them blame such as make no use of these philosophers, and not these philosophers themselves. For it is not natural for the pilot to entreat the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor for the wise to be resorting to the gates of the rich; but whoever made this witty objection was in

a mistake; for this is the most natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must of necessity go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed, must wait on him who is capable to govern—for it is not natural that the governour who is really of any value should entreat the governed to subject themselves to his government. But you will not greatly err, when you compare our present political governours to those sailors we now mentioned, and those who are called by them insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots.

Most right, said he.

From hence then it would seem that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in esteem among those who pursue studies of an opposite nature; but by far the greatest and most violent accusation of philosophy is occasioned by means of those who profess to be studying it, the most of whom, you say your accuser of philosophy calls altogether naughty, and the very best of them of no advantage to the state—and I agreed that you say the truth, did I not?

You did.

And have we not fully explained the cause, why the best of them are of no advantage?

We have.

Would you chuse, then, that we should, in the next place, explain the reason why the most of them must of necessity be naughty, and that we endeavour to demonstrate that of this, as little as of the other, is philosophy the cause?

By all means.

Let us attend then, and begin our reasoning, calling to mind what we formerly observed concerning the natural genius which necessarily belongs to the good and worthy. And what was a leading part in it, if you remember, was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, and never partake of true philosophy.

It was so said.

Is not this one part of his character quite contrary to the present opinions of him?

It is very much so, reply'd he.

Will it not then be no small defence, if we be able to show that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aspire to the knowledge of real being, and not to rest in the many

particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceases from his love of truth before he attain to the knowledge of the nature of each particular being, by that part of the soul whose office it is to attain to such knowledge, and it belongs to that principle in the mind which is akin to it: and when he hath approached to this knowledge, and mingled with real being, having generated intelligence and truth, he would then really have true knowledge, and enjoy life and nourishment in the most real manner, and then alone, and no sooner, does he cease from trouble?

This, said he, will be a most reasonable defence.

What now, will it be the part of such an one to love falsehood, or quite the contrary, to hate it?

To hate it, said he.

But whilst truth indeed leads the way, we can never at all, as I imagine, say that any band of evils follows in her train.

How can we?

But on the contrary we may averr that she is followed by a sound and moderate disposition, and such as is accompanied with temperance.

Right, said he.

Why now, need we go over again, and range in order the whole qualities of the philosophic genius? for you no doubt remember that there belong to men of this character fortitude, magnanimity, docility, memory: and when you reply'd, that every one would be obliged to agree to what we said, we quitted that subject, and turned to that which is the subject of discourse at present, on your saying that you observed some of the philosophers were insignificant, and many of them altogether naughty. And while we were examining into the cause of that calumny, we are now come to this, whence it is that many of them are naughty. And on this account we have gone over again the genius of true philosophers, and have necessarily defined what it is.

It is so, said he.

It is necessary now, said I, that we consider the corruptions of this genius, and in what manner it is destroyed in the most. But one small matter escapes us: who they are they call not naughty, but insignificant; and next,

what those geniuses are which counterfeit the philosophic one, and pretend to its pursuits—what is the genius of their minds, who aspire to a pursuit which does not belong to them, and is above their reach. Thus by their manifold blunders, they have everywhere spread over all this opinion of philosophy you mention.

What sort of corruptions, said he, do you mean?

I shall endeavour to rehearse them, said I, if I be able. And this now, I imagine, every one will allow us, that such a geuius, with all those qualifications we have enjoined one who is to be a perfect philosopher, rarely arises among men, and that there are but few of them. Do not you think so?

Entirely so.

And of those few, consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption.

As what?

What is most of all wonderful to hear, that each of those things we commended in the genius of a philosopher corrupts the mind which possesseth them, and withdraws it from philosophy, fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualifications we have gone through.

That is strange to hear, said he.

And further still, said I, besides these things, all those which are commonly called good, such as beauty, riches, strength of body, a powerful alliance in the city, and everything akin to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy; for you have now a sample of what I mean.

I have, reply'd he, and would gladly understand more perfectly what you say.

Understand then, said I, the whole of it aright, and it will appear manifest, and what we formerly said will not appear absurd.

How then, said he, do you bid me do?

With respect to every kind of seed or plant, said I, whether of vegetables or animals, we know that whatever doth not meet with the proper nourishment, nor season, nor place belonging to it, the more vigorous it is by nature, the more it is defective in the excellencies of its kind; for evil is more opposite to good than to that which is not good.

Why is it not?

It is then agreeable to reason, I imagine, that the best genius, when meeting with nourishment foreign to it, shall be more changed to what is evil than a bad genius.

It is.

And shall we not, Adimantus, said I, in the same manner say that souls of the noblest genius, when they meet with ill education, become remarkably bad? Or do you imagine that great iniquity and the extremest wickedness arise from a weak genius, and not from a vigorous one quite ruined in its education; but that a weakly genius will never at all be the cause of anything remarkable, whether good or evil?

I do not think it will, said he, but the case is as you say.

If then this philosophic genius, which we have established, meet with suitable instruction, it will, as I imagine, necessarily grow up and attain to every virtue; but if when sown in an improper soil it grow up and be nourished accordingly, it will on the other hand turn out quite the reverse, unless one of the Gods come to its assistance. Or do you imagine, as the generality do, that certain of the youth are corrupted by the sophists, and that the corruptors are certain private sophists, which is worthy of our notice? Or think you rather, that the persons who say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction in the most powerful manner, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they incline?

When do they so? reply'd he.

When many of them, said I, are set down, crowded together in an assembly, in their courts of justice, the theatre, or the camp, or any other public meeting of the people, with a deal of tumult, they blame some speeches and actions, and commend others, roaring and bawling out the one and the other beyond measure; and besides these things, the rocks and the place where they are, resounding, redoubles the noise they make whilst they blame and applaud in this manner. In such a situation now, what kind of heart, as we say, do you imagine the youth are to have? Or what private instruction can make him withstand, so as not to be quite overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and giving way, be carried down the stream wherever it carries him, and say that

things are beautiful and base, according as these people say, and pursue the things they pursue, and become of the very same kind himself?

This, said he, must of necessity happen, Socrates.

But, said I, we have not yet mentioned what must of the greatest necessity be the case.

What is that? said he.

That which these instructors and sophists superadd by action, not being able to persuade by speech; or do you not know that they punish with disgraces, and fines, and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade?

I know that, said he, extremely well.

What other sophist then, or what private reasonings do you imagine capable, drawing opposite to these, to overpower them?

I know none, said he.

But is it not besides, said I, great folly even to attempt it? For there neither is, nor was, nor ever can be a different method of attaining virtue, besides this education by these sophists. I mean a humane method, friend, for a divine one, according to the proverb, I keep out of the question; for you must know well, that whatever temper is preserved, and becomes such as it ought to be in such a constitution of politics, you will not say amiss when you say that a divine interposition hath preserved it.

Nor am I, said he, of a different opinion.

But further now, besides these things, said I, you must likewise be of this opinion.

Of what?

That each of these private hirelings, which these men call sophists and deem the rivals of their art, teach no other things but those maxims of the vulgar which they approve when they are assembled together, and call it wisdom. As if one had learned what were the passions and desires of a great and strong animal he were nourishing, how one must approach it, how touch it, and at what seasons it is most fierce or most mild, and from what causes, and the sounds which on these several occasions it was wont to utter, and at what sounds uttered by another the animal is rendered both mild and savage; and having learned all these things by associating with the animal, and by spending considerable time with it, should call this wisdom, and

Ask people what they have

as if he had established an art, should set about the teaching it; whilst yet with reference to these opinions and desires, he knows not in reality what is handsome, or base, or good, or ill, or just, or unjust, but should pronounce all these according to the opinions of the great animal, calling these things good in which it delighted, and that evil with which it was vexed, and should have no other measure as to these things; and should call these things which proceed from necessity of nature, handsome and just, but the nature of necessity and good, how much they differ in reality, he hath never discovered himself, nor is able to show to another. Whilst he is such an one, does he not truly appear to you an absurd teacher?

To me he appears so, said he.

And from this man, think you, does he any way differ, who deems it wisdom to have understood the anger, and the pleasures of the multitude, and of assemblies of all kinds of men, whether with relation to painting, music, or politics? For if any one converses with these, and shows them either a poem, or any other piece of workmanship, or piece of administration respecting the city, and makes the multitude the judges of it, he is under what is called a Diomedæan necessity, which is above all other necessities, of doing whatever they commend. But to shew that these things are in reality good and handsome, have you at any time heard any of them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous?

Nor do I imagine, said he, I ever shall.

Whilst you attend then to all these things, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful, and not many beautifuls, one proper nature to each thing, and not many natures.

They will be the last to do so, reply'd he.

It is impossible then for the multitude to be philosopher. Impossible.

And those who philosophize, must of necessity be reproached by them.

Of necessity.

And likewise by those private persons who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them.

It is plain.

From this state of things now, what safety do you see for

the philosophic genius to continue in its pursuit and arrive at perfection? and consider from what was formerly hinted, for we have allowed, that docility, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this genius.

We have.

And shall not such an one, of all men, immediately be the first at everything, especially if he have a body naturally assisting to the soul?

Why shall he not? said he.

And when he comes to riper years, his kindred and citizens, I imagine, will incline to employ him in their affairs.

Why will they not?

And making supplications to him, and paying him homage, they will submit to him, and anticipate and flatter before-hand his growing power.

Thus, said he, it usually happens.

What now, said I, do you imagine such an one will do in such a case, especially if he happen to belong to a great city, and be rich and of a noble descent, and withal beautiful and of a handsome stature? Shall he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing both the affairs of Greeks and Barbarians, and on these accounts carry himself loftily, without any solid judgment, full of ostentation and vain conceit?

Extremely so, reply'd he.

If one should gently approach a man of this disposition and tell him the truth, that he hath no judgment, yet needeth it, but that it is not to be acquired but by one who subjecteth himself to this acquisition, do you think, that with all these evils about him, he would be ready to hearken?

Far from it, said he.

If now, said I, through a good natural temper and an innate disposition to reason, any one should somehow be made sensible, and be bended and drawn towards philosophy, what do we imagine those others will do when they reckon they shall lose his company and acquaintance? Will they not by every action, every speech, say and do everything both towards the man himself, not to suffer himself to be persuaded, and towards his adviser, to render him incapable by insnaring him in private, and bringing him to public trial?

This, said he, must of necessity happen.

Is it likely, now, such an one shall philosophize?

Not altogether.

You see then, said I, that we were not wrong when we said that even the very ingredients of the philosophic genius, when they meet with bad education, are in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as those vulgarly reputed goods, riches, and all furniture of this kind.

We were not, reply'd he, but it was rightly said.

Such then, said I, admirable friend, is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best genius for the noblest pursuit, and which besides but rarely happens, as we observed. And from among such as these are the men who do the greatest mischiefs to cities and to private persons, and likewise they who do the greatest good, such as happen to be drawn to this side; but a little genius never did anything remarkable to any one, neither to a private person, nor to a city.

Most true, said he.

These indeed then whose business it chiefly was to apply to philosophy, having thus fallen off, leaving her desolate and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor genuine, whilst other unworthy persons, intruding themselves on philosophy, abandoned in a manner by her kindred, have disgraced her, and loaded her with reproaches, such as these you say her reproachers reproach her with: how that of those who converse with her, some are of no value, and the generality of them worthy of the greatest punishments.

These things, reply'd he, are commonly said.

And with reason, reply'd I, they are said. For other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and that the possession of it is attended with dignities and honourable names, like persons who make their escape from prisons to temples, these likewise gladly leap from their handicrafts to philosophy; such of them as are of the greatest address in their own little art; for even in this situation of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, is still far superior: of which dignity many are desirous, who by natural disposition are unfit for it, whose bodies are not only deformed by their

arts and handicrafts, but whose souls also are in like manner confused and crushed by their servile works. Must it not of necessity be so?

Undoubtedly, said he.

Do you imagine then, said I, that they are any way different in appearance from a black-smith, who has made a little money, bald and puny, newly loosed from chains, and washed in the bath, with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming to marry the daughter of his master, encouraged by the poverty and forelorn circumstances he sees him in?

There is, said he, no great difference.

What sort of a race must such as these produce? Must it not be bastardly and abject?

Most necessarily.

But what now? When men who are unworthy of instruction apply to it, and are conversant in it, in an unworthy manner, what sort of sentiments and opinions shall we say are produced? Must they not be such as ought properly to be termed sophisms, and having nothing at all genuine or worthy of one of true judgment?

By all means so, reply'd he.

A very small number now, said I, Adimantus, remains of those who worthily are conversant in philosophy, who happen either to be detained somehow in banishment, and whose generous and well cultivated genius persists in the study of philosophy, being removed from everything which tends to corrupt it; or else, when in a small city a mighty genius arises, who, despising the honours of the state, entirely neglects them, and likewise with justice despising any small thing arising from the other arts, his generous soul returns to philosophy: so that the bridle which keeps in our friend Theagis, is sufficient to keep them; for all other things conspire to withdraw Theagis from philosophy, but the care of his health excluding him from politics, keeps him to it. For as to my genius, it is not worth mentioning; for certainly it hath happened heretofore to but one other, or to none at all. And even of these few now, such as are tasting, and have tasted how sweet and happy the acquisition of philosophy is, and have withal sufficiently seen the madness of the multitude, and how none of them, to speak in the general, doth anything

salutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom one might go to the assistance of the just and be safe, but that he is as a man falling among wild beasts—being neither willing to join them in injustice, nor able, being but one, to oppose the whole savage crew, but, ere he can serve the city or his friends, is destroyed and is unprofitable both to himself and others—reasoning on all these things, lying quiet and minding his own affairs, as in a tempest, when earth and sea are driven by winds, entering under roof, beholding others overwhelmed in injustice, he is satisfied if he shall himself anyhow pass his life here pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes, chearful and composed.

And he shall make his exit, said he, after having done none of the smallest matters.

Nor the greatest neither, said I, whilst he has not met with a republic that is suitable to him; for in a suitable one he shall both be more improven himself, and shall preserve the affairs of private persons as well as of the public.

people who have done nothing wrong but just anything
We have now then, I imagine, sufficiently told whence it happens that philosophy is accused, and that it is so unjustly, unless you have something else to offer.

But, said he, I say nothing further about this point. But which of the present republics do you say is suitable to philosophy?

Not one indeed, said I; but this is what I complain of, that there is no constitution of a city at present worthy of the philosophic genius, which is therefore turned and altered, as a foreign seed, sown in an improper soil, which degenerates to what is usually produced in that soil. After the same manner this race, as it hath not at present its proper activity, degenerates to another species: but should it meet with the best republic, as it is the best in itself, then shall it indeed discover that it is really divine, and that all besides are human, both as to their genius and their pursuits. But now you seem plainly to be going to ask which is this republic.

You are mistaken, said he; for this I was not going to ask, but whether it was this which we have described, in establishing our city, or another one.

As to other things, said I, it is this one, and this very

thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in the city something which shall have the same regard for the republic, which you the legislator have, when you establish the laws.

It was mentioned, said he.

But it was not, said I, made sufficiently plain, through fears which pre-occupied you, when you signified that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether easy to go over what remains.

As what?

In what manner a city shall attempt philosophy and not be destroyed, for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the saying is, fine things are truly difficult.

But however, said he, let our disquisition be compleated in making this evident.

Want of inclination, said I, shall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being present, you shall know my eagerness, and consider now how eagerly and adventurously I am going to say, that a city ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to that at present.

How?

At present, said I, those who meddle with it are striplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, apply themselves to the most abstruse parts of philosophy, and then they go off most consummate philosophers. I call the most difficult part, that respecting the art of reasoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practise this art, they are pleased to become hearers, they think it a mighty matter, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work; but towards old-age, besides some few, they are extinguished much more than the Heraclitean sun, in that they are never kindled up again.

But how should they do? said he.

Quite the reverse. Whilst they are striplings and boys they should apply to juvenile instruction and philosophy, and in taking proper care of their body whilst it shoots and grows to firmness, provide for philosophy a proper assistant; and then, as that age advances in which the soul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorously to apply to her exercises; and when strength decays, and is no longer

able for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed and live at pleasure, and excepting a by-work, do nothing else but philosophize, if they propose to live happy, and at death to have in the other world a lot suitable to the life they have led in this.

How truly, said he, Socrates, do you seem to me to speak with zeal; yet, I imagine, the greater part of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and that Thrasymachus will be the first of them.

Do not divide, said I, Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends, nor were we enemies heretofore. For we shall no way desist from our attempts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life at which when they arrive they shall again meet with such discourses as these.

You have spoken, said he, but short time.

None at all, said I, with respect at least to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is no wonder, for they have never at any time seen existing what hath now been mentioned, but rather such discourses as have been industriously composed, and have not fallen in naturally as these do at present. But as for a man who is come up to the model of virtue, and is rendered conformable to it in the most perfect manner possible, both in word and in deed, never at all have they seen such a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you imagine they have?

By no means.

Neither yet, happy friend, have they sufficiently attended to noble and generous reasonings, so as keenly to inquire after the truth, by every method, merely for the sake of knowing it, banishing at a distance such intricate and contentious debates as tend to nothing else but to opinion and contention, both in their courts of justice and in their private meetings.

The case is just so, reply'd he.

On these accounts then, said I, and with foresight of these things, we were formerly afraid; however, being compelled by the truth, we did assert, that neither city nor republic, nor even single man in the same way, would ever become perfect, till some necessity of fortune oblige

these few philosophers, who are at present accounted not naughty, yet insignificant, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and oblige the city to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are in the offices of power and magistracies, or they themselves, by some divine inspiration, be smitten with a genuine love of genuine philosophy: and I aver that no one hath reason to think that either of these, or both, are impossible; for thus might we justly be laughed at as saying things which are only to be wished for. Is it not so?

It is.

If then, in the infinite series of past ages, the greatest necessity hath obliged philosophy to take the government of a state, or is now prevailing in any barbarous region, remote somewhere from our observation, or shall afterwards happen, we are ready in that case to contend in our reasoning, that this republic we have described hath existed and subsists, and shall arise at least when this our muse shall get the government of the state. For this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we talk impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult.

I am likewise, said he, of the same opinion.

But you will say, reply'd I, that the multitude do not think so too.

It is likely, said he.

Happy friend, said I, do not thus altogether accuse the multitude; but whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and removing the reproach thrown on philosophy, point out to them the persons you call philosophers, and define distinctly, as at present, both their genius and their pursuits, that they may not think you call these philosophers whom they think so; or if they mean the same men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different answers about them from yours. Or do you imagine, that one can be enraged at one who is not in a passion? or that one shall envy the envious, who is himself both void of envy and is of a mild disposition? I will prevent you, and say that I imagine there is in some few so bad a natural temper, but not in the generality.

I likewise, said he, imagine so.

Are you not then of the same opinion with me in this: that these men are the cause of the multitude's being ill affected towards philosophy, who openly satyryze what is no way becoming them, behaving in a scoffing and distasteful manner towards the multitude, always making discourses about particular men, doing what is least of all becoming philosophy.

Certainly, said he.

For certainly, somehow, Adimantus, the man at least who really applies his understanding to real being, has not leisure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature; but beholding and contemplating such objects as are orderly and always uniform, such as neither injure nor are injured of one another, but are in all respects beautiful and according to reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible. Or do you imagine it possible to find out any contrivance to draw men off from the imitation of that in conversing with which they are filled with admiration?

It is impossible, reply'd he.

The philosopher then who converseth with that which is beautiful and divine, as far as is possible for man, becomes himself beautiful and divine. But calumny is powerful in every thing.

It is entirely so.

If then, said I, he be under any necessity, not merely forming himself alone, but likewise of endeavouring to introduce any thing he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artist of temperance and of justice, and of every social virtue?

Not at all, said he.

But if now the multitude perceive that we say the truth of such an one, will they be angry at philosophers, and disbelieve us when we say that the city can never otherwise be happy unless it be drawn by those painters who follow a divine original?

They will not be angry, said he, if they perceive so. But what method of painting do you mean?

When they have got, said I, the city and the manners of men as their canvas, they would first make it clean, which

is not altogether an easy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with private man or city, or to prescribe laws, 'till once they either receive these clean, or cleanse them themselves.

And rightly, said he.

And after this, do not you imagine they will draw a sketch of the republic?

Why not?

Afterwards, I imagine, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally just, and beautiful, and temperate, and the like; and likewise again to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and pursuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeness and the divine resemblance subsisting among men.

Right, said he.

They will then, I imagine, strike out one thing, and insert another, 'till they have rendered human manners, as far as is possible, amiable to the Gods.

It should thus, said he, be the most beautiful picture.

Do we now then, said I, any way persuade these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle array, that such a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whose account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it?

Certainly, said he, if they be wise.

For what is there now they can further question? Shall they say that philosophers are not lovers of real being and of truth?

That, said he, were absurd.

Or that their genius, as we described it, is not akin to that which is best?

Nor this neither.

What then? Whilst their genius is such as this, and meets with suitable exercises, shall it not become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so? Or will you say those will be more so whom we set aside?

Not at all.

Will they still then be enraged at us, when we say that till the philosophic race have the government of the city, neither the miseries of the city nor of the citizens shall have an end, nor shall this republic, which we speak of in way of fable, come in fact to perfection?

It is likely, said he, they will be less enraged.

Are you content then, said I, that we say not of them they are less enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeased and persuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at least consent by their blushing?

By all means, said he.

Let them then, said I, be persuaded of this. But is there any one will call this into question, that those of the philosophic genius do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns?

Not one, said he, would alledge that.

And though they were born with a philosophic genius, one may say they are under a great necessity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for these geniuses to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree. But that in the infinite series of time, of the whole of the human race, there should never at all be so much as a single one preserved pure and untainted, is there any one who will call into question?

How could any do it?

But surely, said I, a single one is sufficient, if he exists, and has a city subject to him, to accomplish every thing now so much disbelieved.

He is sufficient, said he.

And when the governour, said I, hath established the laws and customs we have recited, it is not at all impossible that the citizens should be willing to obey him.

Not at all.

But is it wonderful or impossible that what appears to us should also appear to others?

I do not think it, said he.

And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have sufficiently, as I imagine, explained in the preceding part of our discourse.

Sufficiently indeed.

Now then it seems we are agreed about our legislation—that the laws we mention are the best, if they could exist,

but that it is difficult to get them to prevail, not, however, impossible.

We are agreed, said he.

Head of Plato's Philosophy
After that this hath with difficulty been brought to a conclusion, shall we not, in the next place, consider what follows? In what manner, and from what education and studies, they shall become the preservers of our republic? and in what periods of life they shall each of them apply to the several branches of education.

We must indeed consider that, said he.

I acted not wisely, said I, when in the former part of our discourse, I left untouched the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the propagation of the species, and the establishing governours, knowing with what envy and difficulty they must be introduced, or be carried no further than theory. For now we are under no less a necessity of discussing these things at present. What relates to women and children is already finished; and we must now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governours. We said, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleasures and by pains, and appear to quit this opinion neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change, and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honours and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we said whilst our reasoning passed over and concealed itself, as afraid to rouse the present argument.

You say most truly, said he, for I remember it.

For I grudged, friend, to say what I am now to adventure on; but now we must even venture to assert this: that the most complete guardians must be made philosophers.

Let this be agreed upon, reply'd he.

But consider that you shall likely have but few of them: for such a genius as we said they must of necessity have, is wont but seldom in all its parts to meet in one; but its different parts generally spring up in different persons.

How do you say? reply'd he.

That such as are wont to be docile, of good memory,

quick, and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are akin to these, are not at the same time vigorous, and magnanimous in their mind, so as to live decently, with quietness and stability; but that such are carried by their acuteness wherever it happens, and everything that is stable departs from them.

You say true, reply'd he.

With regard then to these firm habits of the mind, which are not at all versatile, and which one might rather employ as trusty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the same temper with reference to learning; they move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppressed with sleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labour at any thing of this kind?

It is so, reply'd he.

But we said that he must partake both these well and handsomely, or else he ought not to share in the most perfect education, nor magistracy, nor honours of the state.

Right, said he.

Do not you imagine this will but rarely happen?

Why will it not?

They must be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned, in labours, in fears, and in pleasures, and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, whilst we consider whether their genius be able for the highest learning, or whether it fails, as those who fail in the other things.

It is proper now, said he, to consider this question at least in this manner. But which learning do you call the highest?

You remember in some measure, said I, that when we had distinguished the soul into three parts, we determined concerning justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, what each of them is.

If I did not remember, said he, it were just I should not hear what remains.

Do you likewise remember what was said before that?

What was it?

We somewhere said that it was possible to behold these

in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious which one must go over who would see them conspicuously. That it was possible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonstrations above-mentioned; and you said that these were sufficient; so what was then advanced, came to be spoken far short, in my own opinion, of accuracy, but if agreeably to you, you may say so.

To me at least, said he, they seemed to be discussed in measure; and the rest seemed to think so too.

But, friend, said I, in speaking of matters of this kind, such a measure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth is not altogether in measure. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything—though some at times are of opinion that matters are sufficiently well when brought this length, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry.

Very many, said he, are thus affected through indolence.

But the guardian of the city and of the laws, said I, hath least of all need of that passion.

It appears so, reply'd he.

Such an one then, friend, said I, must go over the longer compass, and labour no less in learning than in the exercises, otherwise, as we were now saying, he shall never at all arrive at the perfection of the highest and most suitable learning.

But are not these, said he, the highest? Or is there yet any thing higher than justice, and those virtues which we mentioned?

There is even higher, said I. And even of these, we must not contemplate only the coarse draught, but not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things of small account to employ our whole labour, and to strain hard to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important matters worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect?

The sentiment, said he, is very just. But however, do you imagine, said he, that any one will let you pass without asking you what indeed is this highest learning, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so?

Not at all, said I, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present

you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather imagine, since you have often heard at least that the idea of the good is the highest learning: which idea, when justice and the other virtues use as a model, they become really useful and advantageous; you now almost know that this is what I mean to say, and besides this, that we do not sufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge, though we understood all else in the highest measure, you know that it profiteth us nothing: in the same manner, as it would avail us nothing though we possessed any thing whatever without the possession of the good. Or do you imagine there is any more profit in possessing all things without the possession of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good?

Not I, for my part, indeed, said he.

But surely this too at least you know, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good, and to the more elegant it seems to be wisdom. *practical, not in the*

And very ridiculously, said he.

How indeed can it be otherwise? reply'd I; if when they upbraid us, that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the wisdom of what is good, as if we understood what they say, when they pronounce the word the good.

Most true, said he.

But what, those who define pleasure to be good, are they any way in a lesser error than the others, or are not these too obliged to confess that pleasures are evil?

Extremely so.

They come then to acknowledge, I imagine, that the same things are both good and evil, do they not?

Why do not they?

Is it not evident then that there are great and manifold doubts about it?

Why are there not?

But what, is it not also evident, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude chuse the apparent, even though they be not really so, yet they act, and possess, and are reputed of accordingly; but the acquisition of goods, that were only the apparent never yet

satisfied anyone, but in this they seek what is real, and here everyone despises what is only the apparent.

Extremely so, said he.

This then is that which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it acts all with a prophetic impression, that it is somewhat yet in doubt, and unable to comprehend what it is, nor to hold by a steady opinion of it, as in other things, and thus are they unsuccessful also in other things, if there be in them any profit. About a matter now of such a kind, and of such mighty consequence, shall we say that even these our best men in the city, and by whom we take in hand to do every thing, shall be thus in the dark?

As little at least as possible, said he.

I imagine then, said I, that whilst it is unknown in what manner the just and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to possess, if it be likely he shall know these, whilst he is ignorant of this, but I prophesy no one will come to the real knowledge of these before he knows what is good.

You prophesy rightly, said he.

Shall not then our republic be completely adorned if such a guardian be set over it as is intelligent in these things?

It must of necessity, said he. But with respect to yourself, whether, Socrates, do you say that the good is science, or pleasure, or something else besides these?

You was ever, said I, a worthy man, and manifestly shewed of old that you was not to be satisfied with the opinions of others about these things.

Nor does it appear to me just, Socrates, said he, that one should be able to tell the opinions of others, but not his own, after having spent so much time inquiring about these things.

But what, said I, does it then appear to you just for one to speak of these things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them?

By no means, said he, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he imagines, that he should be willing to tell us what he imagines.

But what, said I, have you not observed of opinions void of knowledge how deformed they all are? Or do those, who without understanding form right opinion, seem to

you in any respect to differ from those who are blind, and at the same time go straight on the road?

No way, said he.

Do you incline then that we should examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful?

Do not, I entreat you, Socrates, said Glauco, give over at the end; for it will suffice us, if in the same way as you have talked of justice, and temperance, and those other virtues, you likewise talk concerning the good.

And I too shall be very well satisfied, friend, said I, but I'm afraid I shall not be able; and by appearing keen I shall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, my happy friends, let us quit at present this inquiry, what the good is (for it appears to me a greater matter than that in our present pursuit we can overtake, even what I imagine of it at the time); but I am willing to tell you what the offspring of the good appears, and what most resembles it, if this be agreeable to you, and if not, shall let it alone.

But tell us, said he; for you shall afterwards explain to us what the father is.

I could wish, said I, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itself. Yet take care, however, that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any respect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring.

We shall take care, said he, as we are able; only tell us.

I shall tell then, said I, after we shall have settled matters together, and I have put you in mind of what was mentioned in our preceding discourse, and has been frequently said on other occasions.

What is it? said he.

That there are many things, said I, beautiful, and many good, and each of these we say is so, and we distinguish them in our reasoning.

We say so.

But as to the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and in like manner concerning all those things which we then placed as many, now again establishing them according to one simple idea of each particular, as being one, we give

each that appellation which belongs to it; and the things themselves we say are seen by the eye, but not understood by the intellect; but that the ideas are understood by the intellect, but not seen by the eye.

Perfectly so. *not seen with eye but with*

By what part then of ourselves, do we see things visible? *intellect, eye, soul*

By the sight, said he.

And is it not, said I, by hearing that we perceive what is heard, and by the other senses all the matters of sense?

Why not?

But have you not observed, said I, with regard to the maker of the senses, how he hath formed the power of sight, and of being visible in the most perfect manner?

I have not entirely perceived it, reply'd he.

But consider it in this manner. Is there any other species, which hearing and sound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third thing if it be not present, the one shall not hear, and the other not be heard?

There is nothing, said he.

Imagine then, said I, that neither do many others (that I may not say none) require any such thing: or can you mention any one that does require it?

Not I, reply'd he.

But with reference to the sense of seeing and the object of sight, do not you perceive that they require something? How?

When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is colour in the objects before him, unless there concur some third species, naturally formed for the purpose, you know that the sight shall see nothing, and the colours shall be invisible.

What is that you speak of? said he.

What you call light, said I.

You say true, reply'd he.

This species then is not despicable. By no small idea then are the sense of seeing, and the power of being seen, connected together; but by a bond the most honourable of all bonds, if light be not dishonourable.

But it is far, said he, from being dishonourable.

Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen in the best manner?

The same as you, said he, and others do; for it is evident you mean the sun.

Is not the sight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God?

How?

The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun in which sight is, which we call the eye.

It is not.

But yet, I imagine, that of all the organs of sense, it partaketh most of the image of the sun. ;

Greatly so.

And the power which it hath, doth it not possess as dispensed and flowing from hence?

Perfectly so.

Is not then the sun, which indeed is not sight itself, yet as it is the cause of it, seen by sight itself?

It is so, said he.

Imagine then, said I, that this is what I was calling the offspring of the good, which the good generates, analogous to itself, and that what this is in the intellectual world, with respect to intelligence and the objects of intelligence, the same is the sun in the visible world with respect to sight and visible things.

How is it? said he. Explain to me yet further.

You know that the eyes, said I, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colours are shone upon by the light of day, but by that faint one of the night, grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no perfect sight.

Just so, said he.

But, I imagine, when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be sight.

There does.

Understand then, in the same manner, the case to be so with reference to the soul. When it shall firmly adhere to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to have intelligence; but when it adheres to that which is blended with

darkness, which is generated and which perisheth, it fancieth and guesseth, taketh up and layeth down its opinions, and resembleth now one without intelligence.

It has such a resemblance.

That therefore which giveth truth to what is known, and dispenseth the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of good, being the cause of knowledge and of truth, as being known by intelligence. And as both these two, knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, when you deem that the good is something different, and still more beautiful than these, you shall deem aright. Knowledge and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to partake most of the image of the sun, but that we were not to imagine they were the sun. So here it is right to judge, that both these partake of the image of the good, but to imagine either of them the good, is not right, but the good itself is worthy of greater honour.

You mean, said he, an inestimable beauty, since it affords knowledge and truth, but is itself superior to these in beauty. And you never any where at all said that it was pleasure.

Softly, said I, and in this manner rather consider its image yet further.

How?

You will say, I imagine, that the sun gives to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth and nourishment, though in itself it be not generation.

Why not?

We may say, therefore, that things which are known have not only this from the good, that they are known, but likewise their being and essence are given them by it, whilst the good itself is not essence, but above essence, superior to it both in dignity and in power.

Here Glauco, with a great laugh, says, what a prodigious excellence is this! I swear.

You yourself, reply'd I, are the cause, having obliged me to tell my opinion about it.

And by no means, said he, stop, if something does not hinder you, but go over again the resemblance relating to the sun, if you are omitting anything.

But I omit, said I, many things.

In defining any object we always tell

Do not omit, reply'd he, the smallest matter.

I imagine, said I, there will be a great deal omitted; however, as far as I am able at present, I shall not willingly omit anything.

Do it not, said he.

Attend then, said I, how that we say there are two species, and that the one reigns over the intellectual world, and the other over the visible, not to say the heavens, lest I seem to you to be using sophistry in the expression. You understand then these two species?—the visible, the intellectual?

I do.

As if then you took a line cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each section according to the same proportion, both that of the visible species, and that of the intellectual—and thus you shall have perspicuity and obscurity placed by one another—in the visible species you shall have in one section images—I call images, in the first place, shadows; next, the appearances in water, and such as appear in bodies which are close, polished, and bright, and everything of this kind, if you understand me.

I do.

Suppose now the other section of the visible which this resembleth, such as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and all sort of workmanship.

I suppose it, said he.

Are you willing then that this section appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the same proportion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very same proportion hath the resemblance to that of which it is the resemblance?

I am indeed, said he, extremely so.

But consider now again the section of the intellectual, how it was divided.

How?

How as to one part of it the soul useth the former sections as images, and is obliged to inquire upon hypotheses, not going to the beginning, but to the conclusion; and the other part again, where the soul goes by an hypothesis to a beginning, not supposed, and without those images about it, by the species themselves, making its way through them.

cc. to Plato. Ideals are fixed +
unchanging. James - Ideals

I have not, said he, sufficiently understood you in these things.

But again, said I, for you shall more easily understand me after these things have been premised. For I imagine that those who are conversant in geometry and computations, and such like, after they have laid down hypotheses of excess and of equality, and made their figures, and three kinds of angles, and other things akin, according to each method, they go upon these things as known, having laid down all these as hypotheses, and do not give any further reason about them, neither to themselves nor others, as being things obvious to all; but beginning at these, they directly go over, explaining the rest, and with full consent end at that which their inquiry pursued.

I know this, said he, perfectly well.

And do you not likewise know that when they make use of the visible species, and reason about them, their understandings are not employed about these species, but about those which they are the resemblances of, holding their reasonings about a real square, and about a real diameter, not about that which they draw? And, in the same manner, with reference to other things, those very things which they form and draw, in which number, shadows and images in water are to be reckoned, these they make use of as images, seeking to behold those real things which one can no way see but by his intellect.

You say true, reply'd he.

This, then, I called a species of the intellectual, but that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in the search of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to go beyond hypotheses in ascending upwards, but made use of images formed from things below, to lead to those above, as perspicuous, as objects of opinion, and distinct from the things themselves.

I understand, said he, that you mention what happens in the geometrical and other sister arts.

Understand now, that by the other section of the intellectual I mean this, that which reason by itself attains, making hypotheses by its own reasoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheses, as steps and handles to go on to that which was not an hypothesis, but the principle of the whole, and attain to it; and then, again, hold-

ing by all those things which hold by it, to descend down to the conclusion, using no where anything which is matter of sense but the ideas themselves, from some, onwards to others, and concluding in ideas.

I understand, said he, but not sufficiently, for you seem to me to talk of a perplexed subject; but you want, however, to determine that the discoveries concerning real being and the objects of intellect, made by the science of reasoning, are more conspicuous than the discoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheses for their first principles, and those who inquire into them are obliged, in their disquisitions, to use their understandings and not their external senses. But as they are not able to perceive by rising up to the principle, but by hypotheses, they seem to you not to have intelligence, though the things are objects of the intellect, by the help of the principle; and you seem to me to call the practice, in geometrical and such other arts, demonstration, and that it is somewhat between opinion and science.

You have comprehended, said I, most sufficiently. And conceive now, that corresponding to my four sections there are these four faculties in the soul: intelligence answering to the highest, demonstration to the second, and assign opinion to the third, and to the last imagination, and range the objects accordingly, that as their objects participate of truth, so reckon that they participate of perspicuity.

I understand, said he, and I agree, and I range them as you desire.



Walter Lipp
on
THE SEVENTH BOOK

AFTER these things now, said I, compare, with reference to instruction and the want of instruction, our nature to such a condition as follows. Consider men as in a subterraneous habitation resembling a cave, with its entrance opening to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in it from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round. Suppose them to have light of a fire, burning far above and behind them, and that between the fire and the chain'd men there is a road above them, along which observe a low wall built, like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks on which they show to men their wonderful tricks.

I observe it, said he.

Observe now, along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals, in wood and stone, and all sort of furniture, and, as is likely, some of those who are carrying these are speaking, and others silent.

You mention, said he, a wonderful comparison, and wonderful chained men.

But such, however, as resemble us, said I. For, in the first place, do you imagine that such as these see any thing of themselves or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave?

How can they, said he, if through the whole of life they be under a necessity, at least, of having their heads unmoved?

But what do they see of what is carrying along? Is it not the very same?

Why not?

If then they were able to converse with one another, do

not you imagine they would think it proper to give names to those very things they saw before them?

Of necessity they must.

And what if the opposite part of this prison had an echo, when any of those who passed along spake, do you imagine they would reckon that what spake was any thing else than the shadow passing by?

Not I, truly, said he.

Such as these then, said I, will entirely judge that there is nothing genuine but the shadows of utensils.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

With reference then both to their freedom from these chains, and their cure of this ignorance, consider the nature of it, if such a thing should happen to them. When any one should be loosed, and obliged on a sudden to rise up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light, and in doing all these things he should be pained, and be unable, from the splendors, to behold the things he formerly saw the shadows of, what do you imagine he would say, if one should tell him that formerly he had seen trifles, but now being somewhat nearer to reality, and having his face turn'd toward what was more real, he saw better; and so, pointing out to him each of the things passing along, should question him, and oblige him to tell what it were, do not you imagine he would be both in doubt, and would deem what he had formerly seen to be more genuine than what was now pointed out to him?

By far, said he.

And if he should oblige him to look to the light itself, would not he find pain in his eyes, and shun it; and turning to such things as he is able to behold, reckon that these are really more certain than those pointed out?

Just so, reply'd he.

But if one, said I, should drag him from thence violently, through a rough and steep ascent, and never stop till he drew him up to the light of the sun, would not he whilst he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation, and after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with splendor, he would be able to see none of those things now called genuine.

He would not, said he, all of a sudden, at least.

But he would need, I imagine, to be accustomed to it some time, if he were to perceive things above. And, first of all, he would most easily perceive shadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that the things themselves. And with reference to these things, he would more easily see the things in the heavens, and the heavens themselves, looking in the night-time to the light of the stars and the moon, than by day, looking on the sun and the light of the sun.

How can it be otherwise?

And, last of all, he may be able, I imagine, thoroughly to perceive and contemplate the sun himself, not in water, nor images of him, appearing in any thing else, but as he is in himself, in his own proper region, such as he is.

Of necessity, said he.

And after this he would now reason with himself concerning him, that it is he who gives the seasons and years, and regulates all things in this visible region, and that, of all these things which they formerly saw, he is in a certain manner the cause.

It is certain, said he, that after these things, he may come to such reasonings as these.

But what? when he remembers his first habitation, and the wisdom which was there, and those who were there his companions in bonds, do you not imagine he will esteem himself happy by the exchange, and compassionate them?

And that greatly.

And if there were there any honours and encomiums and rewards among themselves for him who most accurately perceived what passed along, and best remembered which of them were wont to pass foremost, which latest, and which of them went together, and from these observations were most able to presage what was to happen, do you imagine he will be desirous of these honours, or envy those who among these are honoured and in power? or rather wish to suffer that of Homer, and greatly desire

——as labourer to work

To some ignoble man for hire——

and rather to suffer anything than to hold such opinions, and live after such a manner?

I imagine so, reply'd he—that he would suffer and embrace any thing rather than live in that manner.

But consider this further, said I, if such an one should descend and sit down again in the same seat, should not he now have his eyes filled with darkness, coming on the sudden from the sun?

Very much so, reply'd he.

And should he now again be obliged to give his opinion of those shadows, and to dispute about them with those who are there eternally chained, whilst yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former state (which would require no small time of habit) would he not afford them laughter, and would it not be said of him, that having gone above, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever should attempt to loose them and lead them up, if ever they were able to get him into their hands, should even be put to death?

They would by all means, said he, put him to death.

The whole of this comparison now, said I, friend Glauco, is to be apply'd to our preceding discourse; for if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun, and the ascent above, and the sight of things above, to the soul's ascent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then to me appear in this manner. In the intellectual world the idea of the good is most remote, and scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, it is to be deemed as indeed the cause to all of all things bright and beautiful, generating in the visible world light, and its principle the sun, and in the intellectual world, it is itself the principle producing truth and intelligence, and that this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or in public.

I agree with you, said he, in such manner as I can.

Come now, said I, and agree with me likewise in this, and do not wonder that such as come hither are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their souls are carried away to converse with things above; for it is somehow reasonable

it should be so, if these matters hold according to our comparison above-mentioned.

It is indeed reasonable, reply'd he.

But what, do you imagine this any thing wonderful, that when one comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave awkwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst yet the light is in his eyes, and is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice, or elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or those statues which occasion the shadows, and to dispute about this point, how these things are conceived of by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself?

This is not at all, said he, to be wondered at.

But if one hath, at least, understanding, said I, he must remember that there is a twofold disturbance of the sight, and arising from two causes, when one comes from light to darkness, and from darkness to light. And when one imagines that these very things happen with reference also to the soul, when at any time he sees one in confusion, and unable to perceive any thing, he will not laugh in an unreasonable manner, but will consider whether the soul, coming from a more enlightened life, be darkened by ignorance, or going from prevailing ignorance to a life more enlightened, be filled with the dazzling splendour; and so will congratulate the one on its fate and life, and compassionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wants to laugh at the soul that goes from darkness to light, his laughter would be less improper than if he were to laugh at the soul which comes from the light to darkness.

You say very reasonably, reply'd he.

It is proper then, said I, that we judge of them after such a manner as this, if those things be true. That education is not such a thing as some undertakers talk of; for they somehow say, that whilst there is no knowledge in the soul, they will insert it, as if they were inserting sight in blind eyes.

They say so, reply'd he.

But our present reasoning, said I, now shows that this power being in the soul of every one, and the organ by which every one learns, and being in the same condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwise than with the whole

body to turn from darkness to light, must in like manner, with the whole soul, be turned from generated being, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itself, and the most splendid of being; and this we call the good. Do we not?

We do.

This then, said I, would appear to be the art of his conversion, in what manner he shall with greatest ease and advantage be turned. Not to implant in him the power of seeing, but considering him as possessed of it, only improperly situated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive a method of accomplishing this point.

It seems so, reply'd he.

The other virtues now then of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat resembling those of the body (for when in reality they were not in it formerly, they are afterwards produced in it by habits and exercises), but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other, as it never loseth its power, but, according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends every thing to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to minister to wickedness: so that the more accurately it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness?

Entirely so, reply'd he.

But however, said I, with reference to this part of such a genius, if, being dressed immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of every thing akin to procreation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul towards things downwards, from all which if the soul, being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in the same men would most accurately see those things as it now does these to which it is turned.

It is likely, reply'd he.

But what, is not this likely, said I, and necessarily flowing from what hath been mentioned, that neither these who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city, nor yet those who allow

themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning—those, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they are not willing to manage civil affairs, imagining that whilst they are yet alive they inhabit the islands of the blest.

True, said he.

It is our business then, said I, to oblige those of the inhabitants who have the best geniuses, to apply to that learning which we formerly said was the greatest, both to view the good, and to ascend that ascent; and, when they have ascended and sufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them.

What is that?

To continue there, said I, and be unwilling to descend again to those bondmen, or share with them in their toils and honours, whether more trifling or more important.

Shall we then, said he, do them injustice, and make them live a worse life when they have it in their power to live a better?

You have again forgot, friend, said I, that this is not the legislator's concern, in what manner any one tribe in the city shall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavours to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together, and by necessity, and by persuasion, making them share the advantage with one another, with which they are severally able to benefit the community. And the legislator, when he maketh such men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himself may employ them for connecting the city together.

True, said he, I forgot, indeed.

Consider then, said I, Glauco, that we shall no way injure the philosophers who arise among us, but tell them what is just, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow, indeed, that those who in other cities become philosophers, with reason do not participate of the toils of public offices in the state (for they spring up of themselves, the policy of each city opposing them; and it is just, that what springs of itself, owing its growth to none, should not be forward to pay for its nurture to any one). But you have we generated

both for yourselves and for the rest of the state, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of sharing both in the rewards and labours attending public offices. Every one then must, in part, descend to the dwelling of the others, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects; for when you are accustomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the several images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful and just and good. And thus, as a real vision, both to us and you, shall the city be inhabited, and not as a dream, as are the generality of cities at present inhabited by such as both fight with one another about shadows, and raise sedition about governing, as if it were some mighty good. But the truth is in this manner: In whatever city those who are to govern are the most averse to undertake government, that city, of necessity, will be the best established and the most free from sedition; and that city whose governours are of an opposite character, will be in a condition quite opposite.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

Do you imagine then that our pupils will disobey us, when they hear these injunctions, and be unwilling to labour jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but spend the most of their time with one another, free from public affairs?

Impossible, said he; for we prescribe just things to just men. And each of them enters on magistracy from this consideration beyond all others, that they are under a necessity to govern contrarywise to all the present governours of all other cities.

For thus the matter stands, companion, said I. If you shall find out a life for those who are to be our governours, better than that of governing, then it will be possible for you to have the city well established, for in it alone shall those govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilst they are poor and destitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, imagining they ought thence to pillage good, it is not possible to have the city rightly established. For the contest being who shall

govern, such a war being domestic and within them, it destroys both themselves and the rest of the city.

Most true, said he.

Have you then, said I, any other kind of life which despises public magistracies, but that of true philosophy?

No truly, said he.

But however, they ought, at least, not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwise the rivals will fight about it.

How can it be otherwise?

Whom else then will you oblige to enter on the guardianship of the city but those who are most intelligent in those things by which the city is best established, and who have other honours, and a life better than the political one?

No others, said he.

Are you willing, then, that we now consider this, by what means such men shall be produced, and how one shall bring them into the light, as some are said, from the lower regions, to have ascended to the gods?

Why am I not willing, reply'd he?

This now, as it seems, is not the turning of a shell, but the conversion of the soul coming from some benighted day to the true re-ascent to real being, which we shall say is true philosophy.

By all means.

Ought we not then to consider which of the parts of learning hath such a power?

Why not?

What now, Glauco, may be that discipline of the soul which draws her from that which is generated towards being itself? But this I consider whilst I am speaking. Did not we indeed say that it was necessary for them, whilst young, to be wrestlers in war?

We said so.

It is proper, then, that this piece of learning likewise be added to that which we are inquiring after.

Which?

Not to be useless to military men.

It must indeed, said he, be added if possible.

They were somewhere in our former discourse instructed by us in exercise and music.

They were, reply'd he.

Exercise indeed somehow respecteth what is generated and destroyed, for it presideth over the increase and corruption of body.

It seems so.

This then cannot be the learning we require.

It cannot.

Is it music then, such as we formerly described?

But it was, said he, as a counter-part of exercise, if you remember, by habits instructing our guardians, imparting no science, but only with respect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with regard to measure, a certain propriety of measure, and in discourses, certain other things akin to these, both in such discourses as are fabulous, and in such as are nearer to truth. But as to learning respecting such a good as you now inquire after, there was nothing at all of this in that music.

You have, most accurately, said I, put me in mind, for it treated in reality of no such thing. But, divine Glauco, what may this learning be? for all the mechanical arts have somehow appeared to be servile.

Why have they not? And what other learning is there left yet remaining distinct from music, exercise, and the mechanical arts?

Come, said I, if we have nothing yet further besides these to lay hold of, let us lay hold of something in these which extends over them all.

What is that?

Such as this general thing, which all arts, and reasonings, and sciences make use of, and which every one ought in the first place necessarily to learn.

What is that? said he.

This trifling thing, said I, to understand one, and two, and three: I call this in the general, number, or computation. Or is it not thus with reference to these, that every art, and likewise every science, must of necessity participate of these?

They must of necessity, reply'd he.

And must not the art of war likewise participate of them?

Of necessity, said he.

Palamedes then, in the tragedies, shows every where Agamemnon to have been at least a most ridiculous

general; or have you not observed how he says, that having invented numeration, he adjusted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ships and all the other forces which were not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it seems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he understood not how to number them. But what kind of general do you imagine him to be?

Some absurd one, for my part, reply'd he, if this were true.

Is there any other learning then, said I, which we shall establish as more necessary to a military man than to be able to compute and to number?

This most of all, said he, if he would any way understand how to range his troops, and more still if he want to be a man.

Do you perceive then, said I, with regard to this piece of learning the same thing as I do?

What is that?

It seemeth to be of those things which we are inquiring after, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that no one useth it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being.

How do you say? reply'd he.

I shall endeavour, said I, to explain at least my own opinion. With reference to those things which I distinguish with myself into such as lead towards intelligence, and such as do not, do you consider them along with me, and either agree or dissent, in order that we may more distinctly see whether this be such as I conjecture of it.

Show me, said he.

I show you then, said I, if you perceive some things with relation to the senses, which call not upon the intelligence to the inquiry, as they are sufficiently determined by the sense, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as the sense doth nothing genuine.

You plainly mean, said he, such things as appear at a distance, and such as are painted.

You have not altogether, said I, hit my meaning.

Which then, said he, do you mean?

These things, said I, call not upon intelligence, which do not issue in a contrary sensation at one and the same time; but such as issue in this manner, I deem to be of those which call upon intelligence, since here sense maketh

the one sensation no more manifest than its contrary, whether it meet with it nigh at hand or at a distance. But you will understand my meaning more plainly in this manner: These, we say, are three fingers—the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger?

Plainly so, reply'd he.

Consider me, then, as speaking of them when seen nigh at hand, and take notice of this concerning them.

What?

Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this there is no difference, whether it be seen in the middle or in the end, whether it be white or black, gross or slender, or any thing else of this kind; for in all these the soul of the multitude is under no necessity to question their intellect what is a finger, for never at all does sight itself at the same time intimate finger to be finger, and its opposite.

It does not, reply'd he.

Is it not likely then, said I, that such a case as this at least shall neither call upon, nor excite intelligence?

It is likely.

But what, with reference to their greatness and littleness, does the sight sufficiently perceive this matter, and makes it no difference to it that one of them is situated in the middle, or at the end? And in like manner with reference to their grossness and slenderness, their softness and hardness, does the touch sufficiently perceive these things? And in like manner the other senses, do they no way defectively manifest such things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same?

It does.

And must not then the soul again, said I, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt what at all the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so likewise with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy, if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy.

These at least, said he, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination.

It is likely then, said I, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavours to find out whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two.

Why not?

And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other.

It does.

And if each of them be one, and both of them two, his understanding will at least perceive two distinct; for if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one.

Right.

The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat blended together. Does it not?

It does.

In order to clear this matter, the intellect is obliged again to consider great and small, not as blended together, but distinct, contrarywise of what the sense does.

True.

And is it not from hence, somehow, that it comes first of all to question us, What at all, then, is great, and what is little?

By all means.

And so we have called the one that which is known by intellect, and the other that which is seen by the eye.

Very right, said he.

This then is what at present I was endeavouring to express, when I said that some things call on the intelligence, and others do not. Such as fall on the sense at the same time with their contraries, I define to be such as require intelligence, but such as do not, do not excite intelligence.

I understand now, said he, and it appears so to me.

What now, with reference to number and unity? to which of the two classes do you imagine they belong?

I do not understand, reply'd he.

But reason by analogy, said I, from what we have already said: for if unity be of itself sufficiently seen, or be apprehended by any other sense, it will not lead towards real being, as we said concerning finger. But if there be always seen at the same time something contrary to it, so

as that it shall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would truly want then one to judge of it: and the soul would be under a necessity to doubt within itself, and to inquire, rousing the intellect within itself, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the learning which relates to unity would be of the class of those which lead up and turn the soul towards the contemplation of real being.

But indeed this at least, said he, is what the very sight of it doth in no small measure effect: for we behold the same thing, at one and the same time as one, and as an infinite multitude.

And if this be the case with reference to unity, said I, will not every number be affected in the same manner?

Why not?

But surely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number.

They do entirely.

These then at least seem to lead towards truth.

Remarkably so.

They are then, as it appears, of those pieces of learning which we are in search of. For the soldier must necessarily learn these things, for the disposing of his ranks; and the philosopher for the attaining to real being, coming up above what is generated, otherwise he can never become a reasoner.

It is so, reply'd he.

But our guardian at least happens to be both a soldier and a philosopher.

Why is he not?

It were proper then, Glauco, to establish by law this piece of learning, and to persuade those who are to manage the greatest affairs of the city, to apply to computation, and study it, not in a common way, but 'till by the intellect itself they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the sake of buying nor of selling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war and for the agility of the soul itself, and its conversion from what is generated towards both truth and being.

Most finely said, reply'd he.

And surely now, I perceive likewise, said I, at present whilst this learning respecting computations is mentioned,

how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpose, if one applies to it for the sake of knowledge, and not to make a traffic by it.

Which way, reply'd he!

This very thing at least, which we now mentioned, how powerfully does it somehow lead up the soul, and put it under a necessity of reasoning about the numbers themselves, no way admitting, if one in reasoning with it shall produce numbers which have visible and tangible bodies. For you know of some who are dextrous in these things, how that if one, in reasoning, shall attempt to divide unity itself, they both ridicule him and will not admit of it, but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid lest anyhow unity should appear not to be unity, but many.

You say, reply'd he, most true.

What think you now, Glauco, if one should ask them: Wonderful men, about what kind of numbers are you reasoning? In which there is unity, such as you allow of, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing in the smallest degree, having no fraction in itself? What do you imagine they would answer?

This, as I imagine: that they mean such numbers as can be conceived by the mind alone, but cannot at all be comprehended any other way.

You see then, friend, said I, that, in reality, this learning appears necessary for us, since it appears to lay the soul under a necessity at least of employing the intellect itself towards the discovery of truth itself.

And surely now, said he, it does this at least in a very strong degree.

But what, have you hitherto considered this? that those who are naturally computers appear to be acute in all pieces of learning; and such as are naturally slow, if they be instructed and practised in this, though they gain nothing else, all of them however proceed so far as to become more acute than they were before.

It is so, reply'd he.

And surely, as I imagine, you will not easily find any thing, and not at all many, which occasion greater labour to the learner and student than this.

No, indeed.

On all these accounts then, this learning is not to be omitted, but the best geniuses are to be instructed in it.

I agree, said he.

Let this one thing then, said I, be established among us; and, in the next place, what is akin to it, let us consider if it any way belongs to us.

What is it? said he; or do you mean geometry?

That very thing, said I.

As far, said he, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all those figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the same man would differ from himself when he were a geometer, and when he were not.

But surely now, said I, for such purposes as these, some little geometry, and some particle of computation might suffice: but we must inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute any thing to this great end, to make us more easily comprehend the idea of the good. And we say that every thing contributes to this that obliges the soul to turn itself towards that region in which is the most divine of being, which it must by all means contemplate.

You say right, reply'd he.

If therefore it oblige the soul to contemplate being, it belongs to us; but if it oblige to contemplate what is generated only, it does not belong to us.

We say so at least.

They then who are but a little conversant in geometry, said I, will not dispute with us this point at least, that this science is quite opposite to the common modes of speech employed in it by those who practise it.

How? said he.

They speak somehow very ridiculously, and through necessity; for all the discourse they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation and to practice. Thus they speak of making a square, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like; but yet the whole of this learning is somehow studied with a view to knowledge.

By all means indeed, said he.

Must not this further be agreed on?

What?

That it is the knowledge of what is perpetual, and not at all of what is ever generated and destroyed.

This, said he, is agreed on; for geometrical knowledge is of that which is perpetual.

It would seem then, brave Glauco, to draw the soul towards truth, and to be productive of a philosophic understanding, so as to make us raise the powers of the mind to things above, instead of unworthily fixing them on things below.

As much as possible, reply'd he.

As much as possible then, said I, must we give orders that those in this finest city of yours by no means omit geometry; for even its by-works are not inconsiderable.

What by-works? said he.

Those, said I, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all pieces of learning, as to the understanding of them more handsomely, we know somehow that one's having learned geometry or not makes every way an entire difference.

Every way truly, said he.

Let us then establish this second piece of learning for the youth.

Let us establish it, reply'd he.

But what, shall we, in the third place, establish astronomy?
or are you of a different opinion?

I am, said he, of the same; for to be well skilled in the seasons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to the military art.

You are pleasant, said I, as you seem to be afraid of the multitude, lest you appear to enjoin useless pieces of learning. But this is not altogether despicable, though it is hard to persuade them, that by each of these pieces of learning some power of the soul is both purified and invigorated, which was destroyed and blunted by other studies, though more worthy of preservation than ten thousand eyes, for by it alone is truth beheld. To such therefore as are of the same opinion you will very readily appear to reason admirably well; but such as have never observed this will probably imagine you say nothing at all, for they perceive no other advantage in these things

worthy of account. Consider now from this point, with which of these two you will reason; or carry on the reasonings with neither of them, but principally for your own sake, yet not grudge another, if any one shall be able to reap any benefit by them.

In this manner, reply'd he, I chuse, on my own account principally, both to reason, and to question and answer.

Come then, said I, let us go back again, for we have not taken aright in order what comes next after geometry.

How have we taken? reply'd he.

After plain surface, said I, we have taken a solid moving in a circle, before we considered it by itself, but the right method was to have taken the third augment immediately after the second, and that is somehow the augment of cubes and what participates of depth.

It is so, reply'd he. But these things, Socrates, seem not yet to be found out.

The reason of it, said I, is twofold. Because there is no city which holds them in sufficient honour, they are slightly searched into, being difficult; and besides, those who do search into them want a leader, without which they cannot find them out. And this leader is, in the first place, hard to be found; and after that he does exist, as matters are at present, the inquirers into these things, as they are high-spirited, will not obey him. But if the whole city presided over these things, and held them in esteem, such as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with assiduity and vigour, would discover themselves what they were; since even now, whilst they are on the one hand despised, and kept down by the multitude, and on the other by those who study them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all these disadvantages, grow up through their native charm, and it is no wonder that they do appear.

Because truly, said he, this charm is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were just now saying; or somehow that study which respects plain surface you called geometry.

I did, said I.

And then, said he, you mentioned astronomy in the first place after it, but afterwards you drew back.

Because whilst I am hastening, said I, to go through all things speedily, I advance more slowly. For that augment by depth which was next in method we passed over, because the investigation of it is ridiculous, and after geometry we mentioned astronomy, which is the circular motion of a solid.

You say right, reply'd he.

We establish then, said I, astronomy as the fourth piece of learning, supposing that one to subsist which we have now omitted, if the city shall enter upon it.

It is reasonable, said he. And now that you agree with me, Socrates, I proceed in my commendation of astronomy, which you formerly reprov'd as unseasonable. For it is evident, I imagine, to every one, that this piece of learning at least obliges the soul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither.

It is probable, said I, that it is evident to every one, but to me; for to me it does not appear so.

How then do you think of it? reply'd he.

In the way these pursue it who introduce it into philosophy, it plainly makes the soul entirely to look downwards.

How do you say? reply'd he.

You seem to me, said I, to have formed with yourself no ignoble opinion of the learning respecting things above, what it is; for you seem to think that if any one contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and by earnestly looking up apprehends every thing, you reckon he has intelligence of these things, and not merely sees them with his eyes. And perhaps you judge right, and I foolishly. For I, on the other hand, for my part, am not able to imagine that any other learning can make a soul look upwards but that which respects the being, and that which is invisible. And if any one undertakes to learn any thing of sensible objects, whether he gape upwards, or bellow downwards, never at all shall I say that he learns; for I aver he hath no real knowledge of these things, nor shall I say that his soul looks upwards, but downwards, even though he learns lying on his back, either at land or at sea.

I am punished, said he, for you have justly reprov'd me. But which was the proper way, said you, of learning

astronomy different from the methods they learn at present, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purposes we speak of?

In this manner, said I, that these variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a visible subject, be deemed the most beautiful and the most regular of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to those orbits in which the real velocity, and the real slowness, in true number, and in all true figures are carried with respect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reason and intellect, but not by sight. Or do you think they can?

By no means, reply'd he.

Is not then, said I, that variety in the heavens to be made use of as a pattern for learning those real things, in the same manner as if one should meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Dædalus or some other artist or painter? For one who were any way skill'd in geometry, or seeing these, would truly think the workmanship most excellent, yet would esteem it ridiculous to consider these things seriously, as if from thence he were to learn the truth as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion?

Why would it not be ridiculous? reply'd he.

And do not you then imagine that he who is truly an astronomer is affected in the same manner when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed established by the Former of the heavens, in the finest manner possible for such works to be established. But would not he deem him absurd, who should imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other planets to such like things, and towards one another, existed always in the same manner, and in no way suffered any change, though they have a body, and are visible, but would search by every method to apprehend the truth of these things?

So it appears to me, reply'd he, whilst I am hearing you.

Let us then make use of problems, said I, in the study of astronomy, as in geometry. And let us drop the heavenly bodies, if we want truly to apprehend astronomy, and

render profitable instead of unprofitable that part of the soul which is naturally wise.

You truly enjoin a much harder task on astronomers, said he, than is taken at present.

And I imagine, at least, reply'd I, that we must likewise enjoin other things, in the same manner, if we are to be of any service as law-givers. But can you suggest any of the proper pieces of learning?

I can suggest none, reply'd he, at present at least.

Motion, said I, as I imagine, affords us not one indeed, but many species of learning, all of which any wise man can probably tell. What occur to us are two.

Which now?

Along with this, said I, there is its counter-part.

Which?

As the eyes, said I, seem to be fitted to astronomy, so the ears seem to be fitted to harmonious motion. And these seem to be sister arts to one another, both as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glauco, agree with them; or how do we do?

Just so, reply'd he.

Shall we not, said I, as they deal greatly in these matters, inquire how they talk about them, and if there be any other thing besides these, inquire into it likewise? But above all these things, we will still watch over our own affairs.

What is that?

That those we educate never at all attempt at any time to learn any of those things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed, as we now mentioned with reference to astronomy. Or do not you know that they do the same thing with regard to harmony as in astronomy? For whilst they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they labour like the astronomers unprofitably.

Nay truly, said he, and ridiculously too, whilst they frequently repeat certain notes, and listen with their ears, to catch the sound as from a neighbourhood; and some of them say they hear some middle note, but that the difference is exceeding small which measures them; and others again are in doubt about it, and say that the notes

are the same as were sounded before, and both parties subject the mind to the ears.

But you speak, said I, of the lucrative musicians, who perpetually harass and torment their strings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the comparison may not be too tedious, I shall say nothing of their complaints of the strings, their refusals and stubbornness, but put an end to it. But I say we ought not to chuse these to talk of harmony, but these true musicians whom we spoke of. For these do the same things here as the others did in astronomy; for in these symphonies which are heard they search for numbers, but they pass not thence to the problems, to inquire which numbers are symphonious, and which are not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other.

This is truly, said he, a divine work you mention.

It is then indeed profitable in the search of the beautiful and good, but if pursued in another manner, it is unprofitable.

It is likely at least, said he.

But I imagine, said I, that the proper method of inquiry into all these things, if it reach the union and affinity which they have, and compute in what respects they are akin to one another, this exercise will contribute somewhat towards what we want, and our labour will not be unprofitable, otherwise it will.

I likewise, said he, am of the same opinion. But you speak, Socrates, of a very mighty work.

Mean you the introduction, or what else, said I? Or do not we know that all these things are introductory to the law itself, which we ought to learn; for even the dialectic philosophers do not appear any way expert as to these things.

No, truly, said he, unless a very few of all I have met with.

But whilst they are not able, said I, to offer and to hear reason, shall they ever be able to know any thing of what we say is necessary to be known?

Never shall they be able to do this at least, reply'd he.

Is not this itself then, Glauco, said I, the law? To carry the power of reasoning to its highest perfection, which, being intellectual, the power of sight may be said to re-

seemle it; which power endeavours, as we said, first to look at the animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself. So when any one attempts to reason without any of the senses, by reasoning he pusheth on to know each particular, what it is; and if he never give over till he apprehend by his intelligence what is the good itself, he then arrives at the perfection of intelligence, as the other does at that of visible.

By all means, said he.

What now? Do not you call this progress reasoning?

What else?

And now, said I, as the loosing the men from their chains, and their turning from the shadows towards the statues, and the light, and their ascent from the subterraneous dwelling to the sun; and when there, the looking at the images in water, from their inability at first to look at animals and vegetables, and the light of the sun. And here the contemplating the divine images themselves, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another sort of light, as by the sun: this whole exercise in the arts we have mentioned hath this power, to lead back again that which is best in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in beings, as in the former case that which is brightest in the body is led to that which is brightest in the material and visible world.

I admit, said he, of these things, though truly it appears to me quite difficult to admit of them, and in another respect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we shall hear these things not only now at present, but often go over them afterwards), establishing these things as now expressed, let us go to the law itself, and go through with it as we have done with the introduction. Say then what is the manner of the reasoning power, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place at which, when we are arrived, we shall have repose from travel, and the end of the journey.

You will not as yet, friend Glauco, said I, be able to follow, for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we speak of, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it

appears, whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper confidently to affirm, but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be affirmed. May it not?

Why not?

And further that it is the reasoning power alone which can discover this to one who is conversant in these things we have mentioned, and that by no other power it is possible.

This also, said he, we may confidently affirm.

This at least no one, said I, will dispute with us. That no other method can attempt to comprehend at all, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and passions of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, these we see, having a dream as it were of the being; but it is impossible for them to see the reality, so long as employing hypotheses they hold by these immoveably, without being able to give the reason of them. For where one holds as a principle what he does not know, and a conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, what contrivance can there be found by which an assent of such a kind shall ever become science?

None at all, reply'd he.

Does not then, said I, the reasoning method proceed in this way alone, towards the first principle itself, removing all hypotheses, in order to establish it, and disengaging the eye of the soul from a certain barbarian clay with which it was buried, gently draws and leads it upwards, using as helps and assistants those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but they require another appellation more expressive than opinion, and more indistinct than science. We have somewhere in our preceding discourse termed it demonstration. But it is not, as I imagine, about a name they dispute, who inquire into matters of so great importance as we have now before us.

No indeed, said he.

Do you agree then, said I, as formerly, to call the first class science, the second demonstration, the third faith, and the fourth imagination? and both these last opinion,

and the two former intelligence. And that opinion respects what is generated, and intelligence real being; and in the same proportion as being is to what is generated, so is intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and demonstration to imagination. But as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the division of each of them into two, to wit what is matter of opinion, and what is matter of intellect, we omit, Glauco, that we may not be more tedious here than in our former reasonings.

As for me, said he, with reference to those other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the same opinion.

But do not you call him a reasoner, who apprehends the reason of the being of each particular? And as for the man who is not able to give a reason to himself and to another, in as far as he is not able, so far will you say he wants intelligence of the thing?

Why should I not say so? reply'd he.

And is not the case the same with reference to the good? Whosoever cannot define it by reason, separating the idea of good from all others, and piercing through all arguments as in a battle, eagerly contending to prove it, not according to opinion, but according to reality, and in all these cases to march forward with unerring reason, such an one knows nothing of the good itself, nor of any good whatever; but if he hath attained to any image of the good, we will say he hath attained to it by opinion, not by science, and is dreaming and sleeping out his present life, and ere he be awakened, he will descend to the lower regions, there to sleep on to the end.

Now truly, said he, I will strongly aver all these things.

But surely you will not, as I imagine, allow your own children at least whom you bred up and educated in reasoning, if ever at all indeed you educate them, to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, whilst they are void of reason as letters of the alphabet.

By no means, reply'd he.

You will then lay down this to them as a law. That in a most especial manner they attain to that piece of education, by which they may become capable to question and answer in the most scientific manner.

I will settle it by law, said he, with your assistance at least.

Do you agree then, said I, that above all the other pieces of learning, we place the art of reasoning as the top stone, and that no other piece of learning can be properly set above it, but that every thing respecting learning is now finished?

I agree, said he.

There now remains for you, said I, the distribution: to whom shall we assign these pieces of learning, and after what manner?

That is plain, said he.

Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we chose?

Why do I not? said he.

As to other things then, imagine, said I, that such geniuses as these ought to be pick'd out. For the most firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most graceful; and besides, we must not only seek for such as are of noble and stern manner, but they must be possessed of every other natural disposition conducive to this education.

Which dispositions do you recommend?

They must have, said I, happy friend, acuteness for the sciences, that they may not learn with difficulty; for souls are much more discouraged by hard pieces of learning than by severe bodily exercises, as the toil which is proper to them, and not in common with the body, more intimately affects them.

True, said he.

And we must seek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how else do you imagine any one shall be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accomplish at the same time such learning and study?

No one, said he, unless he be every way of a fine genius.

The mistake then about philosophy, and the contempt of it have been occasioned through these things, because, as I formerly said, they apply to it not in a worthy manner; for it ought not to be apply'd to it by the bastardly, but the legitimate.

How? said he.

In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy ought not, said I, to be lame as to his love of any kind of labour, loving it in some things, and hating it in others: and this is the case when one loves wrestling and hunting, and all exercises of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all these respects has aversion to labour. He likewise is lame, in a different manner from this one, who dislikes all bodily exercise.

You say most true, reply'd he.

And shall we not, said I, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, who hates indeed a voluntary falsehood, and bears it ill in itself, and is beyond measure enraged when others tell a lye; but the involuntary lye, it easily admits, and though at any time it be found ignorant, it is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance.

By all means, said he.

And in like manner, said I, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly and what is legitimate; for when either any private person or city understands not how to attend all these things, they unawares employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they have occasion; private persons employ them as friends, and cities as governours.

The case is entirely so, said he.

But we, said I, must beware of all such things; for if we take such as are entire in body and in mind for so extensive learning, and so extensive an exercise, and instruct them, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the city and its constitution; but if we introduce other sort of persons into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and bring philosophy under still greater ridicule.

That indeed were shameful, said he.

Certainly, said I. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous.

How so? said he.

I forgot, said I, that we were amusing ourselves, and spoke with too great keenness; for whilst I was speaking, I cast

my eye towards philosophy, and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and as being enraged at those who are the cause of it, to have spoken more earnestly what I said.

No truly, said he, not to me your hearer at least.

But for me, said I, the speaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men, but in this election it will not be allowed us. For we must not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is less so than to run. They are the young who perform all great and frequent toils.

Of necessity, said he.

Every thing then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous instruction which they should be taught before they learn the art of reasoning, ought to be set before them whilst they are children, and that method of teaching observed which shall make them learn without compulsion

Why so?

Because, said I, a free spirit ought to learn no piece of learning with slavery; for the toils of the body, when undergone through compulsion, render the body nothing worse; but no piece of compelled learning is lasting in the soul.

True, said he.

Do not then, said I, excellent friend, compel boys in their learning; but train them up amusing themselves, that you may be better able to discern to what every one's genius naturally tends.

What you say, reply'd he, is reasonable.

Do not you remember then, said I, that we said the boys are even to be carried to war, as spectators, on horse-back, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with safety, and like young hounds taste the blood?

I remember, said he.

Whoever then, said I, shall appear the most forward in all these toils, and in all pieces of learning, and in terrors, are to be selected into a certain number.

At what age? said he.

When they have, said I, finished their necessary exercises, for during this time, whilst it continues, for two or three

years, it is impossible to do any thing else; for fatigue and sleep are enemies to learning. And this too is none of the least of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exercises.

Why is it not? said he.

And after this period, said I, let such as formerly have been selected of the age of twenty receive greater honours than others, and let those pieces of learning which in their youth they learned separately be brought before them in one view, that they may see the relation between the sciences and the nature of real being.

This learning indeed will alone, said he, remain immovable in those in whom it obtains.

And this, said I, is the greatest trial for distinguishing between those geniuses which are naturally fitted for learning, and those which are not. He who perceiveth this relation is a reasoning genius; he who doth not, is none.

I am of the same opinion, said he.

It will then be necessary for you, said I, after you have observed these things, and seen who are most approven in these, persevering in learning, persevering in war, and in the other things established by law, to make choice of such after they exceed thirty years, chusing a-new from those chosen formerly, and advance them to greater honours; and observe them, trying them by the reasoning power, who of them without the help of his eyes, or any other sense, is able to proceed with truth to being itself. And here, friend, is a work of great care.

For what principally? said he.

Do not you perceive, said I, the evil which at present attends reasoning, how great it is?

What is it, said he, you mean?

How it is somehow, said I, full of what is contrary to law. Greatly so, reply'd he.

Do you imagine then, said I, they suffer some dreadful thing, and will you not forgive them?

How do you mean? said he.

Just as if, said I, a certain supposititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and should perceive when grown up to manhood that he is not descended of those who are said to be his parents, but yet should not discover his real

parents; can you guess how such an one would be affected both towards his flatterers and towards his supposed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time, again, when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me, while I guess at it?

I am willing, said he.

I conjecture then, said I, that he will pay more honour to his father and mother, and his other supposed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will less neglect them when they are in any want, and be less apt to do or say any thing amiss to them, and in matters of consequence be less disobedient to them than to those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth.

It is likely, said he.

But when he perceives the real state of the matter, I conjecture, he will then slacken in his honour and respect for them, and go after the flatterers, and be remarkably more persuaded by them now than formerly, and truly live according to their manner, conversing with them openly. But for that father, and those supposed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard.

You say every thing, said he, as it would happen. But in what manner does this comparison respect our present argument?

In this. We have certain opinions from our childhood concerning just and beautiful, in which we have been educated, as by parents, obeying and honouring them.

We have, said he.

Are there not likewise other pursuits opposite to these, with pleasures flattering our souls, and drawing towards these. They do not however persuade those who are in any degree moderate, but they honour those their relations, and obey them.

These things are so.

What now, said I, when to one who is thus affected the question is proposed, What is the beautiful? and when he, answering what he hath heard from the law-giver, is refuted by reason; and reason frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is ugly. And in the same

manner, as to what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you imagine such an one will after this do with regard to these things, as to honouring and observing them?

Of necessity, said he, he will neither honour nor observe them any more in the same manner as formerly.

When then he no longer deems, said I, these things honourable, and a-kin to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, is it possible he can readily join himself to any other life than the flattering one?

It is not possible, said he.

And from being an observer of the law, he shall, I imagine, appear to be a transgressor.

Of necessity.

Is it not likely then, said I, that those shall be thus affected who in this situation apply to reasoning, and that they should have, as I was just now saying, great forgiveness.

And pity too, said he.

Whilst you take care then lest this compassionate case befall these of the age of thirty, ought you not by every method to accomplish them in reasoning?

Certainly, said he.

And is not this one prudent care? that they meddle not with reasonings whilst they are young: for you have not forgot, I imagine, that the youth, when they first meddle with reasonings, abuse them in the way of amusement, whilst they use them alway in the way of contradiction. And imitating those who are refuters, they themselves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reasonings, those always who are near them.

Extremely so, said he.

And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, do they not powerfully and speedily come to hold none of the opinions they held formerly? And by these means they themselves and the whole of philosophy are scandalised to others.

Most true, said he.

But he who is of a riper age, said I, will not incline to share in such a madness, but will rather imitate him who

inclines to reason and inquire after truth, than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuseth himself and contradicteth; and will both be more modest himself, and render the practice of disputing more honourable instead of being more dishonourable.

Right, said he.

Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, in this point, that the geniuses ought to be decent and grave, to which one shall impart the art of reasoning, and not, as at present, when every common genius, and such as is not at all proper, is admitted to it?

Certainly, said he.

Will not then the double of the former period suffice one to remain in imbibing the art of reasoning with perseverance and application, and doing nothing else, but in way of counterpart exercising himself in all bodily exercises?

Do you mean six years, said he, or four?

'Tis of no consequence, said I; make it five. After this you must make them descend to that cave again, and oblige them to govern both in things relating to war, and such other magistracies as require youth, that they may not fall short of others in experience. And they must be still further tried among these, whether being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or whether they will in any measure be drawn aside.

And for how long a time, said he, do you appoint this?

For fifteen years, said I. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as are preserved, and as have excelled in all these things, in actions, and in the sciences, are to be brought to the highest degree, and are to be obliged to direct the beam of their soul towards that which giveth light to all; and when they have viewed the good itself, to use it as a model, each of them in their turn, in adorning both the city and private persons, and themselves, all the remainder of their life; occupied for the most part in philosophy, and when their turn comes on them, they toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as any thing honourable, but as a matter of necessity.

And after they have educated others in the same manner still, and left such as resemble themselves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer sacrifices, if the oracle assent, as to superior beings; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men.

You have, Socrates, said he, like a statuary, made our governours every way perfect.

And our governesses likewise, Glauco, said I. For do not imagine that I have spoken what I have said any more concerning the men, than concerning the women, such of them as are of a sufficient genius.

Right, said he, if at least they are to share in all things equally with the men, as we explained.

What then, said I, do you agree that, with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether spoken what can only be considered as wishes, but such things as are indeed difficult, yet possible some way, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz., when those who are truly philosophers, whether more of them or a single one, becoming governours in a city, shall despise those present honours, esteeming them illiberal and of no value, but esteeming the right and the honours which come from it above all things, and accounting justice of greatest moment and most absolutely necessary, and ministering to it and encreasing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own city?

How? said he.

As many, said I, of the more advanced in life as have lived ten years in the city, they will send out to the country, and taking their children away from those habits which the domestics have at present, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned; and the city and republic we have described being thus established in the speediest and easiest manner, it will both be happy itself, and be of the greatest advantage to that people among whom it is established.

Very much so indeed, said he. And you seem to me, Socrates, to have told very well how this city shall arise, if it arise at all.

Are not now then, said I, our discourses sufficient both

concerning such a city as this, and concerning a man similar to it? For it is also now evident what sort of a man we shall say he ought to be.

It is evident, reply'd he; and your inquiry seems to me to be at an end.

q u e s t i o n

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK

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THE EIGHTH BOOK

BE it so. These things, Glauco, have now been agreed on—that in this city which is to be established in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewise the whole of education; and, in like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and that their kings are to be such as most excel both in philosophy and in the arts of war.

These things, said he, have been agreed on.

And surely we likewise agreed on these things, that when the governours are marching with the soldiers, and come to settle themselves, they shall dwell in such habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to any one, but are common to all. And besides these houses, we likewise, if you remember, agreed on what sort of possessions they shall have.

I remember, said he, that we were of opinion none of them ought to possess any thing as others do at present; but, as wrestlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianship from others, or an yearly maintenance on these accounts, and were to take care of themselves and the rest of the city.

You say right, said I. But after we have finished this now, let us recollect whence we made this digression, that we may now proceed again in the same way.

That is no hard matter, said he: for you were mentioning much the same things of the city with those you have done at present, saying that you held such a city to be good, as it was at that time described, and the man to be good who resembleth it; whilst yet it seems you are able to describe a better city and a better man. And you said, moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this one was right. Of the other republics, you said, as I remember, there were four species which deserved to be considered, and to have the errors in them and the lawless people

in them observed; in order that, when we have beheld the whole of them, and when we have agreed which is the best and which is the worst man, we may inquire whether the best man be the happiest, and the worst the most miserable, or otherwise. And when I asked you which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you in this manner having taken up the subject are come to this part of the reasoning.

You have recollected, said I, most accurately.

As a wrestler, now, afford me again the same opportunity; and whilst I ask you the same question, endeavour to answer what you was going to do then.

If indeed I be able, said I.

And I am truly desirous, said he, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics.

You shall hear that, said I, without difficulty, for they are these I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is, secondly, that which has a secondary praise, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils: and that which is different from this one, and followeth next in order, a Democracy; then genuine Tyranny, different from all these, the fourth and last disease of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any distinct species? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and such like republics, are somehow of a middle kind between these, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks.

They are indeed, said he, said to be very many, and very strange ones.

Do you know now, said I, that there is somehow a necessity that there be as many species of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated somehow of an oak, or a rock, and not of the manners of those who are in the city, to which, as into a current, all other things likewise are drawn?

By no means do I imagine, said he, they are generated from any thing but from hence.

If then there be five species of cities, the species of souls in individuals shall be likewise five.

Why not?

We have already gone over that one which resembleth

an Aristocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and just.

We have so.

Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worse species, the contentious and the ambitious man, who is formed according to the Spartan republic; and then him resembling an Oligarchy; then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the most unjust, and set him in opposition to the most just, that our inquiry may be completed; how after all, the most finished justice is in comparison of the most finished injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the possessor: that so we may either follow injustice, being persuaded by Thrasy-machus, or justice, yielding to the present reasoning?

By all means, said he, we must do so.

Shall we then, in the same manner as we began, consider the manners in republics, before we consider them in private persons, as being there more conspicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is first to be considered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be called either ambitious, or aspiring after power), and along with it we shall consider a man resembling it; afterwards we shall consider an Oligarchy, and a man resembling Oligarchy; and then, again, when we have viewed a Democracy, we shall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewise a tyrannic soul, we shall endeavour to become competent judges of what we proposed.

Both our contemplation and judgment, said he, would in this manner at least be agreeable to reason.

Come then, said I, let us endeavour to tell in what manner the ambitious republic arises out of Aristocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes by means of that part which holds the magistracies, when in this itself there arises sedition; but whilst this agrees with itself, though the state be extremely small, it is impossible to be changed?

It is so indeed.

How then, Glauco, shall our city be changed, or in what shape shall our allies and rulers fall into sedition with one another, and among themselves? Or are you willing that, like Homer, we invoke the Muses to tell us, "How first

sedition rose"? and shall we say, that whilst they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk seriously and sublimely?

In what manner?

Somehow thus: It is indeed difficult for a city in this manner constituted to be changed; but as every thing which is generated is liable to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain for ever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this: Not only the vegetable species, but likewise the animal, has seasons of fertility and sterility of soul as well as of body, when their revolutions complete the periphery of their respective orbits—which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrarywise to such as are the contrary. And with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although they are wise, these you have educated to be governours of cities, yet will they not, for all that, by their reason joined with sensation, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. Now the period for a divine generation is that which the perfect number comprehends, and that for a human generation* is that whole geometrical number which is of such an influence as to regulate the better and the worse births—of which when our governours, being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius nor fortunate. And though the former governours shall install the best of them in the office, they nevertheless being unworthy of it, and coming to have the power their fathers had, will begin to be negligent of us, in their guardianship in the first place, esteeming music less than they ought, and in the next place the exercises. Hence our youth shall become less acquainted with music, and the guardians which shall be appointed from among these shall not be altogether expert guardians to distinguish, according to Hesiod and us, the several species of geniuses—the golden, the silver, the brazen and the iron; but whilst iron is mixed with silver and brass with gold, dissimilitude arises and unharmonious irregularity. And when these arise, wherever they prevail they perpetually generate war and enmity. To such a race now of men as

* Six or eight lines here omitted, as the text is unintelligible or corrupted.

this, we must suppose them to say that sedition belongs whenever it happens to rise.

And we shall say that they have answered justly at least, reply'd he.

And of necessity, said I, for they are muses.

What then, said he, do the muses say next?

When sedition is risen, said I, two of the species of geniuses, the iron and the brazen, will be carried, after making gain, and the acquisition of lands and houses, of gold and silver. But the golden and the silver geniuses, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead the soul towards virtue and the original constitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and draw contrary to one another, they make an agreement to divide their lands and houses between them, and to dwell apart one from another; and then enslaving those who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they keep them as domestics and slaves, for service in war and for their own protection.

This revolution, said he, seems to me to arise in such a manner.

Shall not then this republic, said I, be somewhat in the middle between Aristocracy and Oligarchy?

Certainly.

And the change shall happen in this manner, and on this change what sort of life shall it lead? Or is it not plain that in some things it shall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and shall likewise have somewhat peculiar to itself?

Just so, reply'd he.

Shall they not then, in honouring their rulers, and in this that their military abstain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastic exercises and contests of war—in all these things shall they not imitate the former republic?

Yes.

But in this, that they are afraid to bring wise men into the magistracy, as having no longer any such as are truly simple and inflexible, but such as are of a mixed kind; and in that they incline for those who are more forward and

rough, whose natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they esteem tricks and stratagems, and spend the whole of their time in continual war—in all these respects shall it not have many things peculiar to itself?

Yes.

And such as these, said I, shall be desirous of wealth, as those who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner value gold and silver hoarded up, as having repositories of their own, and domestic treasuries, where they hoard them up and hide them, and have their houses enclosed about, where, as in nests altogether peculiar, they squander every thing profusely, together with their wives and such others as they fancy.

Most true, said he.

And will they not likewise be sparing of their substance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to squander the substance of others, through their dissoluteness and secretly indulging their pleasures. They will likewise fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by persuasion but by force, having neglected the true muse, which is accompanied with reason and philosophy, and honoured exercise more than music.

You describe entirely, said he, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill.

It is indeed mixed, said I. One thing is most remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the forward temper, contention, and ambition.

Exceedingly, said he.

Doth not then, said I, this republic arise in this manner? And is it not of such a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be described in words where there is not perfect accuracy, as it sufficeth us to contemplate in description likewise the most just and the most unjust man, and it were a work of prodigious length to go over all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting any thing?

Very right, said he.

What now shall the man be correspondent to this republic? how shall he be form'd, and of what kind?

I imagine, said Adimantus, he shall be somewhat like Glauco here, at least in a love of contention.

Perhaps, said I, as to this particular; but in other respects he does not seem to me to have a natural resemblance of him.

In what?

He must necessarily, said I, be more arrogant, and unapt to music, but fond of it, and fond to hear oratory, but not at all an orator. And such an one will be rough towards some slaves, without despising them, as he does who is sufficiently educated; he will be mild towards such as are free, and extremely submissive to governours; fond of being in the magistracy and of dignity, reckoning that neither eloquence, nor any such thing, should intitle to magistracy, but political management and military performances, being a lover of exercises and of hunting.

This indeed, said he, is the temper of that republic.

And shall not such an one, said I, despise money whilst he is young, but the older he grows, the more he will always value it, because he partakes of the covetous natural temper, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian.

Which? said Adimantus.

Reason, said I, accompanied with music, which, being the alone inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life.

You say well, reply'd he.

And surely at least such an ambitious youth, said I, resembles such a city.

Certainly.

And such an one, said I, is formed, somehow, in this manner. He happens sometimes to be the young son of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who shuns honours and magistracies, and law-suits, and all such public business, and wants to be neglected in obscurity, in order that he may have no trouble.

In what manner then, said he, is he formed?

When first of all, said I, he hears his mother venting her indignation, because her husband is not in the magistracy, and complaining that she is on this account neglected among other women, and that she observes him not extremely attentive to the making of money, not fighting

nor scolding privately nor publicly in courts of justice; but behaving on all these occasions indolently, and perceiving him always taken up about himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt—upon all these accounts, being filled with indignation, she tells her son that his father is unmanly and extremely remiss, and all other such things as wives are wont to cant over concerning such husbands.

They are very many truly, said Adimantus, and very much in their spirit.

And you know, said I, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as appear good-natured, sometimes privately say the same things to the son; and if they see any one either owing money, whom the father does not sue at law, or in any other way doing injustice, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad he hears other such like things. And he sees that such in the city as mind their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, and that such as mind not their affairs are both honoured and commended. The young man, now hearing and seeing all these things, and then again hearing the speeches of his father, and observing his pursuits in a near view, in comparison with those of others, being drawn by both these, his father watering and encreasing the rational part in his soul, and these others the concupiscible and irascible, and being naturally no bad man, but spoiled by the bad conversations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and irascible, and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man.

You seem, said he, to have accurately explained the formation of such an one.

We have now then, said I, the second republic and the second man.

We have, said he.

Shall we not after this say with Aeschylus,

“O'er diff'rent cities din'rent men are set”?

Or, rather, according to our plan, shall we first establish the cities?

By all means so, reply'd he.

It would be Oligarchy then, I imagine, which succeeds this republic.

But what constitution, said he, is it you call Oligarchy?

That republic, said I, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no share in the government.

I understand, said he.

Must we not tell, first, how the change is made from the ambitious republic to the Oligarchy?

We must.

And surely at least how this change is made, said I, is manifest even to the blind.

How?

That treasury, said I, which every one hath filled with gold destroys such a republic; for first of all they find out for themselves methods of expence, and to this purpose strain the laws, both they and their wives disobeying them.

That is likely, said he.

And afterwards, as I imagine, one observing another, and coming to rival one another, the generality are rendered of this kind.

It is likely.

And from hence then, said I, proceeding still to a greater desire of making money, the more honourable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought dishonourable. Or is not virtue so different from wealth, that, if each of them be placed in the opposite arm of a balance, they always weigh opposite to each other?

Entirely so, reply'd he.

But whilst wealth and the wealthy are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the good must be more dishonoured.

It is plain.

And what is honoured is always pursued, and what is dishonoured is neglected.

Just so.

Instead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at last become lovers of gain and of wealth. The rich, on the one hand, they both praise and admire, and bring into the magistracy, but the poor man they despise?

Certainly.

And do not they then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic constitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and less to the less, intimating that he who hath not the valuation settled by law is to have no share in the government? And these things they transact violently, by force of arms, or establish such a republic after they have previously stricken them with terror. Is it not thus?

Thus indeed.

This then, to say in a word, is the constitution.

It is, reply'd he. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we ascribed to it?

First of all, said I, this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you of this? For consider, if one should in this manner appoint pilots of ships according to their valuations, but never entrust one with a poor man, though better skill'd in piloting?

They would, said he, make very bad navigation.

And is it not in the same manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever?

I imagine so.

Is it so in all cases but in a city, said I? or is it so with reference to a city likewise?

There most especially, said he, in as much as it is the most difficult and the greatest government.

Oligarchy then would seem to have this one, which is so great a fault.

It appears so.

But what, is this anything less than it?

What?

That such a city is not one, but of necessity two; one consisting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting against one another.

Truly, said he, it is no way less.

But surely neither is this a handsome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, because of the necessity they are under either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themselves, or not employing them, to appear in battle itself truly Oligarchic, and at the same time to be unwilling to advance money

for the public service, through a natural disposition of covetousness.

This is not handsome.

But what, with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things the same persons, at the same time, minding in such a republic, agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right?

Not in any degree.

But see now whether this form of republic be the first which introduceth this greatest of all evils.

What is that?

That one shall be allowed to dispose of the whole of his effects, and another to purchase them from him, and the seller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilst he belongs to no one class in the city, and is neither called a maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horse-man, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute.

It is the first, said he.

But yet such an one shall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments, for otherwise some of them should not be over-rich, and others altogether poor.

Right.

But consider this likewise: When such a rich man as this is spends of his substance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purposes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magistrates, but was in truth neither magistrate of the city, nor servant to it, but a waster of substance?

So he appeared, reply'd he. He was nothing but a waster.

Are you willing then, said I, that we say of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-cell it is the disease of the swarm, in like manner such an one, when a drone in his house, it is the disease of the city?

Entirely so, Socrates, reply'd he.

And hath not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting? but these with feet, some of them without stings, and some of them with dreadful stings? And of those who are without stings are they who continue poor to old age; and of those who have stings are all these who are called mischievous.

Most true, said he.

It is plain then, said I, that in a city where you observe there are poor, there are somewhere in that place concealed thieves and purse-cutters, and sacrilegious persons, and workers of all other such evils.

It is plain, said he.

What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government?

They are almost all so, said he, except the governours.

And do we not imagine, said I, that there are many mischievous persons in them with stings, whom the magistracy, by diligence and by force, restrains?

We imagine so indeed, said he.

And shall we not say, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, such sort of persons are there produced?

We shall say so.

Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of such a kind as this, and hath it not such evils as these, and probably more too?

It is nearly so, said he.

We have now finished, said I, this republic likewise, which they call Oligarchy, having its governours according to valuation. And let us now consider the man who resembles it, in what manner he arises, and what sort of man he is.

By all means, said he.

And is not the change from that ambitious one, to the Oligarchic, chiefly in this manner?

How?

When such a one hath a son, first of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards he sees him, on a sudden, dashed on the city, as on a rock, and wasting both his substance and himself, either in the office of a general, or some other principal magistracy; then falling into courts of justice, destroyed by sycophants, either put to death, or strip'd of his dignities, disgraced, and losing all his substance.

It is likely, said he.

When he hath seen and suffered those things, friend, and hath lost his substance, he instantly, in a terror, pusheth headlong from the throne of his soul that ambitious and forward disposition, and being humbled by his poverty,

turns to the making of money, lives meanly and sparingly, and applying to work, scrapes together substance. Or do you not imagine that such a man will then seat in that throne the covetous and avaricious disposition, and make it a mighty king within himself, deck'd out with Persian crowns, and bracelets, and sceptres?

I imagine so, said he.

But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious disposition low on the ground, on either side, and having enslaved them under it, the one he allows to reason on nothing, nor ever to inquire but in what way lesser substance shall be made greater; and the other, again, he allows to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich people, and to receive honour on no other account but the acquisition of money, or whatever conduceth towards it.

There is no other change, said he, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one so sudden and so powerful as this.

Is not this then, said I, the Oligarchic man?

And the change into such an one is from a man resembling that republic from which the Oligarchic republic ariseth.

Let us consider now if he any way resembleth it.

Let us consider.

Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things?

Why, does he not?

And surely at least in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing of any other expences, but subduing the other desires as foolish.

Certainly.

And being, said I, an emaciated man, and making gain of every thing, a hoarding-up person, such as the multitude extols—would not this be the man who resembleth such a republic?

It appears so to me, reply'd he. Riches then must be most valued both by the city and by such a man.

For I do not imagine, said I, that such a man hath applied his mind to education.

I do not imagine he has, said he, for he would not have taken a blind one to be the leader of his life.

But farther still, consider this attentively, said I: shall we not say that there are in him, from the want of education, the desires of the drone, some of them beggarly, and some of them mischievous, forcibly kept in by some other desire?

Entirely so, said he.

Do you know then, said I, where you will best observe their wickedness?

Where? said he.

In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever else of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injustice.

True.

And is not this now manifest, that in every other commerce of life, wherever such an one acts so as to be approved, appearing to be just, and by a certain moderate behaviour restrains the other wrong desires within him, he does so, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, trembling for the rest of his substance.

Entirely so, said he.

And truly, said I, friend, you shall find in the most of them desires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occasion to spend the things of others.

Very much so, said he.

Such a one as this, then, will not be without sedition within himself, nor be one, but a kind of double man. He will, however, have for the most part desires governing other desires, the better governing the worse.

It is so.

And on these accounts such a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul would far escape him.

It appears so to me.

And the parsimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any contest of the honourable kind. And being unwilling, for the sake of good reputation, or for any such contests, to spend his substance, being afraid to waken up expensive desires, or any alliance or contest of this kind, fighting with a small part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and makes rich.

Very true, said he.

Do we then yet hesitate, said I, to rank the covetous and parsimonious man as most of all resembling the city under Oligarchic government?

By no means, said he.

Democracy now, as seems, is next to be considered, in what manner it arises, and what kind of man it produceth when arisen; that understanding the nature of such a man, we may bring him to a trial.

We shall in this method, said he, proceed in a consistency with ourselves.

Is not, said I, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy produced in some such way as this, through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz., the desire of becoming as rich as possible?

How now?

As those who are governours in it govern on account of their possessing great riches, they will be unwilling, I imagine, to restrain by law such of the youth as are dissolute from having the liberty of squandering and wasting their substance; that so, by purchasing the substance of such persons, and lending them on usury, they may still become both richer, and be held in greater honour.

They will be more unwilling than any other.

And is not this already manifest in the city, that it is impossible for the citizens to hold riches in esteem, and at the same time sufficiently to possess temperance, but either the one or the other must of necessity be neglected?

It is abundantly plain, said he.

But whilst in Oligarchies they neglect education, and suffer the youth to grow licentious, they lay sometimes under a necessity of becoming poor such as are of no ungenerous disposition.

Very much so.

And these, I imagine, sit in the city, fitted both with slings and with armour, some of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who possess their substance, and others likewise, being desirous of a change.

These things are so.

But the money-catchers, still brooding over it, and not

seeming to observe these; but wherever they see any of the rest giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and drawing to themselves exorbitant usury, fill the city with plenty of drones and of poor.

How can there be, said he, but great plenty?

Nor yet, said I, when so great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguish it, not even by that method, restraining any one from spending his substance at pleasure, nor yet to take that method by which, according to the second law, such disorder might be removed.

According to which?

According to that which, after that other, is secondary, obliging the citizens to apply to virtue. For if one should enjoin them to trade a great deal in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they should in a less shameful way make money in the city, and likewise less of those evils we have now mentioned should arise in it.

Much less, said he.

But at present, said I, by means of all these things, the governours render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themselves and all belonging to them, and the youth likewise, luxurious and idle with respect to all the exercises of body and of mind. and effeminate in bearing both pleasures and pains, and likewise indolent?

What else?

As to themselves, they neglect every thing but the making of money, and make no more account of virtue than the poor do.

They do not indeed.

After they are trained up in this manner, when these governours and their subjects meet together, either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public shows or military marches, either when fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in these cases contemned by the rich; but very often a robust fellow, poor and sun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beside a rich man bred up in the shade, and swoln with a great deal of adventitious flesh, and sees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that such fellows grow rich, and

that they say to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all?

I know very well, said he, that they do so.

For as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to render it sickly, and sometimes without any impression from without is in sedition with itself, shall not in like manner a city resembling it in these things, on the smallest occasion from without, when either the one party maketh an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be sickly and fight with itself, and sometimes, without these things from abroad, be in sedition?

And extremely so.

A Democracy then, as I imagine, arises when the poor, prevailing over the rich, kill some and banish others, and share the places in the republic and the magistracies equally among the remainder; and for the most part the magistracies are disposed in it by lot.

This, truly, said he, is the establishment of a Democracy, whether it arise by force of arms, or through others withdrawing themselves through fear.

In what manner now, said I, do these live, and what sort of a republic is this? for it is plain that a man of this kind shall appear some Democratic one.

It is plain, said he.

Is not then the city, in the first place, full of all freedom of action, and of speech, and of liberty, to do in it what any one inclines?

So, truly, it is said at least, reply'd he.

And wherever there is liberty, it is plain that every one will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleases.

It is plain.

And I imagine that, in such a republic most especially, there would arise men of all kinds.

How can it be otherwise?

This, said I, seems to be the finest of all republics. As a variegated robe, diversified with all kinds of flowers, so this republic, variegated with all sorts of manners, appears the finest.

What else? said he.

And it is likely, said I, that the multitude judge this republic to be the best, like children and women gazing at variegated things.

Very likely, said he.

And it is very proper at least, happy friend, said I, to search for a republic in such a state as this

How now?

Because it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears necessary for any one who wants to constitute a city, as we do at present, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and chuse that form which he fancies.

It is likely indeed, said he, he should not be in want of models.

But what now, said I, is not this a divine and sweet manner of life for the present. To be under no necessity in such a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be subject unless you incline, nor to be engaged in war when others are, nor to live in peace when others do so unless you be desirous of peace; and though there be a law restraining you from governing or administering justice, to govern, nevertheless, and administer justice if you incline.

It is likely, said he, it is pleasant for the present at least.

But what now, is not the meekness of some of those who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet observed, in such a republic, men condemned to death or banishment, yet nevertheless continuing still, and walking up and down openly, and 'as if no one minded or observed him, the condemned man returns like a hero?

I have observed very many, said he.

But is not this indulgence of the city very generous, and not at all to say the small regard, but the contempt it shows for all those things we celebrated so much when we settled our city, how that unless one had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man, unless when a child he were instantly educated in things handsome, and should diligently apply to all these things. How magnanimously it despises all these things, and does not regard from what sort of pursuits one comes to act in political affairs, but honours him if he only say he is well affected towards the multitude?

This contempt, said he, is very generous indeed.

These now, said I, and such things as are a-kin to these, are to be found in a Democracy, and it would be, as appears, a pleasant sort of republic, anarchical and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike without distinction.

What you say, reply'd he, is quite manifest.

Consider now, said I, what sort of man such an one is in private, or, first, must we not consider as we did with respect to the republic in what manner he arises?

Yes, said he.

And does he not in this manner arise from that parsimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a son, I imagine, train'd up by his father in his manners?

Why not?

Such a one by force governs his own pleasures, these of them which are expensive, and tend not towards making money, and which are called unnecessary ones.

It is plain, said he.

Are you willing then, said I, that we may not reason in the dark, first to determine what desires are necessary, and what are not?

I am content, said he.

May not such be justly called necessary, which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of advantage to us; for both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue, is it not?

Very strongly.

This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires.

Justly.

But what now? Such desires as one may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right?

Right indeed.

Let us chuse out a sample of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are.

It is proper.

Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive towards health and good habit of body, and the desire of food

and victuals, may it not be considered as of the necessary kind?

I imagine so.

The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must put an end to life altogether.

It is.

And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary if it any ~~how contribute any thing towards the good habit of the body.~~

Certainly.

But what, such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curb'd in youth, and by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary.

Most rightly indeed.

And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life?

Why not?

In the same manner, surely shall we say of venereal desires and the others.

In the same manner.

And did we not by him whom we just now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of such desires and pleasures, and was governed by the unnecessary desires, but that he who was under the necessary ones was the parsimonious and Oligarchic?

Without doubt.

Let us again mention, said I, how the Democratic arises from the Oligarchic, and to me he appears to arise in great measure thus.

How?

When a young man, bred up, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in a parsimonious manner, comes to taste the honey of the drones, and associates with those vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all sorts of pleasures, and every way diversified, and from every quarter, thence imagine there is somehow

the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic.

There is great necessity for it, said he.

And as the city was changed by the assistance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was a-kin, shall not the youth be changed in the same manner, by the assistance of one species of desires from without to another within him which resembleth it, and is a-kin to it?

By all means.

And I imagine at least, if by any alliance there be given counter-assistance to the Oligarchic party within him, either any how by his father, or by the others of the family, both admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly arises sedition, and opposition, and a fight within him with himself.

Why does there not?

And sometimes indeed, I imagine, the Democratic party yields to the Oligarchic, and some of the desires are destroyed, some of them retire, on the rise of a certain modesty in the soul of the youth, and he is again rendered somewhat decent.

It happeneth sometimes, said he.

And again, I imagine, that when some desires retire, there are others a-kin to them which grow up, and through inattention to the father's instruction, become both many and powerful.

It is wont, said he, to happen so.

And do they not draw towards intimacies among themselves, and meeting privately together, generate a multitude?

What else?

And at length, I imagine, they seize the citadel of the soul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of noble learning and pursuits and of true reasoning, which truly are the best watchmen and guardians in the understandings of men beloved of the Gods.

Very much so, said he.

And then indeed, false and boasting reasonings and opinions, rushing up in their stead, possess the same place in such a one.

Strongly so, said he.

And does he not now again, on coming among those Lotophagi, dwell with them openly? And if any assistance come from his friends to the parsimonious part of his soul, those boasting reasonings shutting the gates of the royal wall against it, neither give entrance to this alliance, nor to the ambassadorial admonitions of private old men; but fighting against these, hold the government themselves. And denominating modesty to be stupidity, they thrust it out disgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanliness, and abusing it most shamefully, thrust it out; and persuading themselves that moderation, and decent expence, are no other than rusticity and illiberality, they expel them their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires.

This they do mightily.

And after that they have emptied and cleared of all these desires the soul that is held down by them, and is initiated in all the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence, and anarchy, and luxury, and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned with crowns; insolence, they denominate Education, anarchy they call Liberty, luxury they call Magnificence, and impudence they call Manhood. Is it not, said I, somehow in this manner that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures?

And very plainly so, reply'd he.

And such a one, I imagine, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labour, and his time no more on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures; and if he be fortunate, and be not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great croud of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were thrust out, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had intruded, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it chanceth, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike.

Entirely so.

And such a one, said I, does not listen to true reasoning,

nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires, and others of the ill ones; and that he ought to pursue and honour those, but to chastise and subject these. But, in all these cases, he dissents, and says that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honour.

Whoever is thus affected, said he, acts in this manner very powerfully.

And does he not live, said I, from day to day, indulging after this manner every incidental desire—sometimes indulging himself in drinking strong drink, and in music, sometimes drinking water, and extenuating himself by abstinence; then again minding the exercises—sometimes too he is quite indolent and careless about every thing; then again he applies as it were to philosophy. Many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a desultory manner says and does whatever happens. If at any time he affects to imitate any of the military, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither. Nor is his life regulated by any order, or any necessity, but deeming this sort of life pleasant, and free, and happy, he followeth it throughout?

You have entirely, said he, gone through the life of one who puts all laws whatever on a level.

I imagine at least, said I, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that, like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would desire to imitate his life, as he hath in him a great many patterns of republics and of manners.

He hath so, said he.

What now? Shall such a man as this be ranked as resembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic?

Let him be ranked, said he.

But it yet remains that we go over, said I, the most excellent republic, and the most excellent man, viz., Tyranny and the Tyrant.

It does, said he.

Come then, friend companion, in what manner does Tyranny arise? for it is almost plain that the change is from Democracy.

It is plain.

Does not Tyranny arise in the same manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy?

How?

What did Oligarchy, said I, propose as its good, and according to what was it constituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not?

Yes.

An insatiable desire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to making money, destroyeth it.

True, said he.

~~And with reference to that which Democracy denomin-~~
~~ateth good, an insatiable thirst of it destroys it likewise?~~

But what is it you say it denominates good?

Liberty, said I. For this you are told is most beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the sake of liberty any one who is naturally of a free spirit chuses to live in it alone.

This word, Liberty, said he, is indeed often mentioned.

Does not then, said I, as I was going to say, the insatiable desire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to stand in need of a tyrant?

How, said he.

When a city, said I, is under a Democracy, and is thirsting after liberty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers appointed it, and grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is necessary, it punishes even the governours if they will not be entirely tame and afford a deal of liberty, accusing them as corrupted and leaning towards Oligarchy.

That they do, said he.

But such as are obedient to magistrates, they abuse, said I, as willing slaves and good for nothing, and both in private and in public commend and honour magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates. Must they not in such a city, of necessity, go to the highest pitch of liberty?

Why must they not?

And must not this inbred anarchy, friend, descend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes?

How, said he, do we say such a thing as this?

Just as if, said I, a father should accustom himself to

resemble a child, and to be afraid of his sons, and the son accustom himself to resemble his father, and neither to revere nor to stand in awe of his parents, that so indeed he may be free, as if a stranger were to be equalled with a citizen, and a citizen with a stranger, and in like manner a foreigner.

It is just so, said he.

These things, said I, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in such a city fears and flatters the scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers and their tutors in like manner. And in general the youth resemble the more advanced in years, and rival it with them both in words and deeds: and the old men sitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleasantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morose and despotic.

It is entirely so, reply'd he.

But that highest pitch, said I, of the liberty of the multitude, how great it is in such a city as this, when the men and women-slaves are no less free than those who purchase them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, we have almost forgotten to mention.

Shall we not then, according to Aeschylus, said he, say whatever now comes into our mouth.

By all means, said I; and accordingly I do say in this manner; with reference even to the brute creatures, such of them as are under men's discipline, how much more free they are in such a city, one who has not experience of it will not easily believe. For readily even the puppies, according to the proverb, resemble their mistresses; and the horses and asses are accustomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up against any one they meet on the road unless he give way: and many other such things happen full, in like manner of liberty.

You tell me, said he, my dream, for I have often met with this when going into the country.

But do you observe, said I, what is the sum of all those things collected together? How delicate it maketh the soul of the citizens, in so much that if any one bring near to them any thing of slavery, they are filled with indignation and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at

length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one whatever by any manner of means may become their master.

I know it well, said he.

This now, friend, said I, is that government, so beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny springs, as it appears to me.

Youthful, truly! reply'd he. But what comes after this?

The same thing, said I, which springing up as a disease in Oligarchy, destroyed it, the same arising here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiousness, enslaves the Democracy. And in reality, the doing any thing to excess is wont to occasion a mighty change to the reverse: thus in seasons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as any.

It is probable, said he.

And excessive liberty seems to change into nothing else but excessive slavery, both with a private person and a city.

It is probable indeed.

It is probable then, said I, that out of no other republic is Tyranny constituted but out of Democracy, out of the most excessive liberty I imagine the greatest and most savage slavery.

There is indeed, said he, reason for it.

But this I imagine, said I, was not what you was asking. But what is that disease which enslaves Democracy, resembling that which destroys Oligarchy?

You say true, reply'd he.

That then, said I, I called the race of idle and profuse men, one part of which was more brave and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones, some to such as have stings, others to such as have none.

And rightly, said he.

These two now, said I, springing up in any republic, raise disturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behoves a wise physician and law-giver of a city no less than a wise bee-master, to be afraid of these, at a great distance principally, that they never get in; but if they have gotten in, that they be in the speediest manner possible cut off, together with their very cells.

Yes, truly, said he, by all means.

Let us take it then, said I, in this manner, that we may see more distinctly what we want.

In what manner?

Let us divide in our reasoning a Democratic city into three, as it really is; for one such species as the above grows through licentiousness in it, no less than in the Oligarchic.

It does so

But it is much more fierce at least in this than in that one.

How?

Under Oligarchy, because it is not in places of honour, but is debarred from the magistracies, it is unexercised, and does not become strong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is somehow the presiding party, and now it says and does itself the most outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of justice, it maketh a noise, and cannot bear any other to say different from it; so that all things, if it be not some few, in such a republic are administered by such a party.

Extremely so, said he.

Some other party now, such as this, is always separated from the multitude.

Which?

Whilst the whole are somehow in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate become for the most part the wealthiest.

It is likely.

And hence, I imagine, the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones.

For how, said he, shall any one press out of those who have but a little?

Such wealthy people, I imagine, are called the pasture of the drones.

Almost so, reply'd he.

And the people would be a sort of third species, such of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not very much substance, but yet are the most numerous, and the most prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully assembled.

It is so; but this it will not do often, if it does not get some share of the honey.

Does it not always get a share, said I, as far as their leaders are able, robbing those who have substance, and giving to the people, that they may have the most themselves?

They are indeed, said he, sharers in this manner.

These then, who are thus despoiled are obliged to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people.

Why not?

Others then give them occasion to form designs against the people, though they should have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and so they are Oligarchic.

Why not?

But at length, after they see that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and imposed on by those slanderers, attempt to do them wrong, do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic, yet not spontaneously? but this mischief likewise is generated by that drone stinging them.

Extremely so indeed.

And so they have accusations, law-suits, and contests one with another.

Frequently too.

And are not the people wont always to set some one, in a conspicuous manner, over themselves, and to cherish him and greatly to encrease his power?

They are wont indeed.

And this, said I, is plain, that whenever a tyrant arises it is from this president root, and from nothing else that he blossoms.

This is extremely manifest.

What is the beginning then of the change from a president into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after that the president begins to do the same thing with that in the fable which is told in relation to the temple of Lycaean Jupiter, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia.

Which? said he.

How that whoever tasted human entrails which were

mixed with those of other sacrifices, necessarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the story?

I have.

And must not he in the same manner, who being president of the people, and receiving an extremely submissive multitude, abstaineth not from kindred blood, but unjustly accusing them (of such things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of justice, stains himself with bloodshed, taking away the life of a man, and with unhallowed tongue and mouth tasting kindred blood, and banisheth, and slayeth, and proposeth the abolition of debts, and division of lands—must not such an one of necessity, and as it is destined, be either destroyed by his enemies or exercise tyranny, and from being a man become a wolf?

Of great necessity, said he.

This is he now, said I, who becomes seditious towards those who have substance, and when he fails he goes against his enemies with open force, and becomes an accomplished tyrant.

It is plain.

And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death on an accusation before the city, they truly conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death.

It is wont indeed, said he, to happen so.

And on this account all those who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand, to demand of the people certain guards for their person, that the assistance of the people may be secured to them.

This, said he, they take special care of.

And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his safety, but secure as to their own.

Extremely so.

And when one who hath substance, and who along with his substance, hath the crime of hating the people, observes this, he then, friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Croesus,

——To craggy Hermus flies,
Nor stays, nor fears, to be a coward deem'd,

because he would not, said he, be in fear again a second time.

But he at least, I imagine, said I, who is caught is put to death.

Of necessity.

It is plain then that this president of the city does not himself behave like a truly great man in a manner truly great, but tumbling down many others, sits in his chair a consummate tyrant of the city, instead of a president.

Why is he not? said he.

Shall we consider now, said I, the happiness of the man, and of the city in which such a mortal arises?

By all means, said he, let us consider it.

Doth he not then, said I, in the first days, and for the first season, smile and salute every one he meets, says he is no tyrant, and promiseth many things, both in private and in public, and frees from debts, and distributes land both to the people in general, and to those about him, and affecteth to be mild and of the patriot spirit towards all?

Of necessity, said he.

But when, as I imagine, he hath reconciled to himself some of his foreign enemies, and destroyed others, and there is tranquillity with reference to these, he in the first place always raises some wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader

It is likely.

And is it not likewise with this view, that being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a necessity of becoming intent on a daily sustenance, and may be less ready to conspire against him?

It is plain.

And, I imagine, if he suspect that any of them who are of free spirits will not allow him to govern, in order to have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy. On all these accounts a tyrant is always under a necessity of raising war.

Of necessity.

And whilst he is doing these things, he must readily become more hateful to his citizens.

Why not?

And must not some of those who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, speak out freely both towards him, and among themselves, finding fault

with the transactions, such of them as are of a more manly spirit?

It is likely.

It behoves the tyrant then to cut off all these, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes, worth anything.

It is plain.

He must then carefully observe who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich, and in this manner is he happy, that, willing or not willing, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all such as these, and to lay snares till he cleanse the city of them.

A noble cleansing! said he.

Yes, said I, the reverse of what physicians do with respect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worst, leave the best, but he does the contrary.

Because it seems, said he, he must of necessity do so, if he is to govern.

In a blessed necessity then truly is he bound, said I, which obliges him either to live with many naughty people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all.

In such necessity he is, reply'd he.

And the more he is hated by his citizens whilst he does these things, shall he not so much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones?

Why shall he not?

Who then are the faithful, and from whence shall he send for them?

Many, said he, of their own accord will come flying, if he give them hire.

You seem, by the dog, said I, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform.

You imagine right, reply'd he.

But those at home, would he not incline to have them also as guards?

How?

After he has taken away the citizens, to give the slaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his person?

By all means, said he, for these are the most faithful to him.

What a blessed possession, said I, is this which you men-

nothing left. No other

tion belonging to the tyrant, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed those former ones!

But surely such at least, said he, he does employ.

And such companions, said I, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him, but the worthy men both hate and fly from him.

Why will they not?

It is not without reason, said I, that tragedy in the general is thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it.

For what?

Because he uttered this, which is the mark of a good understanding: That tyrants are wise, by the conversation of the wise, and he plainly said those were wise with whom they hold converse.

And he commends, too, said he, Tyranny as a divine thing, and says a great many other things of it, as do likewise the other poets.

Therefore then, said I, those composers of tragedy, as they are wise, will forgive us, and such as establish the government of cities in a manner nearly resembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyrists of Tyranny.

I imagine, said he, such of them at least as are more polite will forgive us.

But going about among other cities, I imagine, and drawing together the crouds, and putting to sale their fine, magnificent and persuasive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies.

Extremely so.

And do they not further receive rewards, and are held in honour chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy? But the further on they advance towards the republics the reverse of these, their honour forsakes them the more as if it were disabled by an asthma to advance.

Entirely so.

Thus far, said I, we have digressed. But now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is so beautiful, so numerous and multiform, and no way the same, shall be maintained.

It is plain, said he, that if at any time there be any sacred things in the city, these they will spend, that so what they sell for may still answer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes.

But what shall they do, when these fail them?

It is plain, said he, that he and his drunken companions, and his associates, male and female, shall be maintained out of the paternal inheritance.

I understand, said I, that the people who have made the Tyrant shall nourish him and his companions.

They are under great necessity, said he.

How do you say? reply'd I. What if the people be enraged, and say that it is not just that the son who is come to maturity be maintained by the father, but contrarywise that the father be maintained by the son; and that they did not make and establish him for this purpose, to be a slave to his slaves when he should be grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with their other tumultuary attendants, but in order that they might be set at liberty from the rich in the city, who are also called the good and worthy, by having set him over them. And now they order him and his companions to be gone out of the city, as a father drives out of the house his son with his tumultuary drunken companions.

Then indeed at least shall the people, said he, know truly what a beast they are themselves, and what a beast they have generated, and hugged, and bred up, and that whilst they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the stronger.

How do you say? reply'd I. Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and if he cannot persuade him, will he strike him?

Yes, said he, even stripping him of his armour.

You call, said I, the Tyrant a parricide and a miserable nourisher of old-age; and yet, as it is probable, Tyranny would really seem to be of this kind, and according to the saying, the people, defending themselves against the smoke of slavery amid free men, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism; instead of that excessive and unseasonable liberty, embracing the most rigorous and the most wretched slavery of bond-men.

These things, said he, happen very much so.

What then, said I, shall we not speak modestly, if we say that we have sufficiently shown how Tyranny arises out of Democracy, and what it is when it doth arise?

Quite sufficiently, reply'd he.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK

THE NINTH BOOK

THE tyrannical man himself, said I, remains yet to be considered, in what manner he arises out of the Democratic, and when he doth arise, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy.

He indeed yet remains, said he.

Do you know, said I, what I still want?

What is it?

We do not appear to me to have sufficiently distinguished that matter of the desires, of what kind they are, and how many; and whilst this is defective, the inquiry we make shall be less evident.

May it not be done, said he, in good season still.

Certainly. And consider what it is I want to know about them; for it is this. Of those pleasures and desires which are not necessary, some appear to me to be repugnant to law: these indeed appear to spring up in every one, but being chastised by the laws, and the better desires, along with reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less few in number, and feeble; in others they are more powerful and in greater number.

Which are these you mean? said he.

Such, said I, as are excited in sleep, when the other part of the soul, such as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is asleep, and the part which is brutal and savage, being filled with meats and drunkenness, frisks about, and pushing away sleep, wants to go and accomplish its practices. In such a one you know it dares to do every thing, as being loosed and disengaged from all modesty and discretion; for it scruples not the embraces, as it imagines of a mother, or of any one else, whether of Gods, of men, or of beasts; nor to kill any one, nor to abstain from any sort of meat, and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence.

You say most true, reply'd he.

But I imagine, when one is in health, and keeps himself

temperately, and goes to sleep, having stirred up the rational part, and having feasted it with worthy reasonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himself, and allowing the part of the soul which is concupiscible neither to be starved nor glutted, that it may lye quiet and give no disturbance to the part which is best, either by its joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone and untainted to inquire, and to desire to apprehend what it knoweth not, either something of what hath existed, or of what now exists, or what will exist hereafter; and having likewise soothed the irascible part, not suffering it to be hurried by any thing to transports of anger, and to fall asleep with agitated passion, but having quieted these two parts of the soul, and excited the third part, in which wisdom resides, shall in this manner take rest—by such an one, you know, the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all repugnant to law.

I am altogether, said he, of this opinion.

We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning these things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in every one a certain species of desires which is terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some who entirely seem to us to be moderate. And this species becomes indeed manifest in sleep. But consider if there appear to be anything in what I say, and if you agree with me.

But I agree.

Recollect now what kind of man we said the Democratic one was. For he was somehow educated from his infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued the avaricious desires alone; but such as were not necessary, but rose only through a love of amusement and finery, he despised. Was he not?

Yes.

But being conversant with those who are more refined, and such as are full of those desires we now mentioned, running into their manner and all sort of insolence, from a detestation of his father's parsimony; however, having a better natural temper than those who corrupt him, and being drawn opposite ways, he settles into a manner in the middle of both, and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal

nor licentious, becoming a Democratic man from an Oligarchic.

This was, said he, and is our opinion of such an one.

Suppose now again, that when such a one is become old, his young son is educated in his manners.

I suppose it.

And suppose too, the same things happening to him as to his father: that he is drawn into all kind of licentiousness—which is termed, however, by such as draw him off the most compleat liberty—and that his father and all the domestics are aiding to those desires which are in the middle, and others also give aid likewise. But when those curious magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which presides over the indolent desires, and such as minister readily to their pleasures a certain winged and large drone; or do you imagine that the love of these things is anything else?

I imagine, said he, it is nothing other than this.

And when other desires make a noise about him, full of their odours and perfumes, and crowns, and wines, and those pleasures of the most dissolute kind which belong to such copartnerships, and being encreased and cherished, add a sting of desire to the drone, then truly he is surrounded with madness as a life-guard, and that president of the soul rages with phrensy; and if he find in himself any opinions or desires which seem to be good, and which yet retain modesty, he kills them and pusheth them from him, 'till he be cleansed of temperance, and is filled with additional madness.

You describe perfectly, said he, the formation of a tyrannical man.

Is it not, said I, on such an account as this that of old love is said to be a tyrant?

It appears so, reply'd he.

And, friend, said I, hath not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit?

He hath indeed.

And surely at least he who is mad and is disturbed in his mind undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewise the Gods.

Entirely so, said he.

The tyrannical man then, divine friend, becomes so in perfection, when either by temper, or by his pursuits, or by both, he becomes drunk, and in love, and melancholy. Perfectly so indeed.

Such a one, it seems then, arises in this manner. But in what manner does he live?

As they say in their plays, reply'd he, that you will tell me likewise.

I tell then, said I. For I imagine that after this there are feastings among them, and revellings and banquetings, and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those where Love the tyrant, dwelling within, governs all in the soul.

Of necessity, said he.

And every day and night do there blossom forth many and dreadful desires, indigent of many things.

They are many indeed.

And if they have any supplies, they are soon spent.

What else?

And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of substance.

What else?

And when every thing fails them, is there not a necessity that the desires, on the one hand, nestling in the mind, shall give frequent and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven, as by stings, both by the other desires, and more especially by Love itself, commanding all the others as its life-guards, shall rage with phrensy, and search if any one have any thing which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry off?

Extremely so, said he.

They must of necessity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains.

Of necessity.

And as with such a man his new pleasures have more to say than his antient once, and take away what belonged to them, shall not he deem it proper in the same manner, that himself being young, should have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and, if he

hath spent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents?

Why will he not? said he.

And if they do not allow him, will he not first endeavour to pilfer from, and beguile his parents?

By all means.

And where he is not able to do this, will he not, in the next place, use rapine and violence?

I imagine so, reply'd he.

But, wonderful friend. when the old man and the old woman oppose and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing any thing tyrannical?

I, for my part, am not quite secure, said he, with reference to the safety of the parents of such an one.

But do you truly, Adimantus, imagine that for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a one would give up his antiently beloved and necessary mother; or for the sake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not necessary, give up his decayed, his necessary and aged father, the most antient of all his friends, to stripes, and suffer these to be enslaved by those others, if he should bring them into the same house?

Yes, truly I do, said he.

It seems, said I, to be an extremely happy thing to beget a tyrannical son.

Not altogether so, said he.

But what, when the substance of his father and mother fails such an one, and when now there is the greatest swarm of pleasures assembled in him, shall he not first break into some house, or late at night strip someone of his coat, and after this shall he not rifle some temple? and in all these actings those desires, newly loosed from slavery and become as the guards of love, shall along with him rule over those antient opinions he had from his infancy, the established decisions concerning good and evil—these desires which heretofore were only loose from their slavery in sleep, when he was as yet under the laws and his father, when under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when asleep, such shall he be always when awake; and from no horrid slaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, shall he abstain. But that tyrannical love within him, living with-

out any restraint of law or government, as being sole monarch itself, shall lead on the man it possesseth, as a city, to every mad attempt whence he may support himself and the crew about him; which partly entereth from without from ill company, and partly through their manners and his own is become unrestrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of such a one?

It is this truly, said he.

And if there be, said I, but a few such in the city, and the rest of the multitude be sober, they go out and serve as guards to some other tyrant, or assist him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet they commit at home in the city a great many small mischiefs.

Which do you mean?

Such as these: they steal, break houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves; and where they can speak they sometimes turn false informers, and give false testimony, and take gifts.

You call these, said he, small mischiefs, if there be but a few such persons.

What is small, said I, is small in comparison of great; and all those things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the city, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when there are many such in the city, and others accompanying them, and when they perceive their own number, then these are they who through the foolishness of the people establish as tyrant the man who among them hath himself most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength within his soul.

It is probable indeed, said he, for he shall be most tyrannical.

Shall he not be so, if they willingly submit to him? But if the city shall not allow him, in the same manner as he formerly used violence to his father and mother, so now again shall he chastise his country if he be able, and bringing in other young people, he shall keep and nourish under subjection to these his formerly beloved mother- and father-country, as the Cretans say? And this shall be the issue of such a man's desire.

It shall be entirely this, said he.

But do not these, said I, become such as this, first in private, and before they govern? In the first place by

the company they keep, either conversing with their own flatterers, and such as are ready to minister to them in every thing, or if they need anything themselves, falling down to those they converse with, they dare to assume every appearance as friends, but after they have gained their purpose, they act as enemies.

Extremely so.

Thus they pass the whole of their life, never friends to any one, but always either domineering, or enslaved to another. But liberty and true friendship the tyrannic disposition never tastes.

Entirely so.

May we not then rightly call these men faithless?

Why not?

And surely we may call them most of all unjust, if we have rightly agreed about justice, in our former reasonings, what it is.

But we did rightly agree, said he.

Let us finish then, said I, our worst man. He would then seem such a one awake, as we described as asleep.

Entirely so.

And does not that man become such a one, who, being most tyrannical by natural temper, is in possession of supreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes such a one?

Of necessity, reply'd Glauco, taking up the discourse.

And shall not the man, said I, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched, and he who shall tyrannise for the longest time, and in the greatest measure, shall in reality, in the greatest measure, and for the longest time, be such a one? But as many men, as many minds.

Of necessity, said he, these things at least must be so.

And would this tyrannic man at least differ anything, said I, as to likeness when compared with the city under Tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under Democracy, and the same way of others?

How should they?

As city then is in respect of city as to virtue and happiness, will not man be to man in the same way?

Why not?

What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over,

in respect of that under kingly government, such as we at the first described?

Quite the reverse, said he, for the one is the best, and the other is the worst.

I will not ask, said I, which you mean, for it is plain; but do you judge in the same way, or otherwise, as to their happiness and misery? And let us not be struck with admiration, whilst we regard the tyrant alone, or some few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and consider it, and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion.

You propose rightly, said he; and it is evident to every one that there is no city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power.

If now, said I, I should propose the same things with respect to the men, should I rightly propose, whilst I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able by his understanding to enter within, and see through the temper of the man and who may not, as a child beholding the out-side, be struck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a shew of to those without, but may sufficiently see through him. If then I should be of opinion that all of us ought to hear such a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the same house, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domestics (in which most especially one appears strip'd of theatrical shews), and likewise in public dangers; and after he hath observed all these things, we shall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happiness and misery, in comparison of others.

You would advise to these things, said he, most properly.

Are you willing then, said I, that we pretend to be ourselves of the number of those who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with such men, that we may have one who shall answer our questions?

By all means.

Come then, said I, consider in this manner. Recollect the resemblance of the city and the man to one another, and thus considering each of them apart, tell the affections of each.

Which affections? said he.

To begin first, said I, with the city. Do you call the one under Tyranny either free or enslaved?

Slavish, said he, in the greatest degree possible.

And yet, surely, at least, you see in it masters and free men.

I see, said he, some small part so; but the whole in it, in the general, and the most excellent part, is disgracefully and miserably slavish.

If then the man, said I, resembleth the city, is it not necessary that there be the same regulation in him likewise, and that his soul be full of the greatest slavery and illiberality, and that these parts of his soul which are the noblest be enslaved, and that some small part which is most wicked and frantic is master.

Of necessity, said he.

What now? shall you say that such a soul is slavish or free?

Slavish somehow, I say.

But does not then the city, which is slavish and tyrannized over, least of all do what it inclines?

In great measure.

And shall not the soul too, which is tyrannized over, least of all do what it shall incline, to speak in the general of the whole soul; but hurried violently by some stinging passion, shall be full of tumult and inconstancy?

Why shall it not?

But whether shall the city which is tyrannized over be necessarily rich or poor?

Poor.

And the soul under Tyranny be of necessity likewise indigent and insatiable.

Just so, said he.

But what? Must not such a city and such a man of necessity be full of fear?

In great measure.

Do you imagine you will find more lamentations and groans and weepings and torments in any other city?

By no means.

But with reference to a man, do you imagine that these things are greater in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by his desires and lusts?

How can they, said he?

It is then on consideration of all these things, and others such as these, I imagine, that you have deemed this city the most wretched of cities?

And have I not deemed right? said he.

Extremely so, said I. But what say you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you consider these things?

That he is by far, said he, the most wretched of all others.

You do not as yet say this rightly, reply'd I.

How? said he.

I do not as yet imagine, said I, that he is such in the greatest degree.

But who then is so?

This one shall probably appear to you to be yet more miserable than the other.

Which one?

He, said I, who being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through some misfortune it is brought upon him to become a Tyrant.

I conjecture, said he, from what was formerly mentioned, that you say true.

It is so, said I. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of such importance as these, but most thoroughly to inquire into them by reasoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning the most important matter, a good life and a bad.

Most right, said he.

Consider then whether there be any thing in what I say; for, in considering this question, I am of opinion we ought to perceive it from these things.

From what?

From each particular one of private men, such of them as are rich and possess many slaves, for those have this resemblance at least of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has great numbers.

There is this difference.

You know then that these live securely, and are not afraid of their domestics.

What should they be afraid of?

Nothing, said I; but do you consider the reason?

Yes; it is because the whole city gives assistance to each particular private man.

You say right, reply'd I. But what now, if some God should lift some man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the city, both him and his wife and children, and set him down in a desert with his other substance and his domestics, where no freeman was to give him assistance, in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himself, his children and wife, lest they should be destroyed by the domestics?

In the greatest possible, said he, I imagine, for my part.

Would he not be obliged even to flatter some of the very slaves, and promise them many things, to set them at liberty when there was no occasion for it: and appear to be himself a flatterer of servants?

He is under great necessity, said he, to do so, or be destroyed.

But what, said I, if the God should settle round him many other neighbours, who could not endure if any one should pretend to lord it over another; but if they any where found such a one, should punish him with the extremest rigour.

I imagine, said he, that he would be still more in all sort of distress, thus beset with all sort of enemies.

And in such a prison-house is not the tyrant bound, being such by disposition, as we have mentioned, full of many and most various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilst he has in his soul the greatest desire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go anywhere abroad, nor to see such things as other men are desirous of; but creeping into his house, lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them goes abroad and sees any good.

It is entirely so, said he.

And besides such evils as these, does not the man reap still more of them who, being under ill policy within himself (which you just now deemed to be the most wretched Tyranny), lives not as a private person, but through some fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and without holding the government of himself, attempts to govern others, as if one, with a body diseased, and unable to support itself,

were obliged to lead their life not in a private way, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies?

You say, Socrates, reply'd he, what is altogether most likely and true.

Is not then, friend Glauco, said I, this condition altogether miserable, and does not the tyrant live more miserably still than the man deemed by you to live most miserably?

Very much so, said he.

True it is then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the truly tyrannical man is truly slavish with respect to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and is a flatterer of the most abandoned men. Nor does he ever in the smallest degree obtain the gratification of his desires, but is of all the most indigent of the most things, and appeareth poor indeed, if one knoweth how to contemplate his whole soul; and full of fear through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he resembles the constitution of that city which he governs. But he doth resemble it, doth he not?

Extremely, said he.

And shall we not, besides these things, likewise ascribe to this man what we formerly mentioned, that he must necessarily be, and, by governing still, become more than formerly envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, unholy, and a sink and breeder of all wickedness; and from all these things be most especially unhappy himself, and then render all about him unhappy likewise.

No one, said he, who hath understanding will contradict you.

Come now, said I, as a judge who pronounces after considering all, so do you tell me who, according to your opinion, is the first as to happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, they being five in all—the Regal, the Ambitious, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic.

But the judgment, said he, is easy; for as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happiness, and its contrary.

Shall we, then, hire a Herald? said I, or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston hath judged the best and justest man to be the happiest (and that this is the man

who hath most of the regal spirit, and ruleth himself with a kingly power), and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is most tyrannical who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself and the city.

Let it be published by you, said he.

Shall I add, said I, whether they be unknown to be such or not both to all men and Gods?

Add it, said he.

Be it so, said I, this would seem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the same opinion, must be the second.

Which is it?

Since the soul, said I, of every individual is divided into three, in the same manner as the city was divided into three parts, it will, in my opinion, afford a second proof.

Which is it?

It is this. Of the three parts of the soul, there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each one; and the desires and governments are in the same manner.

How do you say? reply'd he.

There is one part, we said, by which a man learns, and another by which he is irascible; the third is so multiform, we are unable to express it by one word peculiar to itself, but we denominated it from that which is greatest, and most impetuous in it; for we called it the concupiscible, on account of the impetuosity of the desires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleasures, and whatever others belong to these, and we called it avaricious likewise, because it is by means of wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished.

And we said rightly, reply'd he.

If then we say that its pleasure and delight are in gain, shall we not best of all reduce it under one head in our discourse, so as to express something to ourselves, when we make mention of this part of the soul, and calling it the covetous, and the desirous of gain, shall we not term it properly?

So I imagine at least, said he.

But what, do not we say that the irascible ought wholly to run after superiority, victory, and applause?

Extremely so.

If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, shall it not be accurately expressed?

Most accurately.

But it is evident to every one that the part of the soul by which we learn is wholly intent always to know the truth, and as to wealth and glory, it careth for these least of all.

Extremely so.

When we call it then the desirous of learning and the philosophic, we shall call it according to propriety.

Why shall we not?

And do not these, said I, govern in souls, one of them in some, and in others another, as it happeneth?

Just so, said he.

On this account then we said there were three original species of men: the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious.

Entirely so.

And that there were likewise three species of pleasures, one subject to each of these.

Certainly.

You know then, said I, that if you were to ask these three men, each of them apart, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would most of all commend his own. And the avaricious will say, that in comparison with the pleasure of making gain, that arising from honour, or from learning, is of no value, unless one make money by them.

True, said he.

And what says the ambitious? said I; does not he deem the pleasure arising from making money a sort of burden, and likewise that arising from learning, unless learning brings him honour, does he not deem it smoke and trifling?

It is so, said he.

And we shall suppose the philosopher, said I, to deem the other pleasures as nothing in comparison of that of knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilst he is always employed in learning something of this kind, he is not very remote from pleasure; but that he calls the other pleasures truly necessary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a necessity for it.

This, said he, we must well understand.

When therefore, said I, these several lives, and the

respective pleasure of each, dispute among themselves, not with reference to living more worthily or more basely, or worse or better, but merely with reference to this, of living more pleasantly, or on the contrary more painfully, how can we know which of them speaks most conformably to truth?

I am not quite able, said he, to tell.

But consider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reason? Or hath any one a better criterion than these?

How can he? said he.

Consider now; of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? Whether do you imagine that the avaricious man, in learning truth itself, what it is, is more experienced in the pleasure arising from knowledge than the philosopher is in that arising from making money?

There is, said he, a great difference; for the philosopher, beginning from his childhood, must of necessity taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet this pleasure is, the lucrative man hath no necessity of tasting, or of becoming experienced in, but, rather, when he uses earnest endeavours it is no easy matter.

The philosopher then, said I, far surpasseth the lucrative man, at least in experience of both the pleasures.

Far indeed.

But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleasure arising from honour than the philosopher is in that arising from knowledge?

Honour, said he, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at; for the rich man is honoured of many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so as to that of honour, what sort of pleasure it is, all of them have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itself, what pleasure there is, it is impossible for any other but the philosopher to have tasted.

On account of experience then, said I, he of all men judgeth the best.

By far.

And surely, along with prudence at least, he alone becomes experienced.

Why does he not?

But even the organ by which these pleasures must be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philosopher.

Which is it?

We said somewhere that they must be judged of by reason, did we not?

Yes.

But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher.

Why is it not?

If then the things to be determined were best determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended or despised were of necessity most agreeable to truth.

Entirely.

And if by honour, and victory and bravery, must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined?

It is evident.

But since it is by experience, and prudence, and reason?

Of necessity, said he, what the philosopher and the philologist commends must be the most true.

Of the three pleasures then, that is the most pleasant which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most, and in whomsoever of us this part governs, his life is the most pleasant.

How can it, said he, be otherwise? For the wise man being the sovereign commender, commends his own life.

But which life, said I, doth our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure?

It is plain that of the war-like and ambitious man, for this is nearer to his own than that of the lucrative.

And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all.

Why not? said he.

These things now have thus succeeded one another in order. And the just man hath twice now overcome the unjust. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympic Jupiter, the deliverer: for consider, that the pleasure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wise man is, nor are they pure, but some-

how coloured over, as I imagine I have heard from one of the wise men. And this truly now would be the greatest and most complete downfall of the unjust.

Extremely so; but how do you mean?

I shall thus trace it out, said I, whilst in searching you answer my questions.

Ask then, said he.

Tell me then, reply'd I, do we not say that pain is opposite to pleasure?

Entirely so.

And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is somewhat?

We say it is.

/ That being in the middle of both these, it is a certain tranquillity of the soul with reference to them.

Do you not thus understand it?

Thus, reply'd he.

Do you not remember, said I, the speeches of the sick diseased, which they utter in their sickness?

Which?

How that nothing is more pleasant than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the most pleasant.

I remember it, said he.

/ And are you not wont to hear those who are under any acute pain say, that there is nothing more pleasant than a cessation from pain?

I am wont to hear them.

And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the same thing, when they are in many other such like circumstances, where, when they are in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tranquillity of such a state, as being the most pleasant, and do not extol that of feeling joy.

Because this, it is likely, said he, becomes at that time pleasant and desireable tranquillity.

And when any one ceaseth, said I, to feel joy, this tranquillity from pleasure will be painful.

It is likely, said he.

This tranquillity then, which we just now said was between the two, shall at times become each of these, pain and pleasure.

It appears so.

But is it truly possible that what is neither of the two should become both?

I do not imagine it is.

And surely at least, when any thing pleasant or any thing painful is in the soul, both sensations are a sort of emotion; are they not?

Yes.

But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquillity, and in the middle of these two?

It appears so indeed.

How is it right, then, to deem it pleasant not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure?

It is by no means.

In these cases, then, tranquillity is not really so, said I, but it appeareth pleasant in respect of the painful, and painful in respect of the pleasant. And there is nothing genuine in these appearances as to the truth of pleasure, but a sort of imposture.

As our reasoning shows, said he.

Consider then, said I, the pleasures which do not arise from the cessation of pains, that you may not frequently in the present discourse imagine, that by nature these two are universally in this manner, pleasure, the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure.

How, said he, and which pleasures do you mean?

There are many others, said I, but chiefly if you incline to consider the pleasures from smells; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and when they cease, they leave no pain behind them.

Most true, said he.

Let us not then be perswaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure.

Let us not.

But yet, said I, these which reach the soul, by means of the body, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species, certain cessations of pain.

They are so.

And are not the pre-conceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from the foresight of these things, of the same kind?

Of the same.

Do you know then, said I, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly resemble?

What? said he.

Do you reckon, said I, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle?

I do.

Do you imagine then, that any one when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines any thing else than that he is brought to the above, and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is any where else but in the above, whilst yet he hath not seen the true above?

Truly, said he, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise.

But if he should again, said I, be carried to the below, he would imagine he was carried to the below, and would imagine according to truth.

Why would he not?

Would he not be effected in all these respects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below?

It is plain.

Should you wonder then that whilst men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in this same manner? So that even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they are arrived at fulness of pleasure. In the same manner as these who along with the black colour look at the grey, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; so those who consider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure.

Truly, said he, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so.

But consider it at least, said I, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirst, and such like, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit?

What else?

And is not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul?

Extremely so.

And is not the one filled when it receiveth food, and the other when it hath intelligence?

Why not?

But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or that of the more real existence?

It is plain that of the more real.

Which species, then, do you imagine participates most of a more pure substance; whether these which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which participates of true opinion, and knowledge, and intelligence, and in general, of all virtue? And judge of it in this manner. That which resides in that which is always alike, and immortal, and true, and is so itself, and ariseth in what is such, does it appear to you to exist more really than that which resides in what is never alike, and mortal, is so itself, and ariseth in what is such?

This, said he, differs much from that which is always alike.

Does then the essence of that which is always alike participate any more of essence than of science?

By no means.

But what with relation to truth?

Nor of this neither.

If it participate less of truth, doth it not likewise do so of essence?

Of necessity.

In general then, do not the species relating to the care of the body participate less of truth and essence than the species relating to the care of the soul?

By far.

And the body less than the soul; do you not think so?

I do.

Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being?

Why not?

If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to

nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being must be less truly and solidly filled, and participateth of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure.

Most necessarily, said he.

Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and such like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never at all, getting beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it, nor are they ever really filled with real being, nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure, but after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling, and from a lust of these things, kicking and pushing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they perish through their unsatiableness, as those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves.

You pronounce most perfectly, Socrates, as from an oracle, said Glauco, the life of the multitude.

Must they not then, of necessity, be conversant in pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, painted over, and coloured by their position beside one another, hence both their pleasures and pains appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish. Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one.

Of necessity, said he, the matter must be something of this kind.

And what as to the irascible part of the soul? Must not other such like things happen wherever any one gratifies it, either in the way of envy through ambition, or in the way of violence through contentiousness, or in the way of anger through moroseness, pursuing after a glut of honour, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason and without intelligence?

Such things as these, said he, must necessarily happen with reference to this part of the mind.

What then, said I, shall we boldly say concerning all the pleasures, both respecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as are obedient to intelligence and reason, and along with these follow after and obtain the pleasures to which wisdom points, shall obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures which are properly their own, if indeed what is best for every one be most properly his own?

But surely it is most properly, said he, his own at least.

When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects does its proper business and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best and as far as is possible the most true.

Certainly, indeed.

But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it obliges the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all true.

It does so, said he.

Do not then the parts which are the most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effectuate such things?

Extremely.

And is not that which is most remote from law and order, likewise most remote from reason?

It plainly is.

And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order?

Extremely.

And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote?

Yes.

The tyrant then, I imagine, shall be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other shall be the least.

Of necessity.

And the tyrant, said I, shall lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant one.

Of great necessity.

Do you know then, said I, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king?

If you tell me, said he.

As there are three pleasures, as it appears, one genuine, and two illegitimate, the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasure as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior, is not easily to be told, unless it may be done in this manner.

How? said he.

The Tyrant is somehow the third remote from the Oligarchic; for the Democratic was in the middle between them.

Yes.

Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleasure, distant from him with reference to truth, if our former reasonings be true?

Just so.

But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we suppose the Aristocratic and the Royal the same.

He is the third.

The Tyrant then, said I, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third.

It appears so.

A plain surface then, said I, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length.

Certainly.

But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest, by how great a distance it is remote.

It is manifest, said he, to the computer at least.

If now, conversely, one shall say the King is distant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as 729 and 70 are distant from 9, shall he not, on compleating the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one by this same distance?

You have heaped up, said he, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain.

Yet the numbers are true, said I, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them.

But these, said he, do correspond to them.

If then the good and just man surpasseth so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree

further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty and in virtue?

In a prodigious degree, truly, said he.

Be it so, said I. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we have come hither: and it was somewhere said that it was advantageous to do injustice, if one were compleatly unjust but were reputed just. Was it not so said?

It was indeed.

Now then, said I, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these hath in itself.

How? said he.

Let us in our reasoning make a resemblance of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said.

What kind of resemblance? said he.

One of those creatures, said I, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimaera, of Scylla, of Cerberus, and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one.

They are spoken of indeed, said he.

Form now one figure of a creature, various and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself.

This is the work, said he, of a curious former; however, as the formation is easier in reasoning than in wax and such like, let it be formed.

Let there be now one other figure of a lyon, and one of a man, but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk.

These are easy, said he, and they are formed.

Conjoin now these three in one, so as to exist somehow with one another.

They are conjoined, said he.

Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man, so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature.

This is formed around, said he.

Let us now tell him who saith that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice is unprofitable, that he saith nothing else than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lyon, and what respecteth the lyon, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him, and never accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but to suffer them to be biting one another, and to fight and devour one another.

He, said he, who commendeth the doing injustice saith undoubtedly these things.

And doth not he again who saith it is profitable to do justice say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones to grow up, taking the nature of the Lyon as his ally, and having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so nourish them?

He who commendeth justice undoubtedly says such things as these.

In all respects then, he who commendeth justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commendeth injustice to speak what is false; for with regard both to pleasure, and applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine. Nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends.

Not at all, said he, as appears to me at least.

Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, happy man, do not we say that the maxims of good and evil become so upon such accounts as these? These are good which subject the brutal part of our nature most to the human, or rather to the divine, but these evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal. Shall he agree with us? or how?

He shall, if he be advised by me, said he.

Is there then any one, said I, whom it avails, by this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, if something of this kind

happens, if whilst he takes the money he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst; or if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, this would not avail him, no, though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaveth the most divine part of himself to the most unhallowed and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched, and taketh a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin than Euriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life?

By far, said Glauco, for I will answer you for the man.

And do you not imagine that to be intemperate, hath of old been discommended on such accounts as these, because that in such a one that terrible, that great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet?

It is plain, said he.

And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lyon and the serpentine disposition encrease and stretches beyond measure?

Entirely so.

And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice?

What else?

Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when any one maketh this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lyon to become an ape?

Entirely so, said he.

But why is it, do you imagine, that bodily toil and handicrafts are despicable? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when one hath the best part of his constitution naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them?

It is likely, said he.

In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who hath within him the divine governour? not at all imagining that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as

Thrasymachus imagined), but as it is best for every one to be governed by one divine and wise, most especially having it of his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it without; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same?

Rightly indeed, said he.

And law at least, said I, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city, as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free 'till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governour for youth, and then truly we set it free.

It shows indeed, said he.

In what way then shall we say, Glauco, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or do any thing base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power?

In no way, said he.

But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, hath the brutal part quieted and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does in acquiring vigour and beauty, with a sound constitution, in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body.

Entirely so, said he.

Shall not every one then, who hath understanding at least, regulate his life in bending the whole of his powers hither, in the first place, in honouring those pieces of learning which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things?

It is plain, said he.

And next, said I, with reference to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure, nor yet with a view to health, nor principally

regarding this, to become strong, and healthy, and beautiful, unless by means of these he is to become temperate likewise; but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul.

By all means, said he, if indeed he is to be truly musical.

That arrangement then, said I, and symphony arising from the possession of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, struck with admiration of the felicity of the multitude, encrease to infinity, and bring on himself infinite evils.

I do not think it, said he.

But having an eye, said I, to that polity within himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his substance, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his substance, and spend out of it.

Entirely so, said he.

He will regard honours likewise in the same manner; some he will willingly partake of and taste, which he judges will render him a better man, but those which he imagines would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from, both in private and in public.

He shall not then, said he, be willing to act in politics, if he take care of this.

Yes, truly, said I, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him.

I understand, said he. You mean in the city we have now established, which exists in our reasoning, since it is nowhere on earth, at least, as I imagine.

But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, said I, for any one who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and it is no matter to him whether it does exist any where, or shall ever exist here. He does the duties of this one alone, and of no other.

It is reasonable, said he.

*Reality is subjective
idea: abstraction*

THE TENTH BOOK

I OBSERVE, said I, with reference to many other things, that we have established a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among these establishments I mean that respecting poesy as none of the least.

Which? said he.

That no part of it which is imitative be by any means admitted. For it appears, now most of all and with greatest perspicuity, that it is not to be admitted, after that the several principles of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another.

How do you mean?

To tell it as to you (for you will not accuse me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative kind), all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the understanding of the hearers; such of them as have not a medicine to enable them to discern what kind they are of.

From what consideration, said he, do you say so?

It must be spoken, said I, although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first teacher and leader of all these good composers of tragedy: but the man must not be honoured preferably to the truth. But what I mean must be spoken.

By all means, said he.

Hear me then, or rather answer me.

Ask.

Can you tell me perfectly what at all imitation is? for I do not myself altogether understand what it means?

And shall I then anyhow understand it? said he.

That would be no way strange, said I, since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly.

The case is so, said he; but whilst you are present, I

should not be able to adventure to tell, even though something did appear to me. But consider it yourself.

Do you incline then that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method; for we were wont to suppose a certain species with respect to many individuals, to which we give the same name; or do you not understand me?

I understand.

Let us suppose now of the many, which you chuse; as for example, there are many beds and tables, if you incline.

Why are there not?

But the ideas, at least, respecting these pieces of furniture are two; one of bed, and one of table.

Yes.

And are we not wont to say that the workmen of each of these pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one the beds, and the other the tables which we use? and all other things after the same manner. For no one of the artists maketh, at least, the idea itself; for how can he?

In no way.

But see now whether you call such a one as this an artist?

Which one.

One who doth all things, whatever each particular mechanic does.

You mention some dextrous and wonderful man.

Not yet, at least, but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but he maketh also every thing which springeth from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself, as well as others; and besides these things, he maketh the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven and in the world below.

You mention, said he, quite a wonderful sophist.

You do not believe me? But tell me, do you imagine there is no such artist at all? or that, in one respect he is the maker of all these things, and in another he is not? Or do you not perceive that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least?

And what, said he, is this manner?

'Tis no difficult manner, said I, but is many ways and quickly performed; but in the quickest manner of all, if you chuse to take a mirror and carry it round everywhere,

you shall quickly make the sun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourself, and the other animals, and utensils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned.

Yes, said he, the appearances, but not however the real things at least.

You come well, said I, and seasonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of these artists. Is he not?

Why is not he?

But you will say, I imagine, that he doth not make genuine what he makes, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at least, maketh a bed, does he not?

Yes, said he, he too maketh only the appearance.

But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed say just now that he doth not make the species which we say exists, which is bed, but a particular bed?

I said so indeed.

If then he doth not make that which is, he doth not make real being, but some such thing as being, but not being itself; but if any one would say, that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft, were real being, he would seem not to say true.

He would, said he, as it would appear at least to those who are conversant in such kind of reasonings.

Let us not then at all wonder if this likewise happen to be somewhat obscure with reference to the truth.

Let us not.

Do you incline then, said I, that with reference to these very things we inquire concerning the imitator who he really is.

If you incline, said he.

Are there not then these three sorts of beds? One which exists in nature, and which we may say, as I imagine, God made, or who else?

None, I imagine.

And one at least which the joiner makes.

Yes, said he.

And one which the painter makes. Is it not so?

Be it so.

Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three preside over three species of beds.

They are three indeed.

But God, whether it were that he did not incline it, or whether there was some necessity for it that he should not make but one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really bed; but two such, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced.

How so? said he.

Because, said I, if he had made but two, one again there would have appeared, the species of which both these two would have partaken of, and that species would be that which is bed, and not those two.

Right, said he.

God then knowing these things, as I imagine, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really existing, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature.

It appears so.

Do you incline then that we call him the creator of this one, or something of this kind?

It is just in reason, said he, since he hath, in their nature, made both this and all other things.

But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed?

Yes.

And is the painter too, the workman and maker of such a work?

By no means.

But what will you say he is with relation to bed?

This, said he, as I imagine, we may most reasonably call him: the imitator of what these are the workmen.

Be it so, said I. You call him then the imitator who maketh what is generated the third from nature?

Entirely so, said he.

And this the composer of tragedy shall be likewise, since he is an imitator, rising as a sort of third from the King and the truth, and in like manner all other imitators.

It seems so.

We have agreed then as to the imitator. But tell me this concerning the painter. Whether do you imagine he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artists?

The works of artists, said he.

Whether such as they really are, or such as they appear? Determine this further.

How do you say? reply'd he.

Thus: Does a bed differ anything from itself, whether he view it obliquely, or directly opposite, or in any particular position? or does it differ nothing, but only appears different? And in the same way as to other things?

Thus, said he, it appears, but differs nothing.

Consider this too: with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work? whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears? and whether is it the imitation of appearance or of truth?

Of appearance, said he.

The imitative art, then, is far from the truth; and on this account, it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain but to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter shall paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other artists, though he be skilled in none of those arts; yet he shall be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner.

Why not?

But this, I imagine, friend, we must consider with reference to all these things; that when any one tells us of such a painter, that he hath met with a man who is skilled in all manner of workmanship, and every thing else which every several artist understands, and that there is nothing which he does not understand more accurately than anyone else, we ought to reply to such a one that he is a simple man, and that it seems, having met with some impostor and mimic, he hath been deceived; so that he hath appeared to him to know every thing, from his own incapacity to distinguish between science, and ignorance, and imitation.

Most true, said he.

FINISHED

Ought we not then, said I, in the next place, to consider tragedy, and its leader, Homer, since we hear from some that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things,

for a good poet must of necessity compose with knowledge, if he means to compose well what he composes, else he is not able to compose. It behoves us then to consider whether these who have met with those imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and that their works are such as can easily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they are phantoms they make, and not real beings); or whether they do say somewhat, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in these things which they seem to the multitude elegantly to express.

By all means, said he, this is to be inquired into.

Do you imagine then, that if any one were able to make both of these, that which is imitated and likewise the image, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose this to himself as the best thing in life?

I do not.

But if he were in reality intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would far rather, I imagine, seriously apply himself to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavour to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and would study rather to be himself the person commended than the commender.

I imagine so, said he; for neither is the honour nor the profit equal.

As to other things then, let us not call them to account, asking Homer or any other of the poets whether any of them were any way skilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical discourses; for which of the antient or latter poets is said to have recovered any to health, as Aesculapius did? or what students in medicine hath any left behind him, as he did his descendants? Nor let us ask them concerning the other arts, but let them alone: but with reference to those greatest and most noble things which Homer attempts to speak of, with reference to wars, and armies, and constitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is just, somehow, to question him, whilst we demand of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image (which we have defined an

imitator to be), but art the second, and art able to discern what pursuits render men better or worse, both in private and public, tell us which of the cities hath been by you better constituted, as Lacedaemon was by Lycurgus, and many other both great and small cities by many others? But what city acknowledges you to have been a good law-giver, and to have been of advantage to them? Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but shall any one acknowledge you as any thing?

I fancy not, said Glauco. It is not then pretended even by the Homeric themselves.

But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader or counsellour?

Not one.

But what are his discoveries? as among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions spoken of respecting the arts and other affairs—as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian?

By no means is there any such thing.

But if not in a public manner, is Homer said to have lived as a private tutor to any, who delighted in his conversation, and have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life, in like manner as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and even to this day such as denominate themselves from the Pythagorean manner of life appear to be somehow eminent beyond others?

Neither is there, said he, anything of this kind related of Homer. For flesh-lover Creophilus, Socrates, the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous still in his education than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true. For it is said that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition.

It is said indeed, reply'd I. But do you imagine, Glauco, that if Homer had been able to educate men and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with respect to these matters, but to understand them, would he not then have procured himself many companions, and have been honoured and beloved by them? But Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Chian, and many others are able to persuade the men of their times, conversing with them privately, that they shall neither be

able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unless they themselves shall preside over their education; and for this wisdom of theirs they are so exceedingly beloved, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue, and not rather have retained him with gold, and obliged him to stay with them? or, if they could not persuade him, they would as scholars have followed him everywhere, 'till they had got sufficient education?

You seem to me, said he, Socrates, to say perfectly right.

Shall we not then establish this point: That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but that they do not attain to the truth? but as we just now said, a painter who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, shall draw a shoemaker, who shall appear to be real to such as are not intelligent, but who view according to the colour and figures?

Entirely so.

In the same manner, I imagine, we shall say that the poet colours over with his names and words certain colours of the several arts, whilst he understands nothing himself, but merely imitates, so as to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he appears to have knowledge; and if he say anything about shoe-making in measure, number, and harmony, he seems to say quite well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of any thing else, so great an enchantment have these things naturally—since you know, I imagine, in what manner poetical things appear when stript of musical colouring, and expressed apart by themselves, for you have somewhere beheld it.

I have, said he.

Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them?

Entirely, said he.

Come now, and consider this. The maker of the image, whom we call imitator, knoweth nothing of real being, but only of the apparent. Is it not so?

Yes.

Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us sufficiently perceive it.

Say on, reply'd he.

A painter, we say, shall paint reins and a bit.

Yes.

And the leather-cutter and the smith shall make them.

Certainly.

Does then the painter understand what kind of reins and bit there ought to be, or not even he who makes them, the smith nor the leather-cutter, but he who understands to use them, the horseman alone?

Most true.

Shall we not say it is so in every thing else?

How?

That with reference to each particular thing, there are these three arts—that which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it?

Yes.

Is then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made or generated?

Just so.

Of all necessity then, he who useth each particular must be the most skilful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the use in which he useth it. Thus, for example, a player on the pipe tells the pipe-maker concerning pipes, what things are of service towards the playing on the pipe, and he shall give orders how he ought to make them, but the work-man does not so.

What else?

Does not the one then being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other, believing him, make accordingly.

Yes.

With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker shall have right opinion concerning its excellence or naughtiness, whilst he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who useth it shall have science.

Entirely so.

But whether shall the imitator have intelligence from using the things he paints, whether they be handsome and right, or otherwise; or shall he have right opinion from his being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint?

Neither of the two.

The imitator then shall have neither knowledge nor right opinion about what he imitates, with reference to excellence or naughtiness.

It appears not.

The imitator then should be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wisdom concerning what he paints.

Not entirely.

But, however, he will imitate at least, without knowing concerning each particular in what respect it is ill or good; but it is likely, such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude and those who know nothing, that he shall imitate.

What else?

We have now indeed sufficiently, as it appears at least, settled these things: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but that imitation is a sort of amusement, and not a serious affair; and likewise, that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics are all imitators in the highest degree.

Entirely so.

But certainly, said I, this of imitation, is it not somehow in the third degree from the truth? Is it not?

Yes.

To what part then of man bears it a reference, having the power it hath?

What part do you speak of?

Of such as this. The same magnitude, perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner near at hand and at a distance.

It doth not.

And the same things appear crooked and streight, when we look at them in water and out of water, and concave

and convex, through the mistake of the sight as to colours; all this disturbance is manifest in the soul. And this infirmity of our nature painting lays hold of and leaves nothing of imposture undone, in the same way as magic doth, and many other arts of this kind.

True.

And have not the arts of measuring, numbering and weighing appeared to be most ingenious helps in these things, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the measured, and the weighed?

What else?

But this again is at least the work of the rational part in the soul.

It is so indeed.

But whilst reason often measures and declares some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time with reference to these things.

Yes.

But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?

And thus far at least we said rightly.

That part of the soul, then, which judgeth contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judgeth according to the measure.

It would not.

But surely at least that which trusteth to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul.

Why not?

That then which opposeth itself to it would seem to be some of the naughty parts of us.

Of necessity.

It was then this I inclined should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and imitation in general, being far from the truth, delight in their own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and are its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose.

Entirely so, said he.

Imitation then, being naughty in itself, and joining with that which is naughty, generates naughty things.

It seems so.

Whether, said I, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry?

Likely as to this also, said he.

We shall not therefore, said I, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of that part of the intellect with which the imitation by poetry is conversant, and see whether it is naughty or valuable.

It must be done.

Let us proceed then thus. Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily, and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases, receiving either pain or pleasure. Does it any more than this?

No more.

In all these, now, does the man agree with himself, or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he in the same manner disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for in our reasonings above we sufficiently settled all these things, that our soul is full of a thousand such contrarieties existing in it.

Right, said he.

Right, truly, said I, but it appears to me necessary to go over now what was then omitted.

As what, said he?

We said somewhere formerly, said I, that a good man when he meets with such a fortune as the loss of a son, or of anything else, which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest.

Certainly.

But let us now consider this further, whether will he grieve none at all, or is this indeed impossible, but he will, however, moderate his grief?

The truth, said he, is rather this last.

But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you imagine that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself?

Much more, said he, when he is observed.

But when alone he will venture, I imagine, to utter many things which, if any one heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish any one saw him doing.

It is so, said he.

Is it not then reason and law which command him to restrain his grief, but what drags him to grief is the passion itself?

True.

As then there is in the man an opposite conduct with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors.

What else?

And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him?

How?

Law in a manner says that it is best in misfortunes to have the greatest tranquillity possible, and not to bear them ill; since the good and evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage followeth the bearing these things ill, and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern, and besides their grief proves a hinderance to that in them which we ought to have most at hand.

What is it, said he, you speak of?

To deliberate, said I, on the event, and as on a throw of the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what casts up, in whatever way reason shall declare to be best. And not as children when they fall, to lye still and waste the time in crying, but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and sick, dismissing lamentation.

One would thus, said he, behave in the best manner in every condition.

And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational?

It is plain.

And shall not we say that the part which leadeth to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational and idle, and a friend to cowardice?

We shall say so truly.

Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre? For it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them.

Entirely so.

It is plain then that the imitative poet is not made at least for such a part of the soul as this. Nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he mean to gain the applause of the multitude; but he applies to the passionate and the multi-form part, as it is easily imitated.

It is plain.

May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet and place him as correspondent to the painter; for he resembles him, both in that, as to truth, he does but naughty things, and in this too he resembles him, in being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best. And thus we may with justice not admit him into our city, which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nourishes this part of the soul, and strengthening it, destroys the rational; as, when one in a city makes the wicked powerful, he betrays the city and destroys the best men, in the same manner we shall say that the imitative poet establisheth a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great nor what is little, but deems the same things sometimes great and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth.

Entirely so.

But we have not, however, as yet at least, brought the greatest accusation against it, for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one: that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted.

Why will it not, since it acts in this manner?

But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth

long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know we are delighted, and yielding ourselves, we follow along and sympathizing with them, we seriously commend him as an able poet, whoever most affecteth us in this manner.

I know it.

Why do you not? But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behaviour, if we can be quiet and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended.

I perceive it, said he.

Is this commendation then, said I, a handsome one, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be one's self, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him?

No, truly, said he; it appears unreasonable.

Certainly, said I, if you consider it at least in this manner.

How?

If you consider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as is desirous of these, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified; but that part in us which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, neither by reason nor habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not chuse to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem. For I imagine it falls to the share of few to be able to consider that what we feel with respect to the fortunes of others must necessarily be felt with respect to our own, since it is not easy for one to bear up under his own misfortunes, who strongly cherisheth the bewailing disposition over those of others.

Most true, said he.

And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy,

or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, you now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behaviour a buffoon.

Extremely so, said he.

And the case is the same as to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful; which, truly, we have said, attend us in every action that the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nourishes and waters those things which ought to be parched, and constitutes as our governour those which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable.

I can say no otherwise, said he.

When therefore, Glauco, said I, you meet with the commanders of Homer, who tell how this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach one both the management, and the knowledge of human affairs, and that one should regulate the whole of his life according to this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being the best they are able, and agree with them that Homer is most poetical, and the first of tragedy writers; but they must know that the hymns of the Gods, and the praises of worthy action are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it should admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs or verses, you should have pleasure and pain reigning in the city, instead of law and of that reason which alway appeareth best to the community.

Most true, said he.

Let these things now, said I, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that it was with reason we then dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us tell it further, lest it accuse us of a certain roughness, and rusticity, that there is an old

variance between philosophy and poetry. For such as these,—

“That bawling bitch, which at her mistress barks,”

and

“He’s great in empty eloquence of fools,”

and

“On trifles still they plod, because they’re poor,”

and a thousand such like, are marks of an antient opposition between them. But nevertheless let it be said, that if any one show reason for it, that the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we for our part shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer?

Very much so.

Is it not just, then, that we introduce it, apologizing for itself, either in song or in any other measure?

By all means.

And we may at least grant, somehow, even to its defenders, such as are not poets but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we shall hear with pleasure, for we shall gain somewhat if it shall appear not only pleasant but also profitable.

Why shall we not gain? said he.

And if it happen otherwise, friend, we shall do as those who have been in love, when they deem their love unprofitable: though it is a violence on them, they however desist; so we in like manner, through this inborn love of such poetry that prevails in our best republics, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest, and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse we have held, as a counter-charm and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are not to be much in earnest about

such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth, but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to hold those opinions of poetry which we mentioned.

I entirely agree, said he.

For great, friend Glauco, said I, great is the contest, and not such as is imagined, to become a good or a bad man, so as not to be moved neither through honour, nor riches, nor any magistracy, nor poetic imitation, ever to neglect justice and the other virtues.

I agree with you, from what we have discussed, and so I imagine will any other.

But we have not yet, said I, gone through the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her.

You speak of some prodigious greatness, said he, if there be other greater than those mentioned.

But what is there, said I, can be great in a little time? for this whole period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole.

Nothing at all, indeed, said he.

What then? Do you imagine an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of duration?

I imagine, said he, about the whole. But why do you mention this?

Have you not perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal, and never at all perisheth?

On which, he, looking at me and wondering, said: Not I, indeed. But are you able to show this?

I should otherwise do a wrong, said I. And I imagine you yourself can show it, for it is, in no respect, difficult.

To me, at least, said he, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult.

You shall hear then, said I.

Only speak, reply'd he.

Is there not something, said I, you call good, and something you call evil?

I own it.

Do you then conceive of them in the same manner as I do?

How?

That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good.

I do, said he.

But what? Do you not say there is something is good, and something is bad, to each particular? As blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corns, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and as I am saying, almost every thing hath its peculiar evil and disease?

I imagine so, reply'd he.

And when any thing of this kind befalleth anything, does it not render that which it befalleth naughty, and in the end dissolveth and destroyeth it?

Why doth it not?

Its own peculiar evil then, and naughtiness, destroys each particular, or if this does not destroy it, nothing else at least can ever destroy it. For that which is good at least, can never at all destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

How can they? said he.

If then, we shall be able to find among beings any one which hath indeed some evil, which rendereth it naughty but is not, however, able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all?

So, reply'd he, it appears.

What then? said I. Is there not something which renders the soul evil?

Certainly, reply'd he, all these things which we have now mentioned, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does then any of these dissolve and destroy it? And attend now, that we may not be imposed on in imagining that an unjust and foolish man, when he is caught doing injustice, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the naughtiness of his soul. But consider it thus: A disease, which is the naughtiness of animal body, dissolveth and destroyeth body, and reduceth it to be no longer that body, and all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to a non-existence. Is it not so?

Yes.

Consider now the soul in the same manner. Doth injustice or other vice possessing it, by possessing it, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, 'till bringing it to death, it separate it from the body?

By no means, doth it this, said he.

But it were absurd, said I, that any thing should be destroyed, by the naughtiness of another, but not by its own.

Absurd.

For consider, Glauco, said I, that neither by the naughtiness of victuals, whether it be their mouldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we imagine our body can be destroyed, but if this naughtiness in them create in the body a naughtiness of the body, we will say that through their means the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the naughtiness of food which is one thing, the body which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed.

You say most right, reply'd he.

According to the same reasoning then, said I, unless the naughtiness of the body create a naughtiness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another.

There is reason for it, said he.

Let us then either refute these things as not good reasoning, or so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though one should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, 'till one show that through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and impure. But we will never allow it to be said that when a foreign evil befalleth anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, that either the soul or any thing else is destroyed.

But this at least, said he, no one shall ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust.

But if any one, reply'd I, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning, and, in order that he may not be obliged to own the souls are immortal, will say that when one dies he

becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall somehow justly demand of him to show, if he says true in telling us this, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease, and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature—of those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less, and not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others.

Truly, said he, injustice does not appear altogether dreadful, if it shall be deadly to him who practiseth it (for that were a deliverance from evil); but I rather imagine it will appear to be altogether the reverse, it destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and along with his being alive rendering him wakeful likewise; so far, it seems, does it dwell from being deadly.

You say well, reply'd I, for when one's own wickedness and peculiar evil is insufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly can that evil at least, which aims at the destruction of another, destroy a soul or any thing else, but what it is aimed against.

Hardly indeed, said he, as appears to me at least.

When therefore it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that of necessity it always exists, and if it always exists, it is immortal?

Of necessity, reply'd he.

Let this then, said I, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you'll perceive that the same souls shall always remain, for their number shall never become less, none being destroyed, nor shall it become greater; for if anyhow the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal.

You say true.

But let us not, said I, imagine this (for reason will not allow of it), nor yet that the soul in its truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, diversity and difference, considered in itself.

How do you say? reply'd he.

That can hardly, said I, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which hath not the finest composition,

as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul?

It is not likely, at least.

That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings and others too, may oblige us to own; but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it, as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated, and he (who doth this) shall find it far more beautiful at least, and shall more plainly see through justice and injustice, and every thing we have now gone over. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus, where they cannot easily perceive his antient nature, because the antient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away, and he altogether damaged by the waves; and besides, other things are grown to him, such as shell fish, sea weed, and stones, so that he every way resembleth a beast, rather as what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there.

Where? said he.

In its philosophy, and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it affects, as being ally'd to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become if it pursued wholly what is of this kind, and were by this pursuit, brought out of that ocean in which it now is, and had the stones and shell fish shaken off from it, which at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature in great measure earthy, stony, and savage, through those enjoyments which are said to render happy. And then should one behold its true nature, whether multiform or uniform, and everything concerning it. But we have, now, as I imagine, sufficiently gone over its passions and appearances in human life.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

Have we not now, said I, discussed everything else in our reasonings, but have not produced those rewards and

honours of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do), but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have, or have not Gyges' ring, and along with such a ring, the helmet likewise of Pluto.

You say most true, said he.

Will it not now then, Glauco, said I, be attended with no envy, if besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, what and how great there are afforded to the soul both by men and Gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead?

By all means, said he.

Will you then restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning?

What, chiefly?

I granted you that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from Gods and men, it should however be granted for the sake of the argument, that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; or do you not remember it?

I should indeed be unjust, said he, if I did not.

Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by Gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive these prizes of victory which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows them on those who possess it, since it hath already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it doth not deceive those who truly embrace it.

You demand what is just, said he.

Will you not then, said I, in the first place restore me this? That it is not concealed from the Gods what sort of man each of the two is.

We will grant it, said he.

And if they be not concealed, one of them shall be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning.

We did so.

And shall we not agree that, as to the man who is beloved

of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods shall all be the best possible, unless he have some necessary ill from former miscarriage.

Entirely so.

We are then, to think in this manner of the just man, that if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those imaginary evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive, or dead. For never at all is he neglected by the Gods at least, whoever he is who inclines earnestly to endeavour to become just, and practises virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.

It is reasonable, reply'd he, that such an one should not be neglected by him he resembles.

And are we not to think the reverse of these things, concerning the unjust man?

Entirely.

Such then would seem to be the prizes which the just man receiveth from the Gods.

Such they are indeed in my opinion, said he.

But what, said I, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus? (if we are to suppose the truth). Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as racers who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the most part as to just men? that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men.

Entirely so.

You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage where they incline, and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand, I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may be concealed whilst they are young, yet being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and when they be-

come old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by foreigners and citizens, and they shall afterwards be tortured and burnt, which you said were terrible things, and you spoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit of what I say.

Entirely, said he, for you say what is just.

Such as these now, said I, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives in his life time, both from Gods and men, besides those good things which justice contains in itself.

And they are extremely beautiful, said he, and likewise permanent.

But these now, said I, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may compleatly have what is their due in the reasoning.

You may say on, reply'd he, not as to a hearer who hath heard much, but who hears with greater pleasure.

But, however, I will not, said I, tell you the apologue of Alcimus, but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphilian, who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already all corrupted, he was taken up sound, and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, he revived, and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said: That after his soul went out, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain region of spirits, where there were two gulphs in the earth, near to one another, and other two openings in the heavens, opposite to them, and that the judges sate between these. And when they give judgment, they commanded the just to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them the accounts of the judgment pronounced; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they said it behoved him to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to

hear, and to contemplate every thing in the place. And that he saw here, through two openings, one of the heaven and one of the earth, the souls going away, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival, they seemed to come off a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and saluted one another, such as were of acquaintance, and that these who rose out of the earth, asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under earth (for it was a journey of a thousand years), and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments and spectacles of inexpressible beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco, would take much time; but this, he said, was the sum, whatever pieces of injustice any had committed, and how many soever any one had injured, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment of the injustice they had done. So that if any one had put any to death, either by betraying cities, or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they reaped what was worthy, according to these actions. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what is not worth relating in respect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods, and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he said he was present when one was asked by another where the great Aridaeus was? This Aridaeus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as it was reported. And he said the one who was

asked, reply'd: He neither comes, said he, nor ever will come hither. For we then surely saw this likewise among other dreadful spectacles, when we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to come up after having suffered all our sufferings, we beheld both him on a sudden, and others likewise, the most of whom were tyrants, and some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to get up, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, made an attempt to ascend. And then, said he, fierce men, and all of fire to look at, standing by and understanding the bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridaeus and the rest, binding their hands and their feet, and thrusting down their head, and pulling off their skin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns, declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, he said, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent, every one most gladly ascended. And that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these. And that every one, after they had been seven days in the meadow, arising thence, it behoved them to depart on the eight day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, from whence they perceived from above, through the whole heaven and earth, a light stretched as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more bright, and pure. At which they arrived in one day's journey, and thence they perceived through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended: for that this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships in like manner keeping the whole circumference united. And that from the extremities hang the distaff of necessity, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle, and point, were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things, and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is any one we see here. And you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such

a kind as this. As if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser within it, fitted to it, like casks fitted one within another, and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and other four, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; and that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eight, and the fifth wide that of the seventh, the sixth wide that of the fifth, and the seventh wide that of the third, and the eight wide that of the second. And that that of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eight hath its colour from the shining of the seventh, that of the second and fifth like to one another, more yellow than those others. But the third hath the whitest colour, the fourth reddish; the second in whiteness surpassing the sixth, and that the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole it carries, and whilst the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. And that of these, the eight moves the swiftest, and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them compleated its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of necessity. And that on each of its circles there was seated a Syren on the upper side carried round, and uttering her voice in one monotone, but that the whole of them being eight, composed one harmony. That there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of necessity, the Fates, in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Syrens, Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle; and Atropos, in like

manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand; and that Lachesis touched both of these severally with either hand. After they arrive here, it behoves them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and then taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says: The speech of virgin Lachesis, the daughter of necessity; souls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The daemon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall chuse the daemon: he who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere: virtue is independent which every one shall partake of, more or less, according as he honours, or dishonours her: the cause is in himself, who makes the choice, and God is blameless. And that when he had said these things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, and that he was allowed to take no other than it. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them, the models of lives many more than those we see at present. And that they were of every kind. For there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among these, there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others renowned for their descent and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because, of necessity, on chusing a different life it becometh different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these. There, then, as appears, friend Glauco, is the whole danger of man. And, on these accounts, this, of all things, is most to be studied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other studies, shall become an enquirer and learner in this study, if by any means he be able to learn and find out who shall make him expert and intelligent to

discern a good life and a bad; and to chuse everywhere, and at all times, the best of what is possible, considering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life. And to understand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is operated by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired when blended one with another; so as to be able from all these things to compute, and having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death this is the best choice. But it is necessary that one have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he goes into the other world, in order that there also he may be unmoved with riches, or any such evils, and may not, stumbling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater; but may understand to chuse always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes most happy. For that then the messenger from the other world further told how that the prophet spoke thus: Even, to him who comes last, chusing with judgment, living consistently, there is prepared a desirable life, no way bad. Let neither him who is first be heedless in his choice, nor let him who is last, despair. He said that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot run instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils, and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above men-


tioned. For that he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the daemons, and every thing instead of himself; and that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy, and that in general among these, there were not a few found who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials. But that the most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitantly make their choice; and hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem from what hath been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, he said, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their life; for it was both pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of their former life. For he told that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of womankind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw, likewise, the soul of Thamyris, making choice of the life of a nightingale, and he saw likewise a swan turning to the choice of human life, and other musical animals, in like manner, as is likely. And that he saw one soul, in making its choice, chusing the life of a lyon, and that it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, shunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the armour. That next he saw the soul of Agamemnon, and that this one, in hatred also of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And that he saw the soul of Atalante chusing her lot amidst the rest, and having attentively observed the great honours paid an athletic man, was unable to pass by, but took it. That after it he saw the soul of Epæus the Panopean going into the nature of a skilful workwoman.

And that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape. And that by chance, he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that when it saw it, it said that he would have made the same choice if he had gotten the first lot, and gladly made choice of it. And that in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts. The unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame, and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. That after all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they went all in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to every one the daemon he chose, and sent him along to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen. He first of all conducts it to Clotho, to ratify under her hand and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny he had chosen by lot; and after being with her, he leads him back again to the spinning of Atropos, who maketh the destinies irreversible, and that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity. And after he had passed by it, as all others passed, they marched all into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produceth. That when night came on they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains; a certain measure then of the water all of them must of necessity drink, and such of them as are not preserved by prudence, drink more than the measure, and that he who drinks, always forgets every thing. And that after they were laid asleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, some one way, and some another, approaching to generation, like stars. But that he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he knew nothing, but suddenly looking up in the morning he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable,

Glauco, hath been preserved, and is not lost, and it may preserve us, if we observe it, and shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not contaminate the soul.

But if the company will be persuaded by me, accounting the soul immortal, and able to bear all evil and all good, we shall always hold the road which leads above. And justice with prudence we shall by all means pursue in order that we may be friends both to ourselves and to the Gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and, we shall both here, and in that thousand years' journey we have described, enjoy a happy life.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK



EVERYMAN,
I WILL GO WITH
THEE,
& BE THY GVIDE
IN THY MOST NEED
TO GO BY THY SIDE



